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ABSTRACT
 This research looks at the Maronites of Beirut and examines, from their 
perspective, the role of belonging, imagined geographies, and memories of place in the 
processes of making and informing Maronite identity in Beirut after the civil war of 
1975. The civil war of 1975 allows me to examine the city’s change in demographics in 
relation to the Green Line that divided the city between a Muslim West Beirut, and a 
Christian Eastern Beirut during the civil war. The thesis approaches Beirut’s 
homogenous neighborhoods, a result of the city’s cantonization during the civil war, as 
problematic for the future of the country. The first major contribution of this research is 
an illustration of the city from a Maronite perspective; I offer a pre-1975 Beirut and its 
neighborhoods compared with a post-civil war Beirut. The second chapter contributing 
to the body of research is a chapter that examines one specific neighborhood of the city 
and its major role in the processes of identity making for Maronites in Beirut. I identify 
consociational democracy as an institutionalized divide in the country that prevents the 
different ethno-religious groups from effectively communicating; in turn, this divide, 
illustrated by the city’s homogenous neighborhoods, reinforces the misconceptions and 
exclusive imagined geographies fostered within. In my research, I interviewed 24 
Maronites including those with lived experiences in the city before the civil war, and a 
younger generation who do not remember the civil war; I compare and contrast their 
experience to propose a way forward. 
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PREFACE
 I want to preface my thesis by explaining the reason behind my use of the word 
ethno-religious group. I designate the different confessional groups as ethno-religious 
groups because my Maronite participants viewed them as such. In the opinion of the 
majority of the Maronites I interviewed, Shi’ite Muslims were viewed as ethnically and 
religiously different than Sunni Muslims. Maronites also view the Druze community as 
ethnically and religiously different than the Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims. Finally, Maronites 
view themselves as ethnically and religiously different than the Muslims and the Druze 
of Lebanon. My participants looked at every confessional community in Lebanon as 
ethnically and religiously unique and different than the rest. For that reason, I use the 
term ethno-religious to identify the different communities throughout the thesis.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of ethno-religious segregation,1 in an intended pluralistic 
urban society, is integral to understanding the role of urban social landscape processes 
informing Maronite identity both before, and after, the civil war of 1975. The Maronite 
narrative, specifically, is important because of their political and minority status within 
Lebanon’s consociational democracy. Not only is this Christian community an ethno-
religious minority within the borders of their own country, but they are an ethno-
religious minority in the broader context of the region as well – a Middle-East 
dominated by a majority Sunni Arab population. This thesis will examine Maronite 
identity and how Maronites see themselves in an urban context of increasing social and 
demographic change and ongoing recovery of creating a stable and fair representative 
parliamentary system. In the process, the thesis will explain how Maronites create a 
sense of belonging and safety among themselves.  
Understanding the processes of identity making for Maronites is of particular 
importance due to Lebanon’s consociational democracy: per Lebanon’s constitution and 
the Ta’if Accord,2 the president of the Lebanese Republic must be a Maronite. Not any 
Christian denomination, but a Maronite specifically. In contrast, the prime minister must 
                                                          
1 See Figure 1.1 and 1.2. 
2 The Ta’if Accord, or Ta’if Agreement, could either be named for Ta’if, the Saudi Arabian city where the 
Lebanese civil war resolution was signed, or Ta’if for the word sectarian in Arabic. 
2 
be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of parliament a Shi’a Muslim. Therefore, an 
argument can be made that the government and the constitution – a manifestation of 
consociational democracy whereby political elites are charged with keeping the peace – 
work in a way to institutionalize this divide; never allowing for matters to simply be 
Lebanese, but rather always categorizing Lebanese matters into Maronite, Sunni, and 
Shi’a. This constitutional structure is a legacy of European colonization.3  
Because Maronites are guaranteed the executive branch, military leadership, 
and a quarter of the Lebanese parliament, ipso facto, they are a dominant minority 
(Wirth, 1941): a minority ethno-religious group that holds a disproportionate amount of 
power. While Maronites will always occupy the executive branch, top military brass, 
chair of the central bank, and a quarter of parliament, due to their rights under the 
Lebanese constitution (as amended by the Ta’if Accord), every other ethno-religious 
group in Lebanon is left to contend for three-quarters of parliament. Although Sunnis 
are guaranteed the prime minister seat, and Shi’as the speakership of parliament, the 
Christians are guaranteed 64 of the 128 parliamentary seats. Furthermore, of the 64 
seats guaranteed to the Christian ethno-religious groups, 34 are reserved to 
representatives from the Maronite faith; meaning that while 11 ethno-religious groups 
are guaranteed representation in parliament, the Maronites alone would roughly make-
up a quarter of parliament’s seats; a right guaranteed to them by the constitution.  
                                                          
3 The Lebanese Constitution of today, although amended, was written and established during the French 
Mandate’s first 5 years – in 1926 A.D. During this period, the Lebanese flag was the French flag with a 
cedar in the middle. The provisions of the Ta’if Accords that decree a certain ethno-religious identity to 
the top three government posts had originally been dubbed the National Pact – they were verbally agreed 
upon and adhered to; the Ta’if Accord, however, made them official and set them in writing. 
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The decision to reach these numbers is based on the 1960s-demographic study 
that found Lebanon to be roughly split 50-50; 50% Christian, and 50% Muslim. These 
numbers have changed since then, but there is hesitation in conducting another official 
demographic census because the constitution mandates parliamentary representation 
to mirror the population’s demography. As such, the reluctance to conduct an official 
census stems from the fact that a change in the assignment of parliamentary seats 
would cause a shift in the balance of parliamentary seats: most notably the fact that the 
Maronite population has decreased, which means that although they are still 
guaranteed the presidency, the Maronites would see a decrease in their parliamentary 
seats.  
The decrease in parliamentary seats is cited by my participants as the primary 
reason for their opposition to conduct another official demographic census. All of the 
Maronites I spoke with officially for the purpose of this research believed that the 
Maronite population has been on a decline since a lot of Maronite youth and families 
are applying for immigration to Europe, the Americas, and Australia. The majority of my 
Maronite participants believe that Shi’a Muslims have the highest birthrates in the 
country and that is the reasoning they employ when they claim that Shi’a Muslims 
would be the ethno-religious group to gain the most seats in the Lebanese parliament. 
An official census that reflects a decrease in Christian population would ultimately lead 
to a decrease in their seats and conversely an increase for Sunnis and Shi’as. A decrease 
in seats, for Maronites, means decreased representation and less security. This is an 
important issue for many of my participants who feel that even with a 25% 
4 
parliamentary representation, the state is barely able to hold Hezbollah, a Shi’a political 
party and militant group, in check;4 they fear what would happen if the Christian-
allotted parliamentary seats decreased and Shi’a-allotted parliamentary seats increased.   
Both the Lebanese Information Center (2012) and the U.S. department of State 
(2013) categorize the Lebanese population as such: 
Table 1.1: Contemporary Lebanese Demographics 
Ethno-Religious Group: Percentage: Notes: 
Shi’a Muslims 27 – 29 % Including Isma’ili and Alawite Shi’a 
Muslims. 
Sunni Muslims 27 – 29 %  
Druze 5 – 5.6 % Considered by some an off-shoot of 
Islam. 
Maronite Catholics 21 %  
Greek Orthodox 8 %  
Melkite Catholic 5 %  
Protestants 1 %  
Other Christian Minorities 2 – 6 %  
Other non-Christian 
Minorities: 
>1 % Including: Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Mormons, and Bahais 
 
According to the Lebanese Information Center (2012), a non-profit research 
organization based in Virginia, Muslims make up 59% of Lebanon’s population while 
Christians make up 40%. Similarly, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor (2013) in their 2012 report found that 54% of the Lebanese 
                                                          
4 The United States classifies Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The European Union views Hezbollah as 
having two separate entities: the political party, and the militant wing. The militant wing has been 
deemed a terrorist organization by the E.U. as well. For the majority of Maronites, anti-Hezbollah 
Maronites especially, Hezbollah is one entity: a Shi’a political party and militant wing where one cannot 
operate without the other.  
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population is Muslim, 40.5% is Christian, and 5.6% of the population is Druze. The 
difference between the two reports is that the Lebanese Information Center categorized 
the Druze as Muslims in their 2013 census. The U.S. Department of State, however, 
categorized the Druze separately since they do not consider themselves to be Muslims.  
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, aims at understanding the processes 
behind the Maronite identity in a contemporary context where demographic and 
political shifts place an increasing pressure on them as a dominant minority as they deal 
with the different potential scenarios of governance and security in Lebanon. I focus on 
Beirut because it is one of the few cities where the ethno-religious make-up is 
heterogeneous – therefore it allows me to examine Maronites’ social encounters with 
the other. For that reason, I research the critical role of the city in processes of identity 
making for Maronites. I acknowledge that although there is not one singular identity 
that defines the Maronite ethno-religious community, there needs to be a study aimed 
at examining what defines the community. It is my belief that the Ta’if Accord is 
detrimental to the long-term well-being of Lebanon because the consociational 
democracy is simply imposing an artificial peace without working towards any post-
conflict reconciliation between the communities. Beirut’s segregated neighborhoods are 
evidence that the Ta’if Accord did not resolve the civil-war societal divide. Post-conflict 
resolution requires understanding how people think of themselves in relation to others 
in everyday life, in daily environments. The institutionalized divide imposed by the Ta’if 
Accord and the segregated neighborhoods do not allow for these encounters.  
6 
 
Figure 1.1: This map illustrated here by Sergey Kondrashov (2013) demonstrates the 
ethno-religious distribution of Lebanon’s population based on the Lebanese Information 
Center’s 2013 demographics study. As evidenced by this map, ethno-religious 
segregation is not unique to Beirut’s neighborhoods. It is a well-known phenomenon in 
the country that different towns and cities have different ethno-religious identities. 
These identities are usually attributed based on the most dominant ethno-religious 
group in the area.  
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Understanding the machinations behind various identities is thus essential for a 
peaceful and democratic future for Lebanon. For true reconciliation to happen between 
the communities, and not between the political elites (the purpose of a consociational 
democracy), the various ethno-religious communities need to understand each other 
and listen to each other’s concerns in terms that go beyond a strictly sectarian 
perspective. As the Maronite youth demonstrate throughout the interview process, in 
order for the Lebanese society to move past the sectarian politics imposed by the Ta’if 
Accords, there needs to be a path towards a political system that does not involve 
ethno-religious identity with politics.  
The beginning of my thesis introduces the reader to my conceptual framework 
and the Beirut-related scholarly work done before me. Then, I present my methodology 
and explain the field work I conducted during my time in Beirut. The next chapter of my 
thesis examines the history of Maronites in order to give context to their contemporary 
situation. My research comprises the two chapters after that – chapters 5 and 6. The 
first examines processes that inform Maronite identity in Beirut, a capital city whose 
neighborhoods are ethno-religiously segregated. The second chapter focuses on the 
Achrafieh neighborhood and the reason behind its unanimous mention as the place that 
most informs Maronite identity in Beirut, and explores how the urban space in Beirut, 
and Maronite social practice and memory in this place. 
Understanding Maronite identity after the 1975-1990 civil war is important 
because the relatively recent sectarian memories and counter-memories of the city that 
make Beirut a place stem from the 15-year conflict. I chose Beirut as the locale and 
8 
focus of my research because of its urban landscape – its fragmented neighborhoods 
and contested frontiers were created as separate ethno-religious groups segregated 
themselves within homologous environment bubbles: the Achrafieh district is a prime 
example. The urban ethno-religious segregation of neighborhoods in Beirut is a visible 
reminder that consociational democracy has utterly failed to produce post-conflict 
reconciliation. 
 
Figure 1.2: This map depicts modern-day Beirut from a Maronite perspective. I gathered 
the data for this map from interviews conducted with my participants. The map also 
indicates landmarks and their religious affiliation. The landmarks are not just religious 
landmarks, as some may be schools, or even hospitals. The different markers are meant 
to point to different landmarks and the religious affiliation attributed to them around 
the city. The green line running through the middle is the contemporary highway that 
was once the infamous Green Line from the civil war; to this day, it still splits the city 
between what is perceived as a Muslim West Beirut and a Christian East Beirut.  
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Indeed, I argue that urban ethno-religious segregation in Beirut works to 
reinforce the institutionalized sectarian divide. For true reconciliation to happen, there 
needs to be an understanding of the different perspectives on what transpired during 
the civil war; this cannot happen while Beirut’s urban space remains segregated. There 
needs to be an acceptance of ‘the other’ and a willingness to co-exist with them because 
people rarely encounter “others” in daily life. As the 2018 parliamentary elections and 
Beirut’s neighborhoods demonstrate, there is no trust between different ethno-religious 
groups, especially between the Shi’a and Maronite communities. By enforcing sectarian 
parity in government, the Ta’if Accord only serves to keep the Lebanese society divided. 
A Sunni politician is only concerned with the Sunni constituents who will elect him / her; 
similarly, a Christian politician is only concerned with those who will elect him / her; and 
a Shi’a politician is only concerned with those who will elect him / her. What is not 
happening, however, is a Sunni politician being concerned with the Christians, and the 
Shi’a, and the Druze: they are not concerned with the ‘other.’ The political divide that 
began in the 1975 civil war left cultural traces in modern-day urban space in that people 
of Beirut attribute an ethno-religious identity to various neighborhoods. My thesis, 
therefore, aims to examine how Maronites construct identities in Beirut: understanding 
different identities and the processes that inform them can help break down boundaries 
and create understanding of the other.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Modern-day Lebanon’s political government is a consociational democracy: a 
type of post-conflict democracy that aims to keep the peace between major ethnic or 
religious groups. As defined by Salamey and Tabar (2008), it is a type of government run 
by an elite cartel “designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into 
a stable democracy” (p. 239). Kamal Salibi (1988) similarly describes Lebanon as a 
dysfunctional state noting that it is a country only in name but not in reality, in the sense 
that there is not one national identity but rather many different conflicting identities 
rooted in their respective ethno-religious histories and memories. In multiple interviews 
with Maronites, Lebanon was described to me as a lawless jungle, and not a sovereign 
state – the majority of this sentiment stems from the belief that Hezbollah is stronger 
than the central government and that security forces cannot act without Hezbollah’s 
consent. Marwan, a civil-war veteran says: “What modern-day country are you going to 
build when you have a militia on your land, stronger than your military, openly 
conducting military parades in the streets of Beirut?” This chapter situates the problem 
in historical context by linking the various threads of “Lebanese” and “Maronite” history 
to past political situations and their interpretations. 
In his book House of Many Mansions, Salibi (1988) argues that Christians broadly 
identify themselves in terms of Lebanese particularism and the Muslims with pan-
11 
Arabism (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). On the one hand, 
the Christians’ Lebanese particularism is an attempt at creating a unique Lebanese 
identity that is separate from the majority Sunni Arab majority. On the other hand, the 
Muslims’ pan-Arabism has its loyalties lying outside the borders of Lebanon, aimed 
towards the broader identity of the Middle Eastern region, and Arab countries as a 
whole. In effect, Salibi (1988) is describing two incompatible ideologies. The differences 
among the different ‘mansions’ have come to be reflected geographically – notably in 
Beirut’s urban space. The book’s name also serves as a satire of the small country and 
the big egos of its many prominent political households.5 Furthermore, the effective 
cantonization of Beirut during the 1975 civil war, and the massive population shifts 
between Christian and Muslim areas, further hardened the lines of division and 
exacerbated sectarian tension (Fawaz, 1984; Salibi, 1988; Kaufman, 2004).  
Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim communities have long been in fundamental 
disagreement over the country’s history and identity. For a majority of Lebanon’s 
Christians, a majority of whom are Maronites, Lebanon’s history is one of Phoenician 
heritage, devoid of any relation with an Arab history (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; 
Kaufman, 2004). For Muslims, however, there is an insistence that whatever history 
Lebanon can claim for itself, it must be one that falls within a broader Arab history 
(Salibi, 1988; Salamey and Tabar, 2008). Complicating matters further is the 
disagreement and debate, in Lebanon, over the fundamental historical association 
                                                          
5 The heads of said households are referred to as Zou’amah (Arabic: ءامعز; translation: Leader). They are 
seen as leaders in their respective ethno-religious community. Therefore, when they speak, they are not 
simply seen as speaking for their party, but also speaking for the constituents in their district who share 
the same ethno-religious identity. 
12 
between Arabism and Islam: the idea is that one does not necessarily mean the other; a 
fact that is completely ignored by my Maronite participants who insist that Sunni Islam 
is synonymous to Arab heritage – for them, one cannot exist without the other. The 
underlying problem inherent in Lebanese society, therefore, is that it is rather difficult 
to separate political affiliation from religious, and cultural identity. Among Maronite 
residents of Beirut, it is assumed, that a Shi’a invariably votes for Hezbollah or Amal and 
resides in either al-Dahiya or al-Jnoub (Arabic: بونجلا; translation: The South (of 
Lebanon)). Similarly, if a person was to tell another they were from Achrafieh, the 
instantaneous presumption would be that they are Christian – either Maronite, or Greek 
Orthodox6 – and that they are part of the Lebanese Forces, or Kataeb’s political 
constituency.7 With these examples in mind, many scholars argue that a good starting 
point is to acknowledge that to create a country is one thing, but to create a nationality 
is an entirely different matter (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 
2004). 
As such, it is difficult to create a singular unifying Lebanese identity when the 
ethno-religious peoples that makeup the state view themselves as incompatible with 
one another. Consociational democracy in Lebanon has ethno-religious identities 
                                                          
6 Locally referred to as Roum. 
7 Much of this, perhaps, can be traced back to the 1975 civil war where a person’s religious identity was 
printed on their I.D. card as a formal way of identification. Many checkpoints administrating the entry and 
exit to certain neighborhoods would give or deny access simply based on the person’s religion. Similarly, 
there are many stories of kidnappings happening at these checkpoints also due to the religious identity. 
My father and friends who were in the car with him were kidnapped during the civil war after passing a 
Palestinian checkpoint. They were asked to get out of the car after presenting their identification cards 
and the Palestinian militiaman noticed that they were Maronites. 
13 
ingrained in everyday government politics, a problem further exacerbated by the fact 
that different ethno-religious communities live in segregated neighborhoods separated 
from the ‘other.’ For that reason, it is imperative to examine historical events between 
the ethno-religious communities to better comprehend the modern-day fabric of 
Lebanon. In order to better understand the contemporary Lebanese situation, this 
chapter provides a historical narrative that examines the histories of different 
confessional identities and their encounters with the Maronites. I also explain the 
historical geographies of the Maronites for the purpose of understanding historical 
events and their role in influencing contemporary Maronite identity. 
 
2.1 Phoenicianism as a form of Maronite Nationalism 
France’s colonial legacy in Lebanon created a domestic rift in the country. 
Through its “missionaries, geographers, scholars, and politicians,” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 
15) France emphasized the distinct features of the Christians in Lebanon; primarily the 
Catholic Maronites – features that distinguished them from their other ethno-religious 
contemporaries. This exclusive self-perception that France highlighted within the 
Christian community brought the Maronite elites and the Maronite Church together. 
The bourgeois and the conservative respectively, as Kaufman (2004) calls them, 
coordinated together for the purpose of creating a nationalist sentiment and a 
nationalist identity (Jabbra and Jabbra, 1994; Phares, 1995; Kaufman, 2004; Nisan, 
2004). 
14 
This cooperation kindled a Phoenician identity and a sense of Christian 
nationalism disparate from the Arab and Muslim communities in the region (Phares, 
1995; Kaufman, 2004; Nisan, 2004). For Maronites, this glorious non-Arab past is that of 
the Phoenicians and of being the first to write with an alphabet, the first to trade, and 
the first to set sail; some even claim that there are Phoenician ruins in the Amazon 
forest in Brazil and the tropical rainforests of South America. In the end, the Christians’ 
conviction to advocate for a Greater Lebanon split from the Arab world, and their 
divergence from their Arab Muslim counterparts, further served the Sunni and Shi’a 
resentment of their Christian country kin who had turned towards Europe and the 
West.8 Much like the ethno-religious minorities of Turkey, the Christians of Lebanon – 
and the privileged Catholic Maronites of the time – became a local symbol for European 
economic and political dominance (Mills, 2010).  
Lebanese poet, and philosopher Said Akl is famously quoted as having said: “I 
would cut off my right hand, and not associate myself with an Arab.” Many prominent 
Maronites, like Said Akl, emphasize this non-Arab heritage, including Maronite political 
and ideological leaders like Charles Korm, Michel Chiha, Charles Malik, Camille Chamoun 
and Bashir Gemayel – individuals whose stories and nationalist ideals are very much 
alive in the modern-day Maronite and Christian communities. Some of these leaders 
even professed anti-Arab and anti-Muslim views. Said Akl even went so far as to develop 
                                                          
8 In advocating for an independent Lebanese state that Maronites can call home, they insisted on 
including coastal cities; this ensured that their majority would always be tenuous since many of the 
coastal cities, including Beirut, had sizable Sunni populations (Volk 2009). Furthermore, Volk (2009) 
explains that the annexed areas outside Mount Lebanon and Beirut had closer ties to Syria and Palestine 
than they did the Maronites and Druze. 
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a Latin alphabet to be used as a replacement for the Arabic script;9 an alphabet that 
would further engrave a Phoenician identity separate and opposed to an Arab identity 
(Jabbra and Jabbra, 1994). Said Akl, amongst others, argue that the Lebanese dialect as 
spoken by Maronites is distinct enough that it should be considered its own language 
and not a dialect of Arabic. 
Phoenicianism, therefore, was born out of an attempt by a few political, and 
intellectual elites, to serve as a legitimate past, nostalgic to a great history and past 
glories; all of these ideas which could unify the Maronites into one nation, and further 
move away from an Arab-identity (Phares, 1995; Kaufman, 2014). In his book on the 
Phoenician nationalism championed by Maronites, Kaufman (2014) invokes Ernest 
Renan (1882),10 and argues that although language, religion, customs, and geography 
are important in formulating a nation’s identity, the most important by far is that of a 
national consciousness. This national consciousness described by Renan, Kaufman 
(2014) argues, is in effect the Phoenician consciousness for Maronites.  
The Phoenician consciousness allows for the sharing of a past – a Phoenician 
past – through nostalgia. It also allows for the sharing of a ‘glorious past’ as Renan 
(1882) calls it. In general, in Kaufman’s (2014) terms and as it relates to Maronites, 
Phoenicianism facilitated the formation and maintenance of a nationalist identity 
                                                          
9 Similar to Turkey’s alphabet reform as part of Ataturk’s modernization / national identity process. 
10 Renan is a French philosopher and historian. His 1882 book titled “What is a nation?” generally argues 
that nationalism and national identity are equally the product of what people forget, or ‘forgetting’ as 
well as what people remember, or their ‘memories’ and ‘nostalgia.’ Renan finally concludes that 
nationalism and national identity is constantly being produced because the process of forgetting and 
remembering is never-ending. 
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(Renan, 1882). Phoenicianism granted the Maronites a sense of belonging by allowing 
them to imagine themselves as part of a historical collective rooted in a common and 
imposing past, and heading towards a shared and auspicious future. Maronites may 
disagree over politics, or social customs and norms, but most will come together in 
agreement when it comes to their Phoenician non-Arab heritage. 
By World War I, Phoenicianism, as an idea, had been two decades old and it 
developed as a challenge to pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism. Under the French 
Mandate, however, Phoenicianism began to be associated solely with the Maronites in 
Syria and Lebanon. By September of 1920, the entire movement behind Dawlat 
Loubnan al-Kabir (Arabic:  نانبل ةلود  يبكلا ; translation: Greater Lebanon), essentially 
carving modern-day Lebanon out of modern-day Syria, had been labeled Phoenician 
(Kaufman, 2014). So, although a Lebanese state had been declared at the time, there 
still was not one Lebanese nation to have emerged because it was only the Christians 
who adhered to this vision and not the entire Lebanese society (Kaufman, 2014). 
Greater Lebanon had a contiguous territorial boundary, but inside, there was no 
collectivist and unifying identity, or history, for all of its inhabitants – a problem that 
continues today. Although Phoenicianism served as the national conscience for 
Christians and Maronites in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, it only served to provoke the 
Muslim population – a population that was coerced into this newly founded political 
entity (Kaufman, 2014). The Muslim population, at the time, perceived the idea of a 
sovereign Greater Lebanon to be a pro-Western, anti-Arab project because it was 
backed by a Christian France and Europe. 
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The Muslim population, at the time largely led by the upper-class Sunnis of 
Beirut, later reluctantly accepted the reality but did not protest (Kaufman, 2014). While 
Maronites and other Christians saw Phoenicianism as the history of the people and the 
land, most non-Christians saw Phoenicianism as the history of the land only (Kaufman, 
2014). Per Kaufman (2014), two different Phoenicianism ideologies had emerged by the 
1950s, and they existed concurrently side-by-side. On one side, intellectuals and non-
Christians from Beirut viewed Phoenicians as the “forefathers of [a] cosmopolitan, 
liberal, and open-minded Lebanon” (Kaufman, 2014, p. 245). On the other side, 
Phoenicianism was a far more nuanced ideology advocated by Christian-Lebanese 
nationalists. This side continued to view Lebanon as a Christian, non-Arab, and non-
Muslim nation in the larger Arab and Muslim Middle-Eastern region; a neo-Phoenicia as 
Kaufman calls it (Kaufman, 2014). 
The ancient Phoenician people have always existed in the history books, and 
they were there when Maronite and Christian Lebanese needed a basic bedrock for 
their national movement. For the Maronites, and Christians of the Levant, Phoenicians 
were much like the Gauls for France, the Saxons for England, the Pharaohs for Egypt, the 
Babylonians for Iraqis, and Assyria for the Assyrians (Kaufman, 2014). So, although the 
French played a role in the spread and dissemination of Phoenicianism in Lebanon, the 
tendency to fall back on this ideology was always there to be picked up by a Lebanese 
national movement – only in this case, and as it relates to Maronites, the Lebanese 
nationalist movement was picked up by Christian nationalists who wanted to distance 
themselves from the surrounding Muslim Arab world. 
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2.2 Early Maronite History  
Maronites are an ethno-religious community that has existed since the Maronite 
church was founded in the year 680 A.D. as the Syrian Monothelite Communion (Salibi, 
1988). One Muslim Scholar however, the historian Al-Masudi, disputes that the church 
was founded in 680 A.D; rather, Al-Masudi writes that the Maronite church was founded 
a century earlier in the Levant’s Orontes Valley in the year 582 A.D (Salibi, 1988). The 
significance of this claim is two-fold. First, it disputes the common-held notion that the 
Monothelite Doctrine – the belief that Jesus Christ was of two natures (both divine and 
human) but one will and energy – was devised by the emperor Heraclius. If the 
Maronite Church was indeed founded on the Monothelite Doctrine, and was formally 
established in 582 A.D., it would mean that the Maronites’ Monothelite Doctrine pre-
dated emperor Heraclius’ theological scholarship by almost 30 years – and since this 
church, the Maronite Church, was founded on that principle 28 years before him, it 
would then become illogical to assume that Emperor Heraclius was the one who 
established the Monothelite Doctrine. Al-Masudi’s account, therefore, indicates that the 
Maronite church pre-dated emperor Heraclius, and so did the Monothelite Doctrine.11  
Patriarch Douaihy, the 57th Patriarch to lead the Maronite Church between 1670 
and 1704 A.D. , and one of its leading historians, writes that although the Maronite 
Church was officially recognized in 680 A.D., it had existed long before then (Salibi, 
                                                          
11 The significance of the Monothelite Doctrine comes into play later when a split occurs between the 
Christian communities in the Middle-East based on the differing jurisprudence. Monothelite Christians 
were decreed as heretics and subsequently persecuted for believing Jesus was of a divine mind and soul, 
and not human. 
19 
1988).12 Salibi argues on behalf of al-Masudi stating that in the writings of the Sixth 
Ecumenical Council – the council that declared Monothelitism a heresy – there is 
evidence that the originator of this doctrine was Theodore of Pharan, from Arabia 
(Salibi, 1988). Arabica Heretica, as the land came to be called, in reference to the 
heterodox interpretations of Christianity that came out of the area.  
The second importance of al-Masudi and his contemporary Islamic theology 
scholar Abd al-Jabbar’s writings, is the indication that the Maronite Church is older than 
Islam (Salibi, 1988). If both al-Masudi and al-Jabbar are correct in placing the formal 
establishment of the Maronite Church and the Maronites in Syria by the year 582 rather 
than 680, it would mean that the Maronite Church was formally established almost 30 
years before Prophet Muhammad began to preach Islam in Mecca circa 610 A.D. 
Furthermore, al-Masudi and al-Jabbar’s writings place the Maronites, and not just the 
Maronite Church, in the Levant 30 years prior to the rise of Prophet Muhammad and his 
preaching in the Arab Peninsula; meaning that Maronites and their Lebanese 
Particularism indeed existed without relation to Arab history. Salibi (1988), however, 
writes that Arab tribal movement between the Levant and Arabia was not uncommon, 
noting DNA research that some modern-day Lebanese can trace their ancestry back to 
modern-day Yemen and Saudi-Arabia. Since the 2nd century A.D., the tribal politics of 
the Arabian Peninsula had frequently triggered off back and forth migrations between 
the Levant and the Arab Peninsula (Salibi, 1988). 
                                                          
12 This is also an argument that many Maronites make: The church may have been recognized in the late 
sixth century or early seventh century, but the followers of Mar Maroun predated the church. 
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With the reign of Byzantine Emperor Justinian the First (527 – 565 A.D.), the 
chiefs of the Christian Arab tribes (of which Maronites were included) had entered the 
service of the Byzantine Empire. They were officially recognized as state officials, and 
Arab kings over the Levantine territories they controlled around Damascus, including 
the Valley of Orontes (Salibi, 1988). The Valley of Orontes, occupied by the Maronites, is 
described by Salibi (1988) as: The hill country on either side of Mount Lebanon all the 
way north to Aleppo. The significance of the Valley of Orontes is the fact that it was 
centered around the Levant’s chief river – the Orontes River. In Arabic, and in modern-
day Lebanon, the Orontes River is known as Nahr el-Assi (Arabic: لا رهن  صاع ). Nahr being 
the Arabic word for river, and Assi meaning rebel in Arabic. The significance of the 
name, is that this river – unlike most rivers around the world – flows from the south to 
the north. More importantly, however, is that Maronites came to control a major water 
source of the Levant – the area where they settled. In effect, a minority homogeneous 
group came to control a precious water source in an ethno-religiously heterogeneous 
region that severely lacks a potable water supply. 
 
2.3 Maronites and the Crusades, a history from the 11th – 14th century 
Many scholars regard the 11th century and the Crusades’ excursion as the 
earliest period to which one can trace the lines of disagreement between the different 
ethno-religious communities (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). 
The pertinence of this fact is that the different ethno-religious groups of today have 10 
centuries of history between themselves; they had disagreements then, and they have 
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disagreements now. Although Maronites and Druze had existed before the 11th century, 
the 11th century marks the political emergence of Maronites and Druze – two major 
players in Mount Lebanon’s history. The emergence of the two ethno-religious 
communities leads to the political and economic emergence of Mount Lebanon itself – 
the precursor to the contemporary Lebanon which they share with the Sunni and Shi’a 
Muslim communities (Salibi, 1988).13 
Although Maronites were predominantly located in the Orontes Valley, they 
soon became concentrated primarily in the Northern Lebanon region after leaving the 
Orontes Valley – which was their original homeland. The final exodus from the Orontes 
Valley to Northern Lebanon happened between the 10th and 11th century, marking 
perhaps the first major wave of Maronite migration and a change in modern-day 
Lebanon’s demography (Salibi, 1988). The reason for this early Maronite migration, is 
due in part to the Orontes Valley becoming a base for the Byzantine Empire and their 
Christian Syrian followers – two groups with whom the Maronites had a poor 
relationship. This poor relationship between the Maronites and the Byzantine and 
Syrian Christians, as well as the Muslims, stems from the accusations levied against the 
Maronites for being Monothelites – the belief that Jesus Christ’s body and soul were of 
                                                          
13 As demonstrated, and although Maronites and Druze lived in and around Modern-day Lebanese 
territory, it should be noted that their disagreement stemmed as a result of the creeping European power 
in the form of the Crusades; and later a disagreement between Maronites and Muslims as a result of the 
European powers’ meddling in the form of French colonialism. 
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one will; a notion decried as heresy by Byzantine Christians, Syrian Christians, and 
Muslims alike.14  
 At the end of the 11th century, when the Crusaders arrived in modern-day 
Lebanon, most Maronites in Northern Mount Lebanon rallied around them; in fact, the 
pope and the European crusades were surprised to learn of the Maronites’ existence in 
the Levant (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). In the Maronites, 
however, the crusades found allies whom they perceived to be their civilized Christian 
brothers in the Middle East (Fawaz, 1984; Kaufman, 2004). The 11th century, therefore, 
marks the early days when the Maronites began to build ties with the Catholic Church 
and the Christians of the West. A century later, in 1180 A.D., the Maronite Church 
officially entered communion with the Catholic Church of Rome – a religious 
communion that remains to the present day (Fawaz, 1984; Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; 
Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004).15 It also marks the early divide between the Christians, 
among them the Maronites, and ‘the others;’ the divide between the civilized, and the 
non-civilized.16  
With the Maronites’ official communion with Rome and their alliance with 
Europe came troubles at home. 1180 A.D., therefore, is regarded as the point-in-time 
when the distrust between the Maronite community and the Druze, and Muslim 
                                                          
14 There is documented evidence, however, per Salibi (1988) and Phares (1995), in which Maronite 
religious scholars dispute this notion of Monothelitism dating back to the early 15th century. 
15 At the time of this writing, the Maronite Church has two cardinals representing it in the Vatican: Mar 
Bcharah Boutros al-Rai (the current Patriarch of the Maronite Church) and Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir 
(the former Patriarch of the Maronite Church). 
16 Maronites view themselves as more civilized than Arabs whom they perceive to be more primitive. Due 
to their ability to articulate the French language and their close ties to the West, Maronites see 
themselves as more cultured and more open towards the world. 
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communities began to materialize (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 
2004). In the late 12th century, while the Maronites turned to France, and allied 
themselves with the Christians of Europe, their Druze and Muslim neighbors in the 
south of Mount Lebanon turned to Syrian Muslims and the Sunni Caliphate in 
Baghdad.17 As such, these events mark the significant role religious affiliation plays in 
cultural and political identity for Lebanon. Since the 12th century, political and economic 
ties were built almost exclusively based on ethno-religious identity. 
Between the Maronite and Druze villages in modern-day Keserwan, however, 
existed a then-obscure community of Twelver-Shi’as that lived alongside Maronite 
Christians (Salibi, 1988; Kaufman, 2004).18 This Shi’a group also predominantly made-up 
the population of the Baalbek plains, the Bekaa alley, and the mountains south of 
Mount Lebanon. Keserwan, therefore, can be considered as the geographic location 
where this community’s modern-day conflict began to materialize with the Sunni 
Muslim population. During the period between 1291 A.D. and 1305 A.D., Mamluk Sunni 
armies launched three different military expeditions into Twelver-Shi’a villages in order 
to capture the strategic mountainous region of Keserwan (Salibi, 1988; Kaufman, 2004).  
The third expedition, in 1305 A.D., was successful and allowed the Mamluks to 
relocate Sunni Muslims into Keserwan – settling in a region that overlooks Modern-day 
Beirut and the surrounding coastal areas of modern-day Lebanon; this action of 
                                                          
17 At the time, the third Islamic Caliphate, the Abbasid Caliphate was prominent. 
18 This community would later gain power. Hezbollah and Amal – the two major Shi’a political parties in 
modern-day Lebanon are largely made up of a Twelver Shi’a constituency. Together, Hezbollah and Amal 
form one half of the March 8th coalition – controlling half of the Lebanese Parliament and holding the 
speakership at the time of this writing. 
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relocating Sunni Muslims would result in the displacement of Shi’a Muslims and 
Maronites who would be forced to migrate further south into modern-day southern 
Lebanon (Salibi, 1988; Kaufman, 2004).19 It should be noted that unlike the enmity 
between Beirut’s Shi’a and Maronites, the Maronite community and Shi’a community of 
southern Lebanon are much closer to each other; it is possible that this plight may have 
played a major role in bringing the two communities together.   
 
2.4 19th Century Maronite History 
European and Ottoman meddling maintained political and economic clout in the 
region until tensions erupted in the late 1800s. The 19th century, therefore, is most 
infamous locally for the 1860 Mount Lebanon civil war between the Christians – mostly 
Maronites – and the Druze. Majzarit al-Jabal (Arabic: لبجلا ةرزجم; translation: The 
Mountain Massacre), as it is called, forced an ethno-religious segregation on a Lebanese 
society that had previously thrived on everyday contact and inter-mingling (Fawaz, 
1984; Makdisi, 2000). The violent conflict began in April of 1860 and ended in June of 
the same year with the Druze cleansing their towns of Christian inhabitants who 
migrated to Beirut and the coast (Fawaz, 1984; Makdisi, 2000).20 The result was pillaged 
villages with both Christian churches and Druze religious sanctuaries desecrated 
(Makdisi, 2000). The Druze’s perspective is that the Maronites provoked the conflict 
                                                          
19 Perhaps this internal displacement plays a role in the close ties between Maronites and Shi’as in 
Southern Lebanon, ties that do not exist in other places – like the Maronites and Shi’as of Beirut. 
Maronites of Southern Lebanon are adamant supporters of Hezbollah – unlike many Christians and 
Maronites from other parts of Lebanon. 
20 This event created the perception in the Maronite community that “You cannot trust a Druze.” 
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when on May 27th, a Maronite militia sent to collect silk harvest kept going until it 
reached the Druze’ Metn district. When the Maronites saw a garrison of Ottomans, they 
were alarmed and feared an incoming attack by the Ottomans and the Druze whom 
they perceived to be their allies (Fawaz, 1994). Maronites pre-emptively raided mixed 
villages on May 29th, and again on the 30th. The civil war broke out completely on May 
30th of 1860 (Fawaz, 1994).  This violent civil conflict, however brief, has had ever-lasting 
effects on the fabric of Lebanese society; moreover, the violent skirmish of 1860 had 
begun much earlier in Lebanon. 
Usama Makdisi (2000), and others (Fawaz, 1984; Volk, 2010), trace the roots of 
the 1860 civil war in Mount Lebanon to when Ottoman rulers responded to European 
political pressures with a series of political reforms in the Empire. The Ottoman reforms, 
also known as Tanzimat, intended to make everyone equal under the law – regardless of 
religious affiliation (Makdisi, 2000). European powers, and France in particular, arranged 
for the Tanzimat reforms to mandate “interference on behalf of the ‘subjugated’ 
Christian population” (Makdisi, 2000, p. 196). This discourse of reform promoted a 
space whereby religion functioned as a forum for colonial encounter (Fawaz, 1984; 
Makdisi, 2000; Volk, 2010). This meeting between Lebanon’s Christians’ self-described 
‘West,’ and their perennial adversary the ‘Islamic’ Ottoman empire further emphasized 
religion as a form of identity; this resulted in ethno-religious identity becoming the “only 
viable marker of political reform and the only authentic basis for political claims” 
(Makdisi, 2000, p. 2). So was born Lebanon’s ‘modern’ sectarian story, in the form of a 
consociational democracy, and with it the segregation of Lebanon that would inevitably 
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change the social demography of the country; suddenly every ethno-religious group was 
self-segregating: congregating around the ‘self’ away from ‘the other.’ 
As Makdisi (2000) argues in his book on Lebanon’s culture of sectarianism, the 
19th century was the starting point where every ethno-religious community in Lebanon 
began to define and demarcate its own respective boundaries. At this point, ethno-
religious identity – that may have started as early as the 11th century with the Crusades 
highlighting the Maronites’ Christian faith – had become the master status. It had also 
become the source and reason for drawing boundaries where they are. Contrary to 
many contemporary arguments, Makdisi (2000) points out that the Lebanese problem 
isn’t its tribal nature, nor is the sectarianism a “disease that prevents modernization” (p. 
3); the violence of 1860, for Makdisi (2000), was not an explosion of ancient loyalties. 
The violence of 1860, however, indicated the failure of a unified nation and caused 
Lebanese demography – specifically Maronite demography – to change, it inevitably laid 
the foundations for a possible discourse of nationalist secularism. 
It was not just the social fabric of Mount Lebanon that was affected by the 
events of 1860, however. As Leila Fawaz (1984) writes, the relationship between Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon changed and the effects on political life are still felt to this day. 
Although historically Jabal Loubnan (Arabic: نانبل لبج; translation: Mount Lebanon) had 
held sway over the coastal cities, Fawaz (1984) argues that the 19th century was the 
time when that role was reversed; Beirut began to hold economic and political clout 
over Jabal Loubnan (Fawaz, 1984; Volk 2010). Although Beirut undoubtedly prospered 
by its new status as the dominant partner, the unresolved tensions of Jabal Loubnan 
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were transferred to the coast, a precarious situation that would undoubtedly pave the 
way for the city’s sectarian rivalries and tensions in the mid and late 20th century. For 
Mount Lebanon, however, the 1860’s series events resulted in the break-up of the 
feudal economy that was prevalent in Jabal Loubnan (Fawaz, 1984).21  
Furthermore, the numerical and economic balance that existed between the 
Maronite and Druze communities now swung in favor of the Maronites who increasingly 
held more influence in Beirut than the Druze (Fawaz, 1984). Beirut, at the time, became 
the political sphere from which Maronites petitioned the Ottomans and lobbied the 
French (Fawaz, 1984; Volk 2010). Beginning in the 19th century, Beirut became 
increasingly influential and progressively pulled the political strings in Jabal Loubnan. 
After the 1860 war, the political meddling of Beirut waned but its influence remained 
unchanged because of its economic influence; an economic influence largely entrenched 
amongst the Christian population22 which by now had largely made-up the Beiruti 
population (Fawaz, 1984).  
During this time, silk was an internationally traded cash crop that was vital to 
Mount Lebanon’s economy (Khater, 1996). Silk had also brought the peasants of Mount 
Lebanon in direct contact with Europeans and European markets (Khater, 1996). French 
demand for silk brought Lebanese Christian peasants from Mount Lebanon “into the 
folds of the French Capitalist system” (Khater, 1996, p. 327); the silk crops would grow 
in Mount Lebanon but be exported out from the ports in Beirut which had a direct 
                                                          
21 I repeatedly use Jabal Loubnan in this section because Mount Lebanon of the time was much smaller 
and did not have the same borders of Lebanon today. As such, I purposefully use Jabal Loubnan because I 
am talking about the parameters that defined it then, and not the Mount Lebanon district how it is today.  
22 Mostly Orthodox Christian – not Maronite, nor Catholic – before the migration from Jabal Loubnan. 
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connection to Marseilles, France (Khater, 1996). This brought the French ever-closer to 
the Christian population in Lebanon. By the late 1800s, however, Japanese and Chinese 
silk was cheaper, and of better quality than what was grown in Lebanon and Lebanese 
silk factories began to close and reduce in numbers (Khater, 1996). Silk production 
slowly waned in mount Lebanon, but it had made Beirut an essential trading hub 
between Europe and the near-East.  
 By 1888, Beirut – a city now largely made-up of Christian migrants who fled the 
mountainous region because of economic hardships and the 1860 conflict – became the 
heart of economic and cultural life of Jabal Loubnan (Fawaz, 1984). Beirut had become 
the destination of refugees fleeing the troubled areas in the Levant (Fawaz, 1984), and 
had been designated by the Ottomans as the provincial capital which turned it into one 
of the region’s most important trading centers (Volk, 2009). Originally a city dominated 
by Sunni merchants and wealthy Orthodox Christians, many Maronites fled to Beirut 
from Mount Lebanon. Christian populations came from Mount Lebanon, and from 
Damascus, and Syria as well, where Christians had feared reprisals and impending 
retaliation for the violent acts committed by both sides between April and June of 1860 
(Fawaz, 1984).23 
The European consuls in Beirut at the time, and more importantly the French, 
suspected the Ottoman Empire of sympathizing with the Druze and Muslims. European 
envoys suspected the Ottomans were encouraging the Druze and Muslims to attack the 
Christians. Conversely, the Ottomans accused the Europeans, and the French, of inciting 
                                                          
23 The series of clashes in the 1860s is sometimes referred to as the Mountain’s Civil War (Arabic:  برح
لبجلا). It was a repeating cycle of violent acts and retaliations perpetrated by both Christians and Druze. 
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Christian nationalist sentiment in Mount Lebanon. After the involvement of Sunnis and 
their alliance with the Druze, France invoked its Capitulations Agreement signed 300 
years earlier24 with the Ottoman Empire, and intervened on behalf of its Catholic 
protégés (Fawaz 1984; Kaufman, 2004).  Thus, in August of 1860, France exerted its 
power in support of the Christians (Fawaz, 1984), first through its troops stationed in 
Beirut, and second through its warships in Beirut’s harbor (Fawaz, 1984). Subsequently, 
France was accused by the Ottomans that they were enticing unrest in order to validate 
their presence (Fawaz, 1984).  
A month later, in September 1860, following the violent events of Mount 
Lebanon, international powers that included France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire, 
met to discuss the events that transpired (Hakim, 2013). The result of these 
international conferences was Le Règlement Organique (Organic Regulation) that 
established Mount Lebanon as a semi-autonomous mutasarrifate and carved it out from 
Greater Syria (Hakim, 2013). Under this new agreement, the Ottoman Sultan, with the 
approval of European powers, appointed a non-Lebanese Christian mutassarif to govern 
the territory (Hakim, 2013).  
Now that the Maronites had a recognized homeland, they further removed 
themselves from the Arab-Muslim surroundings by learning the French language from 
the Jesuit priests sent by France to setup schools in Lebanon, and the Jesuit order in 
Syria (Fawaz, 1984; Kaufman, 2004). Maronites first began to adopt the language and 
                                                          
24 Earlier in 1535 A.D., in the “Capitulations Agreement” signed with the Sublime Porte (a French term for 
the Ottoman Empire’s central government), France declared itself the ‘guardian of Catholics’ in the 
Ottoman Empire (Fawaz, 1984; Kaufman, 2004, p. 26).  
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culture of the French circa 1831 in their first bid to remove themselves from the Muslim, 
Arab, surroundings (Fawaz 1984; Kaufman, 2004); to this day, fluency in French and 
speaking it in public is one of the distinct Maronite, and Christian, ‘features’ and status-
symbols in public Beiruti space. The French language plays a very significant role in 
influencing Maronite and Christian identity in Beirut today. 
The Maronites became the French of the Levant; they “died for the same ideas 
[the French] were defending” (Fawaz, 1984, p. 37). Lebanon soon after became known 
as the Switzerland of the East, and its capital city Beirut was dubbed the Paris of the 
East. The relationship between the Maronites and the French was twofold. On one 
hand, the French genuinely cared for the Maronites whom they believed were as close 
as one could get in the Orient to a civilized and noble culture (Fawaz, 1984; Kaufman, 
2004). On the other hand, France needed the “perfect collaborator for their colonial 
aspirations in the region” (Fawaz, 1984, p. 27; Kaufman, 2004). The elite Maronite class, 
in conjunction with the Maronite Church, worked with the French to establish Greater 
Lebanon – a French Mandate within the Ottoman Empire. Once Greater Lebanon was 
formed, the Maronites worked with the French to mold it into a Western-oriented 
stronghold in the Middle-East. in this manner, the French would have easier control 
over the mandated territories of the Orient, and the Maronites, as collaborators, would 
have their long-sought political power in Lebanon. During this period, the French 
worked with Maronite elites and the Maronite church to foster Phoenicianism as 
Lebanon’s national identity. 
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2.5 20th Century Maronite History 
 The foreign meddling in Lebanon continued into the 20th century where 
Maronites felt emboldened by the military presence of their French allies.25 The first five 
years of the French Mandate that began in 1921 were very strong pro-Christian years 
where the French showed favoritism towards the Maronite Christians. General Gouraud, 
appointed as High Commissioner over Greater Lebanon at the time, was a devout 
Catholic himself whose “faith tremendously influenced his policies” (Fawaz, 1984, p. 28). 
Therefore, it was not all too strange for him to regard the Lebanese Christians, and the 
Catholic Maronites in particular, as brothers of the same faith – much like the Crusades 
and the Vatican before him. As a French-speaking Catholic group, the Maronites 
presented a stark contrast to the French when compared to their Arab Muslim 
neighbors; and so, the Maronites became France’s “well-loved collaborative group that 
could only facilitate the process of colonization” since they were already civilized 
(Kaufman, 2004, p. 29). France’s colonialism, according to Kaufman (2004), involves 
spreading civilization. The Maronites could help facilitate that with their adopting of 
French customs, culture, and language. 
 In 1958, the brooding ethno-religious tensions burst. A crisis emerged between 
Maronites and Sunni Muslims in Beirut’s urban environment (Salamey and Tabar, 2008). 
The tensions had started 2-years earlier in 1956 when the pro-Western Christians 
refused to break ties with the West following the Suez Canal Crisis. Matters further 
                                                          
25 The presence of the French military and their support for the Maronite community was viewed by the 
Muslims then, and is viewed today, as a hurdle towards harmonious co-existence. Muslims resent the 
Christians’ reliance on outside powers; they view it as Christians preferring to rely on Western powers 
rather than negotiating with their fellow countrymen on domestic issues and concerns.  
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escalated when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun showed a positive attitude 
towards the Baghdad Pact of 1955 – a Middle-Eastern alliance modeled after NATO. 
Egypt’s president Abdel Nasser viewed the Baghdad Pact as a pro-Western alliance that 
posed a threat to his pan-Arab ideals. 
At a time when the pro-Western Christian president Camille Chamoun supported 
a pro-Western military alliance, the Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami supported the 
pan-Arab Egyptian-Syrian alliance that would later form the United Arab Republic. This 
unease lasted for period of 2 years but nonetheless served as the precursor to the civil 
war of 1975, which was caused by much of the same: conflicting identities, contested 
memories of past events, and incompatible visions for the future of the country. A 
secular, capitalist, pro-west, and western-oriented country advocated for by the 
Maronites versus an anti-west, socialist, Arab-League oriented country advocated for by 
the Sunnis and the Druze (Salibi, 1988; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004).   
The most recent civil war, however, from 1975 to 1990 gave a quasi-closure to 
the 1958 crisis. This civil war was another struggle for the Maronites who fought “in 
order to preserve their religious and ethnic identity and satisfy their security needs 
amidst an overwhelming Muslim population in Lebanon and across the frontiers” 
(Sirriyeh, 1994, p. 60). Maronites felt that their identity was in danger; a majority 
Muslim population was seen by them as overwhelming and a threat to their way of life. 
In their eyes, a Sunni-dominated Lebanon would no longer remain secular. The most 
recent civil war, therefore, can help explain the mistrust between these regionally-
dominant ethno-religious groups. As it relates to this research, Beirut’s confessional 
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segregation of today has been traced to the cantons established by the different militias 
during the civil war of 1975 (Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh 1998; Kaufman, 2004; Fregonese, 
2009; Larkin, 2010); an act taken by the Christian militias for security purposes first, and 
for the establishment of a federalist system that proved to be unacceptable by the other 
Lebanese parties second (Sirriyeh, 1998). 
Much like previous crisis, the civil war of 1975 was framed as a conflict between 
a pro-Western side and a pro-Arab side. One side, consisting mostly of Christian political 
parties, emphasized that Lebanon was non-Arab and should not be subject to the 
broader pan-Arab movement sweeping the Middle-East at the time (Salibi, 1988; 
Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). The other side, conversely consisting of 
Palestinian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim political parties, believed that Lebanon should be 
part of the pan-Arab movement and submit to the League of Arab Nations (Salibi, 1988; 
Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). The civil war did not start as an ethnic 
conflict, but the political disagreements became framed in opposing ethno-religious 
group terms (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). Further 
exacerbating this problem is the fact that neither side of the political, or ethno-religious 
spectrum can agree on the events that transpired. As a result, the civil war is not taught 
in schools. The events of the 1975 civil war, therefore, are a learned-memory because 
the Lebanese youth learn it from their parents who recall the civil war events from a 
subjective lens of lived experience and ethno-religious communal bias. 
On April 13th, 1975, during a baptism at the Church of Notre Dame in East 
Beirut, Palestinian Liberation Organization members (a secular organization officially, 
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but with a mostly Sunni Arab membership) conducted a drive-by, shooting and killing 4 
Christians: the father of the child who was just baptized, and three bodyguards who 
belonged to the protection team of Maronite leader Pierre Gemayel, then-patriarch of 
the prominent Gemayel family, who was attending the baptism (O’Balance, 1998). That 
night, Christian militiamen close to the Kataeb Party (Pierre Gemayel’s political party) 
retaliated with an attack on the nearby Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut. This series of 
events, on April 13th, 1975, very likely denoted sectarian undertones to the remainder 
of the conflict over Lebanon’s identity – pitting Christians versus ‘the other’ (O’Balance, 
1998; Sirriyeh, 1998). 
The civil war divided the capital Beirut and the whole of Lebanon into an ‘us 
versus them’ grounded in ethno-religious sentiment. This divide, a result of the 
cantonization of the neighborhoods, seeped into the modern-day urban fabric of the 
city with the contemporary segregation of cities and Beirut’s neighborhoods (Phares, 
1995; Sirriyeh 1998; Kaufman, 2004; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010). Beirut’s 
cantonization during the civil war continues to inform the contemporary segregation of 
Beirut's urban landscape.  
Understanding this segregation, and the processes that led to it, is integral to 
understanding Maronite identity as it continues in the 21st century. Similar to Falah’s 
(1996) examination of Israeli-Palestinian segregation in ‘mixed cities,’ I argue that the 
Maronite / Christian segregation from Sunni and Shi’a Beirutis is largely due to the 
differences in ideological, social, political, and economic relations, not a natural 
outcome of simple cultural and religious difference. The shaping and evolution of this 
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urban segregation, along ethno-religious lines, was further compounded by the ethnic 
violence of the civil war. As in Falah’s (1996) study, the segregated communities in 
Beirut generated an even more exclusive identity. 
Beirut, therefore, became important as a place because it is one of the few cities 
in Lebanon where all three major ethno-religious groups – Maronites, Sunnis, and 
Shi’ites – co-exist, albeit in mostly segregated neighborhoods and districts. Today, more 
than 25 years after the end of the civil war, the locals still refer to an Eastern and 
Western Beirut. Where once Eastern Beirut was a canton of Christian militias,26 and 
Western Beirut a canton of Muslim militias,27 the Lebanese people still refer to Christian 
and Muslim neighborhoods of Beirut in this manner: A Christian, Eastern Beirut, and a 
Muslim, Western Beirut. Although there is officially only one Beirut, among the people 
there are two different Beiruts. 
 
                                                          
26 Christian militias were primarily made-up of Maronites and Orthodox Christians; depending on the 
neighborhood you hailed from, you were more likely to join the dominant Christian militia in your 
neighborhood. In Beirut, the dominant militias were Kataeb and Ahrar before they were folded into the 
broader Lebanese Forces. 
27 Muslim Militias included the Lebanese National Movement which was mainly comprised of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, Kamal Jumblatt’s Druze militias, militias loyal to Prime Minister Rashid 
Karami – a Sunni, and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in Lebanon.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Review of Related Research 
This chapter situates the contributions of this thesis to two broad bodies of 
academic literature. First, I provide an overview of the literature related to Beirut and 
the different ethno-religious groups of Lebanon. My work with the Maronite community 
of Beirut is most directly inspired by Lara Deeb's (2011) ethnographic work on the Shi'a 
community in the Dahiya suburbs of the city, and Asher Kaufman’s (2010) book on the 
Maronites’ search for identity in Lebanon.28 Reading their work prompted me to want to 
do more research on my own community and its identity. The second section offers a 
conceptual framework for my research by giving a synopsis of the theoretical work on 
imagined geographies and belonging.  
There is a general consensus among scholars that there were two distinct sides 
in Lebanon's civil war of 1975 (Sirriyeh, 1998; Nagel, 2000; Ramsay, 2005; Salamey & 
Tabar, 2008; Kaufman, 2010; Fawaz, 2014; O'Brien, 2015). The agreed upon consensus is 
that Christian militias were on one side, and Muslims — both Sunni and Shi'a — were on 
the other; the nuanced differences correlated with this matter however, is whether the 
                                                          
28 In this book, Kaufman heavily relies and recounts stories and political ideologies from time spent with 
Christian militias and the Lebanese Forces. During that time, Kaufman was one of the Israeli soldiers who 
intervened in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975; an event that was greeted by Christians with rose petals 
and rice – a form of celebration. 
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civil war was inherently sectarian in nature, or if different ethno-religious groups took 
up different positions with regard to the identity of Lebanon. While much of the 
scholarship is on the civil war itself, and about the urban landscape, very little is written 
about the urban identity of Maronites moving forward. While all authors identify this 
ethno-religious group as a major player in the civil wars, a close examination of what 
Maronite identity is to Maronites themselves is lacking. My research aims to fill this gap 
by exploring Maronite identity as it has been shaped by the civil war of 1975, and by the 
contemporary urban landscape. 
 As Sirriyeh (1998) noted, Beirut is still segregated along the very same ethno-
religious lines that were demarcated by the effective cantonization of the capital city 
during the civil war of 1975 (Kaufman, 2004; Larkin, 2010). Cantonization is the process 
of creating ‘cantons,’ or territorial districts; in the case of Lebanon, Beirut was divided 
into cantons where neighborhoods became districts ruled over by sectarian militias. This 
process of cantonization essentially eroded the state’s sovereignty and influence over 
the capital city; control and security of neighborhoods eventually became the concern 
of the different militias vying for control during the 1975 civil war. 
Many scholars today still describe Beirut as a city recovering from civil war, as 
well as a city whose population attributes major importance to ethnic and religious 
identity (Sirriyeh, 1998; Nagel, 2000; Ramsay, 2005; Salamey & Tabar, 2008; Lawler, 
2011; Fawaz, 2014; O'Brien, 2015). By virtue of the violent sectarian historical events, 
where neighborhoods were targeted simply due to the ethno-religious identity 
attributed with them or the militia occupying them, the urban landscape is embedded 
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with memories that influence the contemporary identities of the different ethno-
religious groups. Memories of violence created by the act of urbicide29 (Fregonese, 
2009; Fawaz, 2014) continuously perpetuates 'anti-other' sentiment, therefore 
reinforcing the already present divide between the dominant ethno-religious groups; a 
sentiment that impacts identity as well.  
Sara Fregonese's (2009) concept of urbicide "expresses the hostility towards a 
universally accepted ‘civil’ way of life" (Fregonese, 2009, p. 310) in multi-ethnic places. 
Through urbicide, Fregonese (2009) illustrates the hostility between two different 
neighborhoods. Al-Shiyyah and Ayn al-Remmaneh, although situated in urban Beirut, 
mirrored a broader conflict in the region — that of the Arab / Israeli conflict by proxy of 
Palestinian militias and Christian militias who received training and armaments from 
Israel. Fregonese (2009) goes on to explain that urbicide therefore isn't simply a 
localized affair but can rather possibly contain a "multi-sited geopolitical discourse" (p. 
311). Fawaz (2004) describes the neighborhoods as becoming much more than simply 
residential: by way of embodying political and ethno-religious identities, Fregonese 
(2009) essentially attaches political and ethno-religious identities to parts of Beirut that 
were destroyed during the sectarian civil war. The examples in her article stem from 
various former civil-war militia members who recollect different battles and their 
attachment to the different neighborhoods, thus branding these different spaces with 
sectarian undertones. 
                                                          
29 Urbicide refers to the destruction of a city / urban landscapes. 
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In many contemporary accounts of urban discourse on Beirut, ethnicity and 
identity are almost always intertwined. In an article on ethnic conflict in Beirut, Nagel 
(2000) explains that "ethnic conflict in the growth and transformation of cities has long 
concerned urban scholars" (p. 213). The Maronite situation is no different. Nagel 
maintains that Beirut's urban setting "epitomizes the manipulation of ethnicity, 
heritage, and cultural identity" (p. 218). Finally, she illustrates how the reconstruction of 
Downtown Beirut was influenced by identity and politics (Nagel, 2000). In her 
conclusion, Nagel asserts that Beirut reveals how "ethnic boundaries and identities have 
become intertwined with every component of national and urban redevelopment" (p. 
229). In doing so, Nagel ties ethnic identity with bounded space in the reconstruction of 
Beirut. 
In a separate article, Nagel (2002) argues that the civil war was not the end of 
the struggle for identity but rather that Beirut itself is the space in which "an ongoing 
discourse about the shape and meaning of Lebanese nationhood and identity" (p. 718) 
is taking place. In this sense, Nagel (2002) describes the current rebuilding of Beirut as 
"another battlefield in the long-running struggle over national identity and sectarian 
inequality in Lebanon" (p. 719). Similar to contemporary discourse among the local 
population, she describes the civil war not simply as that of Christian versus Muslim but 
rather one of political ideals. Nagel (2002) explains that Christians fought for Lebanese 
nationalism, whereas the Muslims fought for Arab socialism and pan-Arabism in a bid 
for involvement in the greater region. Essentially, Nagel (2002) argues that the civil war 
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was not so much sectarian, as it was an armed conflict over the identity of Lebanon — 
an armed conflict that had different sects on different sides. 
Similar to Nagel's argument on the divide between the Maronite and Muslim 
beliefs on where Lebanon stands, Allan Ramsay (2005) traces it back even further than 
pan-Arab versus Lebanese particularism. In his analysis of this divide, Ramsay (2005) 
argues that the Maronites were pro-West, and wished to re-create a Phoenician state, a 
re-incarnation of the very same maritime Phoenicians of the ancient times; an empire to 
which Maronites claim to be descendants of (Ramsay, 2005; Kaufman, 2010). 
Conversely, and similar to Nagel (2002), Ramsay (2005) holds that the Muslims' belief 
was that Lebanon is part of the Arab world — although he is careful to point that even 
within the Christian and Muslim camps, there was a divide. For example, Ramsay (2005) 
points out that Sunnis and Shi'as disagree between themselves in regard to certain 
versions of history. Concerning the civil war, he notes that the city came to be divided 
along a "notorious Green Line, splitting the Muslim west apart from the Christian east" 
(Ramsay, 2005, p. 138). Ramsay (2005) concludes that critical for the country, and the 
region as a whole, is the future of the Maronite community — a community that, much 
similar to other minority ethno-religious communities in the region, is on a decline.30 
With regard to the split between Muslims and Christians, and illustrating the 
divide and segregation of Beirut's neighborhoods, Mona Fawaz (2014) invokes Lefebvre 
when she describes Beiruti space as embodying historical moments from the civil war. 
Fawaz (2014) addresses Haret Hreik, a neighborhood in the western districts of Beirut. 
                                                          
30 According to the Lebanese Information Center, Christian emigration since the first day of the 1975 civil 
war to 2011 is estimated at 731,066. This number has no doubt increased since then. 
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This space simultaneously symbolizes the Shi'a communities laying claim over the 
western side of Beirut and the "erasure of a Christian village whose residents found it 
impossible to maintain a living amidst violent reactions and animosity" (Fawaz, 2014, p. 
930). Prior to the civil war, Haret Hreik was a Christian neighborhood, the Hezbollah 
symbols and the funds provided for the neighborhood’s reconstruction, therefore, can 
be interpreted as Shi’as taking over historically Christian neighborhoods.  Fawaz (2014) 
goes on to explain that different districts, or spaces, in Beirut, embody the social 
displacement of their respective communities. Therefore, by extension, these spaces 
come to embody political identity as well as ethno-religious identity (Fawaz, 2014). 
In a more qualitative article, Salamey and Tabar (2005) examine whether a 
consociational democracy is "good" for the long-term of Lebanon and if this form of 
government can effectively bridge the divide between the different ethnic communities. 
The researchers conducted 300 interviews by phone, split roughly even between Sunni, 
Shi’a, and Christian residents of Beirut, thus encompassing a broad heterogeneous 
representative population (Salamey & Tabar, 2005). Furthermore, Salamey and Tabar 
(2005) examined the power-sharing agreement by detailing the way parliamentary seats 
are allocated along confessional lines within the parameters of consociational 
democracy. In their article, Salamey and Tabar (2005) refer to Lebanon’s consociational 
democracy as confessionalism because the parameters of power-sharing revolve around 
the confessional identity of the different political parties – read religious identity. The 
power-sharing, therefore, is a balance of power between the major ethno-religious 
groups. In their conclusion, Salamey and Tabar (2005) argue that "deep-rooted political 
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institutionalization of confessionalism along a degenerate Consociational model in 
Lebanon has abducted modem urbanization and transformed such a process into a 
catalyst for permanent conflict" (p. 254). In summary, Salamey and Tabar (2005) argue 
that the reconstruction of Beirut embodies the confessional divide and ethno-religious 
identities that played a role in the civil war; as such, the physical and social landscape 
will forever incite tensions that may erupt at any moment. Example: During my trip, at 
night, you could see Maronite youth standing around important entry-points to their 
neighborhoods looking to stop anyone who looks “suspicious” from entering. 
In fact, Makdisi (2000) points out that the institutionalized divide in the Lebanese 
political system works in such a way that it requires cooperation amongst the different 
ethno-religious groups; in effect, the Lebanese political system forces the different 
parties to reach across the aisle and form coalitions with parties representing the ‘other’ 
ethno-religious groups.  On the other hand, however, the very institutionalized divide in 
the Lebanese political system that Makdisi (2000) praises for requiring cooperation 
works to keep the status quo – enforcing an ever-presence of ethno-religious identity, 
and therefore a divide in the political and societal fabric along ethno-religious lines. As 
Salamey and Tabar (2005) have noted, Lebanon’s consociational democracy keeps the 
peace between the political elite but it has not brought the different ethno-religious 
groups closer since the end of the civil war. My research contributes to scholarship by 
examining how Maronites construct their identity in Beirut. Understanding the different 
identities involved in Beirut’s urban landscape and the everyday processes that inform 
them can help break down boundaries and create understanding of the other.  
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3.2 Conceptual Literature: Identity, Imagined Geographies, and Belonging 
My research draws upon literatures that address identity theory and theories of 
space, place, and belonging in cultural geography. These literatures emphasize that 
identity is a continually evolving, and fluid process that requires an arena, or space, 
within which the process occurs. That space, in turn, contributes to, and is also changed, 
by that process. The agents that influence this change, or serve to reinforce it, are the 
oral histories and memories that occurred in this place. For the purpose of this study, 
Beirut and its neighborhoods are the arena in which Maronite identity is constantly 
being shaped and negotiated. This literature review therefore examines different 
theoretical perspectives, and explains how I situate Maronite identity in relation to 
Beiruti spaces and places.  
 
3.3 Space and Place 
Space and place are the arena in which identity, imagined geographies, and 
belonging take place. Although the two terms overlap in some cases, and have been 
used interchangeably at times, the two terms refer to two distinct and separate ideas. In 
summary, “space” refers to a geographic location – an area, or a locale. “Place,” 
however, is space infused with human attachment: it is a space endowed with a certain 
identity (Tuan, 1977). Place, therefore, is a space that has come to have meaning – 
whether through memories, learned histories, nostalgia, lived experiences, or other 
human interaction that attributes a certain significance to a set of geographic 
coordinates (Massey, 1994; Agnew, 2014; Cresswell, 2014).  
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 John Agnew (2014) writes that although little critical definition and attention has 
been given to space and place, they nonetheless have a long-standing conflict between 
them. Agnew (2014) traces the interest of geography in defining space and place to Yi-
Fu Tuan’s work (1974) and argues that there has been much effort exerted theoretically 
to define and describe the difference. Agnew (2014) notes that place, in particular, is 
difficult to define because it “exists on one or the other end of a continuum running 
from nomothetic (generalized) location at one end to idiographic (particularistic) place 
at the other” (p. 324). Agnew (2014) essentially argues that the definitions of place are 
on a spectrum, like a pendulum that swings between a more general (nomothetic) 
definition, to a more idiographic (individual, or particular) definition. 
Lefebvre’s (1991) neo-Marxist approach to putting space and place together, 
Agnew says (2014), is the most popular today. In Critique of Everyday Life, Lefebvre 
(1991) focuses on the production of meaning within spaces in which social interaction 
takes place. Lefebvre argues that social space is a means of production. Lefebvre (1991), 
in his work on socially produced space, where identity, memory and space converge on 
each other, describes three different categories (Lefebvre, 1991). The first category, 
'perceived space,' is the result of "human design, urban planning, and spatial 
organization" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 291). The second category, 'conceived space,' is the 
abstract and imagined space. It may include signs and perceived symbols, and it tends to 
be influenced by politics and economics (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 291). The third, 'lived space' 
is less theoretical and more applied. Larkin (2010) describes Lefebvre's 'lived space' as 
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"how people inhabit everyday life, the way they create their city as 'users' through 
practices, images, and symbols (p. 416). 
Similar to Lefebvre, David Harvey (1989; 1990) argues that the concepts of space 
and time are social constructs that influence social reproduction: space is constructed 
and then influences social production; which in turn influences space, in a continuous 
process. For example: imagine a space that is a place of worship, or a hospital. By virtue 
of being designated by society as a place of worship or a hospital, the space becomes 
emplaced with a set of expected cultural parameters and social norms. The norms of the 
place of worship, or hospital, condition the activities within; at the same time, the 
activities within continue to reinforce the meaning of this place of worship, or hospital, 
by virtue of the acts being done.  
Harvey (1989) builds on Lefebvre’s three aspects of space by infusing it with a 
temporal dimension. This notion is born out of a post-modern theory that distance has 
become arbitrary with the advent of technology; an argument he calls “time-space 
compression” (p. 426). Time-space compression, Harvey (1990) says, has led to the 
“collapse of spatial barriers [and] undermined older material and territorial definitions 
of place” (3). The new territorial parameters used to define place, Harvey says, are social 
constructs: exclusionary behavior is what defines place.  
Taking Lefebvre and Harvey’s work and infusing it with political discourse leads 
us to Doreen Massey’s (2005) work on the relation between space and politics. In her 
work, Massey (2005) addresses three different ways to approach space. Her first 
contention is that we should understand space as the result of inter-relational 
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interactions. This first understanding of space then, as Massey describes it, does not 
accept ‘relations’ and ‘identities’ for what they are, but rather argues that they are part 
of that created social space; the processes that create identities are thus inherently 
spatial. Massey’s (2005) second proposition for a better understanding of space is that 
“the story of the world cannot be told […] as the story of ‘the West’ alone” (p. 10). 
Massey (2005) argues for a “serious need” (p. 11) to accept the world’s multiplicity and 
heterogeneity; to do so, however, we need to change the parameters that define 
spatiality (Massey, 2005). Massey’s argument here is similar to Roy’s (2009) in that we 
ought not transfer Western studies of space to non-Western parts of the world because 
the processes behind the creation of space are not the same. Massey’s (2005) third 
characteristic for space is the need to regard it as an open, and never-closed system. 
Massey (2005) invokes Laclau in reproducing the argument that only by “conceiv[ing] of 
the future as open can we seriously accept or engage in any genuine notion of politics 
(11).” In summary, Massey (2005) argues that the process is never a closed system, but 
rather the need to make meaning is a continuous open process across a temporal 
spectrum: both in the past, in the present, and in the future.  
 
3.4 Identity 
Like Massey’s (2005) call for understanding that the meaning of space is 
continuously created across time, recent identity scholarship disputes the perception 
which holds national identity as ‘primordial’ and fixed to a specific geographic location, 
community, race, or gender group (Mills, 2008; Nagel and Staeheli, 2008; Mills, 2010). 
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Identity, as adapted in recent literature, is not "unitary," nor unyielding and 
uncompromising (Mills, 2010, p. 12); it is rather flexible and shifting, encompassing 
various meanings, even contested ones (Mills, 2008; Nagel and Staeheli, 2008; Mills, 
2010). Identity, therefore, is produced by the continuous negotiation of political, social, 
and economic processes as they happen in social space.  
 It is a process negotiated and disputed in the arena of space and place by 
societies with multiple memories and counter memories (Mills, 2008; Nagel and 
Staeheli, 2008; Mills, 2010). Furthermore, identity is constantly formed and re-formed 
by the interactions and encountered experiences of daily life (Mills, 2008; Langellier, 
2010). In the process of formulating identity, the self becomes defined not only by what, 
and who, we are, but also by what, and who, we are not (Hall, 2006; Johnson, 2012); 
and although identity is influenced, and shaped, by past experiences, Hall and Du Gay 
(1996) argue that identity is also influenced by "what we might become, how we have 
been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves" (p. 4), 
noting that identity is therefore "constituted within, not outside representation" (p. 4). 
In the process of bounding identity, the negotiation of multiple social paradigms — 
religious, ethnic, social, and political affiliations (Mills, 2010) — inadvertently fabricates 
an 'other' (Hall, 2006); if said identity is different than the self, it must therefore be the 
'other'. In this endless, fluid process of formulating the self, symbolic boundaries 
materialize demarcating what the identity is, and what it is not; denoting the self, and 
the other (Hall, 2006).  
 To better understand Maronite identity, it is important to establish an 
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understanding of Maronite ethno-religious history. Maronites trace their origins to the 
early fourth Century and Mar Maroun.31 Since the fourth century, the identity of this 
ethno-religious group has been an ever-evolving process, shaped and molded by 
navigating complex social, political, and economic variables encountered over the 
centuries, resulting in a complex contemporary identity. Wherever there is a human 
footprint, there is a memory of the experience, a place the experience occurred, and the 
creation of some understanding of oneself in relation to that emplaced history. Due to 
the Maronites' long history, their memories of place and their formation of Maronite 
identity are the result of almost 1800 years of continual shaping; in the process, the 
Maronite faith has been politicized (Makdisi and Silverstein, 2006). This is something 
many of my participants corroborated. There was this idea that was repeated whereby 
they viewed Maronite politicians, and others, as businessmen trading with religion for 
personal gains. Many believe that if the politicians stopped talking about Maronites, and 
Shi’a, and Sunni matters, then maybe the different communities would be closer to one 
another. 
Memories are powerful forces cultivated by lived experiences, and emotions. 
Memories are constantly being produced and re-produced within, and in relation to, 
specific contexts — they surround us; they are everywhere because not only do they 
influence individuals, and the identity of the self, but rather physical landscapes come to 
be associated with memories. Memories, therefore, work as a sensory cue that evoke 
and provoke certain feelings or emotions. In short, memories "install pauses and 
                                                          
31 Mar is the word for Saint in Assyrian and Syriac. It has also been used historically, and in present-day, as 
a title given to the patriarch of the Maronite Church. 
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digressions in our normative thought processes; and they transport us, however 
momentarily, to different times and different places" (Drozdewsky et al. 2016, p. 446).  
As such, memory plays a pivotal role in the processes of identity-making; it is an 
ever-created and ever-manifested process between people, communities, and nations 
because it defines who we are and how we perceive others (Mills, 2008; Nagel and 
Staeheli, 2008; Mills, 2010; Drozdewsky et al. 2016). Memories are therefore pervasive, 
and powerful actors, in creating a sense of who we are and who we are not (Hall, 2006 
Nagel and Staeheli, 2008; Mills, 2010; Drozdewsky et al. 2016). If memory were to work 
as a means of story-telling, then identity becomes a sense-of-self produced, and 
reproduced, through memory and place (Drozdewsky et al. 2016). 
Political memory is particularly important in shaping identity (Maalouf, 1984; 
Slyomovics, 1994; Chakrabarty 1996; Slyomovics, 1998; Gregory; 2004; Kaufman, 2004; 
Neyzi, 2008; Larkin, 2010; Johnson, 2012) especially in Lebanon where political parties 
have relatively homogeneous constituencies of similar ethno-religious identities. The 
process of discovering and defining who, or what someone is, is heavily influenced by 
political ideology as "societies, or groups within [these societies], strive for some 
coherent identity" (Johnson, 2012, p. 240). In many cases, political memory is 
(re)created through stories passed on from generation to generation about a certain 
place, or certain people. Thus, although an individual may not have personal lived 
experience with an 'other' or a place, they subconsciously hold and reinforce certain 
prejudices based on these political memories. According to Johnson (2012, p. 240) this is 
a 'trained memory.' A trained memory, he says, is an "instructed memory; [a] forced 
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memorization enlisted in the service of the remembrance of those events belonging to a 
common history which are held to be remarkable, even founding, with respect to the 
common identity.” As Mills argues, national identity politics plays a major role in the 
construction of memory (Mills, 2008; 2010); this construction of memory is further 
intensified in a scenario of segregation and post-conflict society: the difference between 
self-identity and the ‘other’ becomes even more emphasized.  
Memory and conflict tend to be embedded in a disputed place or territory that 
was central to an ethno-national conflict (Neyzi, 2008; Larkin, 2010; Nagel 2000; Nagel, 
2002; Bakshi 2012. Processes of memory, therefore, rely on and influence certain 
landscapes and places (Mills, 2008; 2010). Furthermore, segregation as a result of past 
conflicts intensifies many aspects of memory, to include forgetting and nostalgia 
(Slyomovics, 1994; Slyomovics 1998; Neyzi, 2008; Bakshi 2012). Because of segregation, 
the oral histories are not contested by the ‘other,’ and the result is usually one version 
of events that gets continuously reinforced. Bakshi describes 'forgetting' as: “a positive 
meaning insofar as having-been prevails over being-no-longer in the meaning attached 
to the idea of the past” (Bakshi, 2012, p. 480). In a sense, forgetting is where history and 
memory ignores, or ‘excludes,’ certain events. 
In contrast to 'forgetting,' which seeks to omit, nostalgia takes a more positive 
approach to memory, a rosier lens to view contested memory, attempting to paint the 
negative in a more positive light. Whereas 'forgetting' contracts a positive history by 
omitting the negative, nostalgia takes what can be a negatively disputed narrative by 
some and paints it in a more positive light (Neyzi, 2008; Bakshi 2012). Memory literature 
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maintains that nostalgia is a representation of the past, and although there may exist 
disputed and contested memories, the nostalgia is neither false nor unauthentic unto 
itself; the nostalgic memory is true to those who recount it (Neyzi, 2008; Larkin, 2010; 
Johnson, 2012; Mills, 2010; Bakshi, 2012). In relation to geography, space and place 
come to be viewed differently because of the memory through which they are 
perceived. A place, or an oral history, is rarely viewed the same by different identities if 
the memory is contested. 
 
3.5 Imagined Geographies and Belonging 
Imagined geographies can be understood as power-laden representations of 
places, people, and cultures that reflect the standpoint of the observer as much as the 
actual state-of-things in a given place. These representations are usually influenced by 
personal preconceived ideas and feelings towards a particular subject. Originally, the 
term was proposed by Edward Said who coined the term “Orientalism” when he argued 
against the power dynamics-lens through which colonial and western powers saw the 
colonized, non-western peoples and cultures (Said, 1978). In his orientalist theory, Said 
argues that imagined geographies are power-laden, and non-innocent in nature, and 
automatically serve to create an excluded ‘other’ (Said, 1978).  
Cultural landscapes can be infused with nostalgia or memories, and urban 
landscapes of cities can be affected by imagined geographies (Hoelscher, 2003; Johnson, 
2003; Hoelscher and Alderman 2004; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010; Mills, 2010; 
Johnson, 2012). In a post-conflict city, societies can seek to imbed nostalgia into the 
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physical landscape of the city (Johnson, 2003; Fregonese 2009; Larkin, 2010; Mills, 2010; 
Johnson, 2012). Memories begin to shape imagined geographies and influence physical 
landscapes. Memories, therefore, are a lens through which we comprehend imagined 
geographies and interpret physical landscapes; memories influence our perception. 
Competing groups who have contested and counter-memories will come to hold 
different parameters for imagined geographies and attribute different meanings to the 
same physical landscape. The articulation through imagined geographies, or physical 
representation, gives these memories meaning; we come to understand history and 
explain and view certain places differently when we imbed them with imagined 
geographies. As such, memory may be illustrated, exhibited, and performed in the 
physical landscape, 'displaying' memory (Mills, 2010: 15; Hoelscher, 2003; Hoelscher 
and Alderman 2004; Johnson, 2003; Johnson, 2012). 
 This may take many forms in the context of Beirut: a statue may be destroyed 
and removed, like Temsel al-Shaaleh (Arabic: ةلعشلا لاثمت; translation: Statue of the 
Flame / Beacon) in Ain el-Remmaneh.32 In contrast, a statue may be erected post-
conflict like Temsel al-Shuhada (Arabic: ءادهشلا لاثمت; translation: Statue of Martyrs) in 
Sahat al-Shuhada (Arabic: ءادهشلا ةحاس; translation: Martyr's Square) as a symbol that 
the society is a reconciled post-conflict society.33 This latter example attempts to create 
                                                          
32 Temsel el-Shaaleh is a statue erected in 1975 as a memorial for Kataeb martyrs who fell during the civil 
war – Christian militiamen. At the time of its unveiling, the militant wing of the Kataeb party swore in 
more than 1,150 new members; my father and his brothers were among them. 
33 Unlike Temsel el-Shaaleh, Temsel al-Shuhada was erected after the civil war and is not affiliated with 
any ethno-religious group. Temsel al-Shuhada is a memorial to all who had fallen during the civil war. 
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a more nostalgic feeling in that society; it is no longer fractured but rather is now 
united. That is, society now has moved past the 15 years of sectarian violence. 
Although Lefebvre establishes three separate dimensions of space, it is not 
impossible for them to overlap (Larkin 2010). For example, an apartment building with a 
shrine for Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary simultaneously signifies that it is at once both 
a Christian residential building and not a mixed ethno-religious residential building. The 
shrine at the entrance of the building works to include one group, while excluding 
others. The memories provoked by similar symbols are further intensified due to the 
'post-conflict' status of a fragmented Beirut; as such, the events of the civil war further 
reinforce and exacerbate the contested memories and disputed histories. In one of her 
articles, Lucia Volk (2009) mentions checkpoints in Beirut as being a painful reminder of 
the checkpoints and roadblocks setup by militias during the civil war to mark the extent 
of their influence.  
Such symbols serve to create perceived and conceived spaces. In Lebanon, the 
convergence of the perceived and conceived spaces produces a sort of boundary, 
designating who belongs and who does not belong. These boundaries in return are 
reinforced by human agents through daily interactions. A Maronite will usually not cross 
into al-Dahiya (Arabic: ةيحاضلا; translation: the suburb), not only because the 
neighborhood's entrances are plastered with posters of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and 
Hezbollah's Sayyed Nasrallah, but also because a Maronite grows up hearing from their 
parent that they do not belong there and that it is a different, and dangerous area for 
Maronites. The same is probably true for a Shi'a who looks across the street and sees a 
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Lebanese Forces cross spray-painted on a building, or a poster of Bashir Gemayel. The 
images displayed there materialize, with tangible boundaries, the imagined geographies 
that map a separate self and ‘other.’ Much like a Maronite hesitates in going to al-
Dahiya, a Shi’a may very well feel that they do not belong in an Eastern-Beiruti district 
like Achrafieh. Albeit the city does not officially recognize these borders and boundaries 
that split the different ethno-religious groups, these boundaries are nonetheless 
recognized by society and are passed down from the pre-civil war's generation to the 
post-civil war society. The lines may not be official on a map, but they are very much 
real in people's thoughts and minds as I demonstrate in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Lefebvre's (1991) argument for the perceived, conceived, and lived aspects of 
space are particularly useful in the case of Beirut; they help us to better understand the 
contested memories and spaces by understanding how these special aspects come 
together. Beirut, after a 15-year sectarian civil war, is essentially a “space of 
uncertainty” (Larkin, 2010, p. 416), a sphere of disputed narratives, and contested 
memories and space. It is a city, an urban space, that defies a simple reduction into 
three abstract and distinct dimensions (Larkin, 2010). Thus, Beirut should be examined 
within the context of this research as a "hybrid, fragmented, and unstable city" (Larkin 
2010, p. 416) due to its post-conflict emergence as a place of encounter and 
confrontation between the different ethno-religious groups (Larkin 2010). 
A transgression occurs when a spatial practice breaks the traditional norm. For 
example: a restaurant in Muslim towns opening while the sun is up during Ramadan, or 
people taking Fridays off instead of Sundays in Christian parts of Lebanon. Transgression 
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is an act of breaking rules, or exceeding boundaries (Cresswell 1996). According to 
Cresswell (1996), transgression is different than resistance in that the effect and 
reaction of a particular act are more defined. It is not so much the lead-up to breaking 
the norm and the reasoning behind it, but rather the after-effects of the taboo and 
results of it. Furthermore, Cresswell's (1996) transgression recognizes that there are 
power dynamics at play and that usually it is the powerful who create the established 
memories and norms that color a space (Cresswell 1996). In the case of Maronites, who 
are most powerful in Beirut al-Sharkiyyeh (Arabic: ةّيق رشلا; translation: The Eastern 
(Beirut), they determine the spatial order: if it is acceptable to close shop on Friday and 
not Sunday, or if it is normal to prohibit the sale of alcohol and gambling like in al-
Dahiya. The socio-spatial order, however, is flexible; as we will see in chapters 6 and 7, 
certain kinds of Muslims are welcome as long as they do not disrupt the order. 
Essentially, transgression is the conduit connecting imagined geographies and 
belonging, to the city of Beirut as a place. All the disputed narratives and contested 
memories, confined to a place, create a sense of belonging. If you fall within the norm, 
you belong; if at any point, you break the norm, you transgress – and do not belong. 
In the context of imagined geographies, and more specifically for the purposes of 
this research, Beirut, transgression becomes more than just crossing into al-Dahiya or 
al-Sharkiyyeh. Memories of place establish norms and rules; Maronite identity, as 
influenced by the civil war of 1975, starts to establish what is acceptable and what is 
not, what is prohibited and what is not. A Maronite church in al-Dahiya ringing its bells 
is a transgression, similarly a mosque's Adhan (Arabic: ناذآ; translation: Muslim call to 
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prayer) in al-Sharkiyyeh is also perceived as a transgression; it is a break of the norm and 
what is acceptable.34 Much like belonging and boundaries unequivocally create inclusion 
and exclusion, transgression illustrates the taboo and the norm. Space, therefore, is the 
arena in which transgression is played out. 
In many cases, belonging is associated with identity (Antonsich, 2010). In 
describing her experience in Turkey, Mills wrote: "to figure out who someone is, people 
ask about where." (Mills, 2010; p. 1). Mills denotes that the question of inquiring where 
someone is from, is aimed at formulating an identity based on their place of origin 
(Mills, 2010). "Imagined geography situates a person in some way within the nation in 
terms of culture, socioeconomic status, political, or even ethnic identity" (Mills, 2010; p. 
2). These imagined spaces, therefore, become conditioned and imagined through 
cultural, religious, economic, and political lenses (Maalouf, 1984; Hall and Du Gay; 1996; 
Gregory, 2004; Mills, 2008; 2010). 
I attended the wedding of a Shi’a friend of mine here in in the United States in 
the summer of 2016. When I got to the reception party and I was congratulating his 
family, his uncle asked me my last name. I answered with Boutros – I had refrained from 
giving out my last name on purpose because I knew his family was from Southern 
Lebanon; giving my last name would have immediately given me away as a Christian 
because Boutros stands for Peter in Arabic and it usually signals a Christian family. I 
remember being thankful for my formal dress shirt that night because it allowed me to 
                                                          
34 There have been instances in the past where Muslims and Christians show unity. The majority of these 
acts, however, happen between political allies: most notably between Hezbollah and General Aoun, and 
Saad Hariri and Samir Geagea.  
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hide the rosary that I was wearing around my neck. It wasn’t that I didn’t feel safe, it 
was that I was afraid of offending someone if they saw it.  His reply was: “Christian? 
Where are you from?” and I answered: “I grew up in Beirut, but my family roots are 
originally from Zahleh.” He replied: “Zahleh… Catholics, Orthodox, and Maronites are 
our brothers. The tension between the Hezb (Hezbollah) and al-Ouwwet (Lebanese 
Forces) will ease. There is no rift between our people tonight. Thank you for coming my 
son.” So, as we can see, this is a societal norm that Lebanese people adhere to even 
outside of Lebanon; people inquire about your roots because knowing where you come 
from gives them information about you. 
In Beirut, your ethno-religious identity is typically the place, group, and culture 
you are associated with. If a Lebanese tells someone they are from Achrafieh, there is an 
almost immediate assumption that they are Christian, that they vote for a “Christian 
party,” and that they are strong advocates of Lebanese Particularism. If someone says 
they are from al-Dahiya, it is almost automatically assumed that they are Shi'a, they 
vote for Hezbollah or Amal – the two most prominent Shi’ite political parties – and that 
they are adhere to Wilayat al-Faqih (Arabic: هيقفلا ةيلاو; translation: Governance of the 
Jurist). If someone says they are from Ras Beirut (Arabic: تو  يب سأر; translation: North 
Beirut), it is almost automatically assumed that they are Sunni and vote for the Future 
Movement party. 
Maronite identity, like other ethno-religious identities in Lebanon, is thus the 
result of imagined geographies, belonging, and memories of place converging in Beirut. 
This thesis therefore affirms that understanding the identity of each of the ethno-
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religious groups in Lebanon is a step towards mending the rift between them. Beirut, in 
particular, is important because it allows us to study the different ethno-religious 
identities relative to each other; most importantly the boundaries delineating the 
respective Maronite, Sunni, and Shi'a spaces. Homogeneity, therefore, becomes an 
obstacle in post-conflict societies because a group becomes enclosed unto-itself. As a 
non-porous boundary, the homogeneity of the different ethno-religious communities 
becomes a problem when it refuses to listen to the concerns of the ‘other.’ With respect 
to Lebanon, this is manifested in Beirut’s segregated neighborhoods and other 
homogenous towns and cities. 
 
59 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Major Research Question 
The ultimate research question guiding my study is thus: From the perspective of 
Maronites, what is the role of belonging, imagined geographies, and memories of place 
in the process of making and informing Maronite identity in Beirut after the civil war of 
1975? To further develop and particularize this research question, I pose the following 
three sub-questions:  
1- From a Maronite perspective, what effect, if any, did the civil war of 1975 
have on the urban social geography?  
2- From a Maronite perspective, how does attachment to parts of Beirut, as a 
place, inform their identity as a people? 
3- What role do homogeneous neighborhoods in Beirut play in processes of 
making Maronite identity. 
My intellectual goal to answer my research question is three-fold. First, to understand 
and report on the Beiruti Maronite perspective of belonging. How do they see inclusion 
and exclusion working in the city? Second, what are Maronite imagined geographies?  
What are the pre-conceived ideas about the different areas of the city, and what 
transgressions and resistances are occurring? Third, what role do segregated 
neighborhoods and districts play in re-enforcing Maronite identity? By pursuing these 
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three goals, I am able to understand the different components that make up Maronite 
identity. By telling the story of Beirut’s urban Maronite community, I am enabled to 
report on different layers and processes that play a part in the identity-making of this 
ethno-religious group. And by understanding how Maronites construct their identities 
through and within the city, we are one step closer to breaking the political gridlock and 
urban cultural segregation imposed by consociational democracy. 
 
4.2 Maronites in Beirut: Place and People as Site and Subject of Study 
The location for my research is the capital city Beirut and its suburbs, an area 
locally referred to as Beirut al-Koubra (Arabic: ى ريكلا تو  يب; translation: Greater Beirut). I 
chose a heterogeneous location that would allow me to also examine Maronite identity 
through everyday encounters with the ‘other;’ mainly the Maronite encounter with the 
Sunnis and the Shi’as. The reason for choosing Beirut is that, unlike most of Lebanon, it 
is unique in the sense that all ethno-religious groups claim one urban district or another 
within it; while those districts are homogeneous, the city itself is heterogeneous. 
Greater Beirut includes the suburbs and Maronites of different socio-economic status: 
wealthy elites live near the city center in north-east Beirut, while middle and lower-class 
Maronites live in the suburbs. By interviewing people across Greater Beirut, my 
participant pool includes Maronites of varying socio-economic status. 
For the most part, however, I focused on ‘Eastern Beirut.’ Although Beirut is not 
officially demarcated into western and eastern districts, the local population designates 
Eastern and Western Beirut based on the civil war divide that split the capital city in two 
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– a legacy of the Green Line demarcation during the civil war (Davie, 1994; Chakhtoura, 
2005; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010). Eastern Beirut denotes predominantly Christian 
and Maronite neighborhoods and districts. However, Maronites who hold official 
government positions may not strictly be working out of Eastern Beirut; One 
‘authoritative’ person I interviewed, on the condition that no notes be taken, or 
recording be done, was a Maronite working in a Shi’a district in Western Beirut. 
The ultimate focus of my research is to understand Maronite identity from an 
urban, Beiruti perspective. How does Maronite identity play out in Beirut in the context 
of space and place? Sirriyeh (1998) argues that self-segregation was a strategy that 
Maronites used to protect themselves. That seems logical for the past, in the immediate 
aftermath of a 15-year long violent sectarian war, but his research was written twenty 
years ago (Sirriyeh, 1998). Why, then, do Maronites and other ethno-religious groups 
continue to self-segregate? Is safety still a justified reason? What is it, about the city, 
that shapes Maronites’ individual senses of self and community as a whole? Why – from 
a Maronite perspective – does urban ethno-religious segregation still exist 28 years after 
the end of the civil war? How do the current boundaries of segregation in the city 
influence or reflect notions of Maronite identity? How can Maronites’ imagined 
geographies and memories of place help illuminate their experiences of inclusion and 
exclusion in Beiruti place and space? 
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4.3 Ethnography 
To accomplish my research goals, I conducted an ethnographic narrative. An 
ethnography is “a family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with 
agents and of richly writing up the encounter, respecting, recording, representing at 
least partly in its own terms the irreducibility of human experience” (Willis and 
Trondman, 2002, p. 394). Through ethnographic voice-recorded interviews, I aimed to 
correlate the relationship between Beiruti place, space, events, and their influence in 
forming Maronite identity (See Appendix A).  An ethnographic study recognizes that a 
researcher has the power to sway the research and the data as a result of their 
immersion in the society and social world they are studying (Delamont and Atkinson, 
1995; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Punch, 2001). The inherent nature of an 
ethnography is the understanding, therefore, that the familiarity with the participant 
population, and the learned bias and opinions on certain subjects may influence the 
researcher; an ethnographic study does not pretend to be ‘objective’ in the sense of 
reporting the neutral observations of a detached observer (Punch, 2001). 
Poststructuralist and postmodernist critiques view this “ethnographic authority” 
(Willis & Trondman, 2002, p. 395) in a negative light, arguing that experiences, 
imbedded in the subconscious, influence the writer’s reflection (Clifford & Marcus, 
1985). This process, to which the researcher is unconscious, leads them to report on the 
observed culture through a sort of invisible biased lens (Clifford & Marcus, 1985). In 
contrast, the very same critique of ethnographies’ inherent weakness is perceived to be 
a strength by others. Willis and Trondman (2002, p. 7) argue that the “discursive 
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naïveté” described by Clifford and Marcus (1985) is a strength because the very biased 
nature of ethnographies demonstrate that the reflexive studies, and data analysis 
gained from participant observations, cannot be “equated with the lived outcomes” 
(Willis & Trondman, 2002, p. 7). The social landscape being studied “requires constant 
reflection on the social processes and the personal characteristics and values of the 
researcher, which inform the data generated as well as the subsequent interpretation 
and data analysis” (Punch, 2001; p. 168). This subconscious experience that influences 
the reflection process is a fundamental element in the data’s interpretation (Mason, 
1996; Punch, 2001; Willis & Trondman, 2002). These biases, inherent to the very nature 
of ethnographies, are one of the methodology’s very strengths (Willis & Trondman, 
2002).  
 
4.4 Situated Knowledge and Related Assumptions 
As a Maronite who speaks the language, adheres to and practices the Christian 
Maronite faith, and lives by the Maronite culture's values and traditions, I occupy a 
particular position as I conducted research and write about my community's identity 
and what it means to be a Maronite in Beirut. Because Maronites view themselves as 
ethnically, and religiously different from others in Lebanon, I label them as an ethno-
religious group. By virtue of this fact, I also label the ‘other’ as ethno-religious groups for 
the sole reason that my participating Maronites labeled them as such.35 The Maronite 
                                                          
35 Maronites in general, and the participants from my interviews, tended to label Sunnis as one major 
ethno-religious group that was ethnically and religiously distinct from them. For Maronites, Sunnis are 
religiously Sunni Muslim, and ethnically Arab by descent. At the same time, they also considered Shi’as to 
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faith is almost exclusively adhered to by ethnic Maronites – in the broader sense of 
ethnos that members of a particular group construct. Although some would argue that 
there is room to label Maronites as a linguistic group, I do not do so because the 
younger generations are moving away from the Syriac language; many of the bibles 
today, which was almost the only connection left between Maronites and the language, 
are in Arabic. Maronite's dialect of Aramaic, Syriac, is spoken today only in rural 
Maronite villages, but remains the official liturgy language of the Maronite church. 
Although there are efforts to revive the language, Maronite youth scarcely speak it 
outside of Sunday mass. 
Born and raised a Maronite, my research is heavily influenced by my lived 
experience as well as by the lived experience of the Maronite individuals I interviewed. I 
expected to encounter Maronites who would make the following distinction: Maronites 
are not Arab, but descendants of the sea-faring Phoenicians and Assyrians that lost our 
native language because of centuries-long Arab and Ottoman occupation. When I served 
in the United States Army, I encountered and interacted with many Assyrians in Iraq 
who made this specific distinction36 — and although fellow soldiers could not 
comprehend the significance, having this insider knowledge is fundamental: being non-
Arab and non-Muslim is of importance in that part of the world. It highlights your 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be an ethno-religious group that was distinct from them, and different than Sunnis. Generally speaking, 
the different ethno-religious groups were further broken down by my participants depending on levels of 
religious orthodoxy and political affiliation. 
36 For Iraqi Assyrians, however, the distinction was more-so that they are not Arab. Every Assyrian I met in 
my deployment to Iraq, and even in the United States, was articulate in the Assyrian language. Maronites, 
in comparison, speak Arabic in everyday interaction and reserve the Syriac language – a dialect of Assyrian 
– for church mass and the Bible. 
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ancestry, as well as serves as a tool in creating the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’ Through this 
insider understanding of the minority ethno-religious culture, I am able to understand 
the customs and values better than a non-native who is new to this ethno-religious 
minority culture. 
My research is strengthened by my Maronite identity and my family's legacy in 
participating in the civil war of 1975 because I have first-hand knowledge of the learned 
memories that come with being a Maronite who was born after the civil war. 
Furthermore, my foreign education and foreign citizenship played a positive role in 
enlisting participants in my research. In Lebanon, a foreign education and foreign 
citizenship is seen as superior to both the local education and the Lebanese citizenship. 
An American citizenship is viewed in this manner: an American passport can get you to 
most places, and an American citizenship is viewed around the world less suspiciously 
than a Lebanese citizen with a Lebanese passport. Similarly, a Lebanese education is 
viewed as second-rate to a foreign education; or rather a Western education. As it was 
made clear to me when I asked why Maronite youth prefers to immigrate than stay in 
Lebanon, a western education from the United States or Europe will take precedence 
over a Lebanese one when applying for jobs; as such, a lot of elite Maronites (and elite 
Lebanese in general) who can afford it, send their children to study abroad. Lebanese 
youth with a Lebanese education are not competitive with someone who holds a degree 
from the West; during the hiring process, companies favor those who studied abroad. 
Hence, with my American citizenship and my American education, everyone seemed 
66 
eager to talk to me; the conversations helped build rapport, and as a result I was able to 
elicit more interviews. 
At the same time, I acknowledge that my foreign education and foreign 
citizenship may have negatively impacted my research analysis because I have not lived 
in Lebanon since 2002.  I have followed Lebanese news closely since my family and I 
immigrated to the United States in 2002, but some events were mentioned for which I 
was not present, nor was I surrounded by a Maronite community; my interpretation of 
some comments and reactions is thus influenced by my own absence. Moreover, I 
recognize that my young age may have negatively impacted the way elders saw me. In a 
culture that correlates knowledge and wisdom with age, I would simply be a child to 
them and this can negatively impact my research as they may not have believed that I 
can comprehend and reflect on the experiences and oral histories they are recounting to 
me. I use this to my advantage, however, by showing the elders that I am eager to learn 
from their oral histories and situate their experiences; once the elderly learned about 
my research, and saw that I was serious about this project, they were more willing to sit 
down with me and have conversations.  
Furthermore, with my status as an American (in my participants’ perspective) 
with an American education, I ran the possibility of being seen as an outsider; the result 
of this may be an insincere sentiment being presented to me because the participant 
wished to be portrayed in a specific manner, or wished for me – the researcher – to 
perceive them in a certain way, or report in a certain way. More than a few times, when 
I arrived for an interview, I was introduced to neighbors or family present as “an 
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American” or “from America.” As a researcher, I strived to invoke trustworthiness with 
my participants. Therefore, the first step I took in gaining the trust of my participants is 
by informing them that the interview was completely anonymous, and that pseudonyms 
will be given to mask their real identity.  
Building rapport with the participants who are not family friends or former 
classmates was crucial, and confidentiality was perceived to be of utmost importance to 
them since the socio-economic status of a few participants cannot afford them 
protection and defense under the law in the case that something sensitive was made 
public. The second step in in my process to gain trust was to get the interview questions 
to my participants ahead of time. With my interview questions, I attached a copy of my 
IRB certificate,37 and presented a translated copy of the IRB certificate (French or 
Arabic) if the participant was not comfortable with the English language. The purpose of 
this was to demonstrate a legitimate research purpose to alleviate any feelings of 
suspicious information-gathering; this was relevant when I spoke with Maronites who 
held government positions. 
 Furthermore, my interview questions were written in English, French, and 
Arabic. The goal behind this was to encompass all my participants and clear the way for 
all levels of education and socio-economic status. It is important to note here, that in 
order to gain trustworthiness, I spoke in French with the elite Maronite participants who 
usually initiated conversation in French and spoke in Arabic with those who initiated 
                                                          
37 An IRB certificate is issued by the Institutional Review Board. Any research that involves human subjects 
requires an IRB certificate. In this process, the researcher is required to provide a copy of their research 
proposal as well as a copy of the questions that will be asked. Once approved, the researcher receives the 
IRB certificate permitting them to conduct their research.  
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conversation in Arabic. Arabic sprinkled with French and English seemed to be the 
preferred language for Maronite youth. Beyond trustworthiness, this technique enabled 
me to break the power dynamics and put myself, as the researcher, and my research 
participant on equal footing.  
Although I e-mailed the interview questions ahead of time, and gave a hard copy 
to those who had no internet access or computer (usually these were elderly or short-
notice participants), I revisited every participant before I left the country and shared 
with them a copy of my notes and conclusions. This member-checking helped me 
ensure that I was comprehending and assessing comments and reactions in ways that 
most closely reflected the perspectives of my participants. To balance out my fear of 
misunderstanding a concept, or inaccurately portraying a comment or the Maronite 
community’s reaction, I opted for a semi-structured interview the first time where a 
conversation was loosely guided by my interview questions (See Appendix A), and an 
open-ended discussion of my results and findings the second time around.  
 
4.5 Methodological Approach 
I conducted a series of interviews between June and August of 2016 where I 
lived in Beirut for 3 months. During this time, I gathered visual data which I analyzed 
alongside the oral histories I gathered in my interviews. While in Lebanon, I stayed with 
my grandmother in Ayn-al-Remmaneh neighborhood,38 a neighborhood famous for its 
                                                          
38 This neighborhood is one of the three neighborhoods that constitute the “delta” of Christian resistance. 
During the civil war, there were three neighborhoods in Beirut that formed a triangle of Christian 
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Lebanese-Forces, Kataeb, and Ahrar residents / constituents.39 Most of the residents 
living in my grandmother’s street are elderly: I did not officially interview them, nor did I 
write notes in our discussions. Because most were widows, they usually gathered for 
morning coffee and breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Every lady would host the other ladies 
at some time of the day, and they would drink coffee or tea; and when the 
neighborhood ladies came to my grandmother’s I would sit with them and listen: they 
always seemed to find their way to discussing contemporary politics, or reminiscing the 
civil war, and what life was like. Due to the strong Lebanese-Forces affiliation of the 
neighborhood, however, and in order to spread out my participants across political 
ideologies, I elected not to interview these ladies and to simply sit and listen. In the end, 
I had participants that were spread out across Beirut’s Christian-identified 
neighborhoods, as well as different participants scattered on the socio-economic scale.  
Most of my interviews were individual 1-on-1 interviews, while the others were 
focus groups largely made-up of people with opposing political views. For example, I sat 
down with 4 ‘older generation’ Maronites – all of whom identified with a different 
political party and all of whom were part of militias during the civil war. This allowed the 
discussion to go beyond the pre-written questions, and it entered an arena of debate 
where I got to hear different perspectives on the same issue.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
resistance. These neighborhoods were famous for their Christian nationalist sentiment – they became 
known as the Delta after the Greek Delta letter because they formed a triangle on a map. 
39 Most of the residents were affiliated with Christian militia groups during the civil war, both men and 
women. While most men fought on the front-lines, many of the women worked in communication, or 
logistics. 
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Going into this research, I envisioned that conducting interviews with Maronites 
would shed light on the processes that inform Maronite identity: What is it that makes 
someone a Maronite? As such, I felt that splitting my participants into three distinct 
groups would yield the best results: 10 participants who were regarded to be in a 
position of power, or authority in the Maronite community; 10 participants with lived 
experience of the civil war and remember what life was like before and during; and 10 
participants who do not have lived experience of the civil war, and do not remember 
what life was like before and during the civil war. Although the aim was 30 participants, 
I left Lebanon with a total of 24 participants. With Maronite identity being the center of 
my research question, I elected to work exclusively with Maronite participants in order 
to better reflect Maronite identity by analyzing and describing the Maronite 
perspective. By doing so, I am better able to focus on my sample group. In some sense, 
the broader sampling of my participants is homogeneous in nature in that they all 
identify as Maronite. 
I have designated the three groups as the authoritative, older, and younger 
groups. The first of the three is the authoritative / official group. These were 
participants who wield authority in the Maronite community – whether it be a person 
within the Maronite Church,40 a person in a political party, or a person with authority 
                                                          
40 Due to the political role sometimes played by the Maronite Church, I elected to categorize them in the 
authoritative / official group. There are many scholars who write about the Maronite Church’s role in 
developing a Maronite identity under the French rule. Furthermore, during the civil war and to this day, 
the Maronite Church’s top clergy serve in an advisory capacity to many prominent Maronite leaders. In 
Maronite communities, priests and nuns play a prominent role in solving domestic issues; their role for 
conservative families is similar to that of a marriage counselor, or mentor in the West. They are respected 
figures people go to for advice. 
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working for the government. The aim behind this group was to create a category for 
someone who was expected to give a ‘canned answer’ all-the-while not discounting 
their voice. The authoritative group was carved separate owing to the expectation that a 
certain answer was ‘forced’ upon the participant, a certain narrative that the 
government wished to portray; as such, and in order not to discount or silence their 
voice, this group was created to be separate from the others.  
Although the aim was to have 10 participants from each group, the participants 
from this group were cut at 4. Even though there were a total of 6 authoritative voices 
in my research, the official ‘authoritative’ participant count remains at 4 because two of 
the ‘authoritative’ voices were family friends, and due to the close rapport with the 
participant they were slotted in the ‘older’ category. The reason there is a distinction 
between them is that, due to the weak rapport with the 4 authoritative voices who 
were strangers to me before the interview process compared to the 2 authoritative 
voices who were more familiar to me, I elected to then make the distinction that the 
authoritative / official group would remain a group within which I categorize those with 
authority who I was not familiar with. These 4 authoritative participants were 
participants who I got to interview by going through the proper channels, and not by 
having a relative reach out to them for an interview; as such, the distinction further 
separates these individuals as authoritative figures than the two ‘friendlier’ 
authoritative figures whom I categorized under the older group.  
The second group is what I call the older group. These participants are 
individuals who lived before, or during, the civil war and remember it vividly. These 
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participants offer me lived experiences, and oral histories of Beirut as well as the 
Maronite identity and community of the time. In total, there were 11 participants from 
this group. Two of the participants are hybrid participants in that they are categorized in 
this group but could at the same time be categorized under the authoritative group; as 
explained earlier, the distinction for the two participants whom I categorized under the 
older group is that they are family friends and they were not reached through official 
means. Because I am familiar with these two participants, and due to the strong rapport 
that pre-dated the research opportunity, I elected to categorize them in the older 
group; this allowed me to keep the authoritative group as a voice for Maronites who 
serve in an official capacity, and whom I reached by proper, and official channels.  
The third group is my younger group. This group is made up of participants who 
were born after the civil war and do not remember what it was like before. This group 
helps me understand the influence of Maronite memory on a generation that did not 
have a lived-experience of the sectarian civil war. How, then, does this generation view 
the segregated neighborhoods of Beirut? How do they perceive the imagined 
boundaries created by the generation before them? Furthermore, this group is 
important because they have lived in a time where Muslims and Christians are starting 
to intermingle again; a fact they were eager to share. This group offers contemporary 
experience of urban life and Maronite identity uninfluenced by direct experiences of a 
sectarian civil war. As such, it enables me to compare and contrast between the 
Maronite participants who lived before, and during the civil war. For example: while 
most of the participants in the older group did not appear to have Muslim friends, many 
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of the younger participants in the younger group appeared to have Sunni and Druze 
friends.41 
From the understanding that all previous lived-experiences have a way of making 
their way into current practice, I believe that the various groups I have carved out within 
the Maronite community afford me a maximum variation sampling for the short two 
months I was in the city. With the participant groups detailed out, the aim of this 
research was to have 10 participants in each group. With 10 authoritative figures, 10 
older, and 10 younger, I felt like I would have a broad enough sampling group with 
which I can work with. In the end, I did not quite reach my goal and ended up with 24 
participants with my time in the field.  
In summary, there were 4 'authoritative' persons I interviewed, 11 categorized in 
the 'older group' and 9 in the `younger' group. The participant pool was selected from 
different districts of Beirut and different neighborhoods so as to gain different insight 
into how different places and spaces shape Maronite identity. With the different 
interviewees in each group, and heterogeneity in their residence and / or place of work, 
the intent was that the oral histories being recounted, and memories being shared, 
would be diverse enough to illustrate their different lived experiences.  
 I anticipated to conduct a recorded interview with every member of my 
participant pool. In the end, all my interviews were recorded except for two 
                                                          
41 While the older group lived in segregated neighborhoods that still appear to this day, many of the 
younger group participants meet people from other ethno-religious groups (largely Sunni and Druze). 
Although none of my 9 participants did appear to have Shi’ite friends, it is too small a participant pool to 
assume that Maronites in general do not have Shi’ite friends. It is also important to note that they met 
their Sunni and Druze friends in universities and that they are not their neighbors. 
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participants. One divulged sensitive militia movement information from the civil war 
and wished for their voice to remain anonymous; they felt like they could be identified 
and wished to remain anonymous — I was, however, given consent to take notes during 
the interview. The other participant was a civil war veteran and current military officer; I 
conducted a 2-hour interview with them, however I was not allowed to audio record, or 
take any notes. 
The end-result, therefore, was 24 interviewed participants: 22 of whom gave 
consent to be audio recorded, and 23 for hand-written notes. Through this method of 
qualitative inquiry, I anticipate being able to portray a meaningful account of the role of 
urban places, and urban social landscapes, in processes of making and informing 
Maronite identity before, during and after the civil war of 1975. By comparing and 
contrasting the lived experiences, and oral histories of the older and younger group, I 
analyze how the urban social geography changed; furthermore, I aim to make note of 
the generational differences immerging between the older Maronite generation and the 
younger generation that has had more social encounters with the ‘other’. By describing 
and analyzing their lived experiences, I am able to discern the differences between the 
urban social geography before the civil war of 1975, and what it's like now. 
Moreover, in the process of conducting my interviews, I made sure to ask all 
three groups (the authoritative, those who experienced the civil war, and those who do 
not) on what they saw, or felt, Beirut was like before the civil war (See Appendix A: 
Questions 7-14): Was it always segregated? Did the neighborhoods always have an 
ethno-religious identity? What I aim to do with this information is create new maps. My 
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Maronite participants' memories and stories enabled me to draft 3 maps that illustrate 
Beirut from a Maronite perspective: A Beirut as a result of the Maronite community's 
imagined geography. Furthermore, the maps I have drafted will be more peculiar 
concerning the different ethno-religious neighborhoods and districts.  
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
Due to the wide range of concepts and social constructs I anticipated to show in 
my data, I broke down the lived experiences into 'themes' and then analyzed these  
relationships categorically. First, with the recorded interviews, I began by translating 
and transcribing. Next, I color-coded the different 'themes' that seemed to be recurring. 
What color-coding allowed me to do is not only simplify my comparing and contrasting 
of the lived experiences, but also facilitated a system where I can simply look for yellow 
highlighting, for example, — which is the color I have chosen for Maronite 'identity 
triggers' — and quickly contrast it to other yellow highlighting from a different 
interview. Another example would be the Maronite Church and red highlighting. Any 
time an interviewee discussed the Maronite Church and its role during the civil war or in 
modern-day urban life, the transcribed lines were highlighted red. With this color-
coding, I then analyzed, compared, and contrasted all the related themes. 
 
4.7 Ethics 
I expected to encounter requests to hide participants' identities due to 
Maronites’ resentment of Hezbollah's growing influence in the country and the fear 
76 
among a few in the Maronite community to speak against this powerful political group 
(Mostly those who lived extremely close to al-Dahiya or had government jobs). 
Therefore, ultimate discretion and a multitude of steps had to be undertaken when 
conducting interviews and interactions with the authoritative group. For example, I 
interviewed a Maronite politician and it took 37 days before I was granted an interview 
with them: they had to inquire as to “who sent me” and the “end-goal of my 
information gathering” was. Furthermore, as an 'insider' to this community, I had to 
make the familiar unfamiliar, and that is where the member-checking I mentioned 
earlier came in. For member checking, I revisited the participants I had spoken with a 
transcribed copy of the interview. The aim was to receive approval to use the 
information given to me; through this, l was able balance out inherent bias and 
assumptions by getting the go-ahead from the research participant. The information 
portrayed henceforth represents the meaning intended by my participants since they 
signed off on it. 
Finally, risk of privacy for fear of retaliation was an anticipated risk that my 
participants had to undertake. For this reason, they were given the choice to choose a 
pseudonym, or remain completely anonymous. Due to Maronite animosity against 'the 
other' and animosity towards other Maronites who do not feel the same way, 
anonymity was a top priority for me concerning my research participants. As such, even 
if they elected to use their regular name, I chose a pseudonym for them when I mention 
them in this article. The benefit, as I see it and as my participants have said to me, is that 
by feeling safe, they felt that by getting their voice heard and getting their thoughts and 
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ideas out there, they were making their voices heard. In this thesis, I did not use 
anyone’s real name. I used either the participants’ chosen pseudonyms or names that I 
made-up to hide the participants’ identity.  
 
4.8 Limitations and Contributions 
As stated previously, one limitation considered was the time constraint. I was in 
the country from June 8th to August 11th and two months is not nearly enough time to 
accurately understand the processes informing Maronite identity. Although an official 
census has not been done since the 1960s, I estimate that there are around 900,000 
Maronites because Maronites are the biggest Christian denomination in Lebanon and 30 
participants cannot accurately portray a population that size. The U.S. Department of 
State (2013) and the Lebanese Information Center (2013) put the Christian population at 
around 1.3 Million in 2013. 
 Furthermore, with Beirut being a place and space with contested memories, it 
should be noted that although from a Maronites' perspective, their way is the right way 
and it is the authority behind their imagined geographies, sense of belonging, and 
transgression; it should not be seen as the 'only' way. It should also be noted that there 
is not ‘one’ way even within the Maronite community itself. Moreover, there are Shi'a, 
Sunni, and Druze and 14 other officially-recognized ethno-religious groups in Lebanon 
who could contend and dispute the version of events recounted to me by the Maronite 
participants. This does not mean, however, that to each respective person, their own 
recollection is not an honest and 'true' recollection. I understand that the different 
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recollections are influenced by lived experiences, oral histories, and memories of place. 
In spite of these limitations, however, I do believe that this thesis offers a meaningful 
analysis of Maronite identity. 
With my research, the aim is to introduce processes of identity making for 
Beiruti Maronites to the field of cultural geography. The processes of identity-making 
for Maronite identity is complex: many events, places, and spaces across a spatio-
temporal scale have had an effect on this community. By reporting on Beiruti Maronite 
identity, I aim to introduce a new  
platform through which one can study this ethno-religious minority of the Middle-East.  
Furthermore, following Roy's (2009) argument, my research is not applying a Western or 
a Global North concept to an Eastern culture; rather, as someone who is a member of 
that culture, I am reporting on my own community on the processes that make us 
unique.  
Beirut's current urban segregation is studied very little. It is studied even less so 
in connection to Maronite identity. When studied, however, it is often examined 
through a geo-political lens. Maronite identity, and especially the Maronite community 
of Beirut is often not addressed. Therefore, my contribution is in the form of an 
ethnographic narrative that will illustrate this community through an urban studies 
perspective. Bearing in mind that political, cultural, and religious sentiments will be 
expressed, I would re-iterate the possibility (and probability) that all these different 
concepts can, and probably are, inter-connected. I believe strongly that understanding 
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Maronites is a first step to mending the rift that exists between the different ethno-
religious communities of Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BEIRUT – A CITY REBORN
“The war divided us all, no matter the religion.” 
- Robert, a Lebanese Army veteran. 
Interview with author, June 2016 
 
Take a stroll down the streets in downtown Beirut and you might find yourself 
walking right above the previous 6 incarnations of Beirut; you will peer at history that is 
thousands of years old beneath the glass covering the ancient ruins. Cross the street and 
talk to people sitting at cafés about what is underneath the glass and someone is sure to 
liken Beirut to the phoenix bird from Greek mythology.42 The story told is that Beirut 
was reduced to ash 7 times, and 7 times it has been rebuilt. Like the phoenix, it is a long-
living city that rises from the ashes. Another story you might hear is a play on phonetics 
whereby the phoenix is associated with Phoenicia – the land of the Phoenicians.43 As 
this legend goes, the Phoenix bird is named after the Phoenicians. The reason for it is 
the association between a certain red-purple dye discovered by the Phoenicians in a 
conch shell, and the supposed red-purple color of the Phoenix. “Like the phoenix, Beirut 
was destroyed and burnt to ash 7 times in history, and 7 times it has risen back up” a 
young participant, Sari, told me. Since the end of the Lebanese civil war, Lebanon’s cities 
                                                          
42 In ancient Greek mythology, the phoenix is a bird that reincarnates from the ashes of its previous death.  
43 The same is applicable in the Arabic language where Finiqya (Arabic: ايقينيف; translation: Phoenicia) 
sounds remarkably similar to Tayr al-Finiq (Arabic: قينيفلا  يط; translation: Phoenix Bird). 
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and towns have segregated themselves to the point where different municipalities, or 
urban districts, can be identified as predominantly Sunni, Shi’a, or Maronite. This 
process of establishing cantons during the civil war – the creation of semi-autonomous 
districts in urban Beirut – has translated into modern-day segregated neighborhoods. 
This incarnation of Beirut, therefore, is a fractured Beirut: it is a Beirut born out of 
sectarian differences; a reality made possible as a result of nostalgia, memories, 
counter-memories and contested memories, boundaries, and belonging. 
The first recorded destruction of Beirut occurs in 140 B.C., a result of a conflict 
over the throne of the Seleucid Empire.  The second ‘destruction’ is more cultural than 
physical in nature: it happened in 64 B.C. when Beirut was conquered by Pompey and 
assimilated into the Roman Empire; as a result, architecture more ‘Roman’ in nature 
was built. The third destruction came in the mid-6th century after an earthquake leveled 
the city; as a result of the Roman Empire’s occupation, the reconstruction efforts 
resulted in a more Roman urban landscape. In 635 A.D., Beirut was destroyed again, this 
fourth destruction was both physical and cultural. After the Arab conquest, a more 
Arab-looking architecture replaced Beirut’s Roman landscape. Beirut was destroyed and 
rebuilt a fifth time during the times of the crusades as a result of a battle between the 
Crusades and the Abbasid Caliphate. The sixth rebirth of Beirut occurred slowly 
throughout the Ottoman period where, for 600 years, Ottoman architecture increasingly 
influenced the urban landscape. The seventh reconstruction came about after the 
1920s, when after the French colonization, the urban landscape morphed from Ottoman 
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design and influence to a more Western, French, architecture.44 This seventh 
reconstruction, is something Maronites and Christians are thankful for. When Maronite 
speak of the French occupation in comparison to the Ottomans, they are quick to point 
out that the French built schools, hospitals, roads, and railroads; in comparison, they tell 
you that the Ottomans only ever “took” and never “gave.” 
One might argue, however, that Beirut has actually been reborn 8 times if we 
take into consideration the urbicide that occurred as a result of the 1975-1990 civil war 
(Fregonese, 2009).45 This 8th reincarnation of Beirut is one with a schizophrenic identity: 
It is not a Beirut with a singular identity, but rather a city with multiple ethno-religious 
identities attributed to the multiple neighborhoods that were carved during the civil 
war. These neighborhoods of today are a remnant legacy of the sectarian cantons that 
divided the city, during the civil war, along ethno-religious lines.  
This chapter will examine the role of Beirut in the processes of identity making 
for Beiruti Maronites. As noted by my participants, the civil war created a lived 
experience that became embedded in the physical landscape of the city. When talking 
to the older participants, they would reference specific parts of the city and some of the 
events that occurred there during the civil war; furthermore, many of the shop-names 
are direct references to civil war events or status. The lived experience of the civil war, 
therefore, influences modern every-day life in Beirut through imagined geographies and 
                                                          
44 There is another, more mythical legend that goes: Beirut has historically been destroyed by two earth-
splitting earthquakes, a fire that burnt the city, a Tsunami, and three times by conquering armies. This, 
also, when added, is a total of seven times.  
45 As noted by my participants, the 7 ‘reincarnations’ of Beirut were not always a result of destruction. 
Some of the ‘incarnations’ point to a change in architecture and culture. For example: the Ottoman 
architecture during the mid to late-1700s; or the influence of French culture after the 1920s.   
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inherited memories of place. Events that occurred during the civil war are attached to 
modern-day streets and landscapes; in turn, these streets and landscapes illicit 
memories and emotions from the local populace. 
The quasi-reconciliation after the end of the civil war in 1990, in the form of the 
Ta’if Accord, serves to reinforce the ethno-religious identity associated with the 
neighborhoods. The sentiment usually echoed by my participants usually was 
somewhere along the lines of: My family fought and died for this neighborhood during 
the civil war. It is ours and they (the ‘other’) do not belong (physically, or culturally). A 
civil-war veteran who wished to remain anonymous for safety reasons had this to say: 
“As Bashir Gemayel once said, we (Christians) are the saints of this East and its devils, 
we are its cross and its spear, we are its light and its fire. We can burn it to the ground if 
they burn our fingers, or we can enlighten it if they leave us be.” The participant used 
this Bashir quote when we were discussing Beirut, saying afterwards: “We would have 
burned Beirut and Lebanon to the ground before we let them dictate its identity.” This 
line of reasoning, then, echoes what many scholars have said about the civil war: it was 
over the identity of Lebanon, and whether it started with sectarian undertones or not, 
the fact is that towards the end of the civil war, it very much carried sectarian 
undertones. 
Today, more than 25 years after the end of the civil war, Maronites still 
demarcate ‘our neighborhoods’ and their ‘neighborhoods,’ and the parameters that 
designate the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are the very same ethno-religious sentiments passed 
down from the civil war generation. Furthermore, these lines, for the most part, mirror 
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the imaginary borders drawn up by the sectarian militias during the civil war. In modern-
day Beirut, the locals still refer to an Eastern and Western Beirut – a designation 
originally referring to anything east of the Green Line, and anything west of the Green 
Line. As my participants, and Maronites in general refer to them, there was al-
Gharbiyyeh (Arabic: ةّيبرغلا; translation: The Western (Beirut)) and al-Sharkiyyeh. Where 
once Eastern Beirut was a canton of Christian militias, and Western Beirut a canton of 
Muslim militias, the Lebanese people still refer to Christian and Muslim neighborhoods 
of Beirut in this manner: A Christian, Eastern Beirut, and a Muslim, Western Beirut. 
Although there is officially only one Beirut, among the people there are two different 
Beiruts.46 
The Civil war of 1975 fractured Beirut and demarcated the different cantons that 
were created then into modern-day neighborhoods segregated along ethnic and 
sectarian divides. These divides were further entrenched by a violent sectarian civil war 
that lasted 15 years, between 1975 and 1990. During the war, a battle line stretched 
from the north to the south of Beirut. The Green Line, as it came to be called 
(Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010; Shlay and Rosen, 2010), did not originally demarcate an 
Eastern Beirut and a Western Beirut as people of different ethno-religious backgrounds 
lived on both sides of the Green Line.  
As the civil war prolonged, however, the Green Line separated Muslim militias, 
primarily based in Western Beirut, from the Christian militias who were primarily based 
in Eastern Beirut. The ethno-religious militias, in their fighting across the Green Line, 
                                                          
46 One might also argue that there are many Beiruts. A Sunni Beirut, a Shi’a Beirut, a Palestinian Beirut, a 
Maronite Beirut etc…  
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embodied the competing rhetoric of power, territory, and identity (Davie, 1994; 
Chakhtoura, 2005; Fregonese, 2009) which resulted in two very-much homogenous 
sectors that served to further reinforce the sectarian undertones the civil war was 
increasingly spiraling into (Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010).  Fregonese writes: “Beirut's 
wartime built environment […] played an active part in the socio-political reimagination 
of the entire city and of the political spaces beyond it” (Fregonese, 2009, p. 317). As a 
result, Beirut became a city with multiple competing identities; every neighborhood 
carried the identity of its most dominant ethno-religious group.  
 
Figure 5.1: This picture illustrates the Muslim – Christian Green line. Professors Møystad 
from the University of Beirut and Ludvigsen from Østfold College used newspaper 
articles and clippings from the time of the Lebanese civil war to piece it together. The 
solid dark-green line marks the Muslim – Christian divide while the light-green 
highlighted areas mark the contested areas – if we look closely, we can see that the 
highlighted areas area all to the left (or west) of the green line. (Møystad and Ludvigsen, 
1995).  
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Maroun, a civil war veteran,47 described the Green Line to me saying: “Originally, 
the Green Line was the highway that lead to Beirut’s only sea port. Both sides fought for 
control of the highway because controlling it meant controlling the entrance and exit to 
the port, and by extension controlled the incoming and outgoing ships and shipment. 
After a few years of it being the frontlines where Muslims were on one side and 
Christians on the other, the highway and the buildings were mostly abandoned. 
Eventually, trees and brush started sprouting and covering the cement and so it is why 
we call it the Green Line.” As Maroun notes later on: “Originally the Green Line existed 
between the Palestinian militias and the Christian militias; then, it divided Beirut 
between Christians and Muslims. But as the war went on, and with the intervention of 
Syria and Israel, there was also a line that began to form separating Sunni 
neighborhoods from the Shi’as’. As the Shi’as increasingly migrated into Beirut from the 
south, they also began to congregate amongst themselves. Today, while the divide may 
be lessening between Christians and Sunnis, there is a divide between us and the Shi’as; 
and a divide between the Sunnis and the Shi’as.” Although Hezbollah (Shi’a) and Amal 
(Shi’a) are staunch allies with Syria, it was not that way during the civil war. Syria 
supported the Palestinians (Sunni Arabs) and helped arm them against the Shi’a of 
Hezbollah, but not Amal.  
For a majority of the younger Maronite generation, their histories and memories 
of the civil war are derived from the older generation’s lived experiences. These 
memories, in turn, create imagined geographies whereby socially or spatially distant 
                                                          
47 Maroun, a Maronite who considers himself part of the Lebanese Force’s constituency today had fought 
against them in the civil war. Maroun fought with the Druze of Kamal Jumblat.  
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parts of the city are represented in ways that express fear and discrimination. Generally 
speaking, however, these imagined geographies are influenced by the previous 
generation’s oral histories, memories, nostalgia, and forgetting. In essence, the 
imagined geographies, influenced by ethno-religious identity and its consequences 
during the civil war, create memories of place that further reinforce confessional 
identity. 
 In the context of Beirut, memories of place influence identity because historical 
events that happened to your ethno-religious group play a major role in who you are, 
and how others perceive you. Robert, a participant who was in the Lebanese Army 
during the civil war, says: “I had Muslim friends before the war took extreme sectarian 
tones. At one point, the different parties set up checkpoints around their districts and 
neighborhoods. At these checkpoints, they would check your I.D. card; at the time, the 
cards had your religious identity on them. If they stopped at our checkpoint, or if we 
stopped at theirs, there was a possibility of kidnapping. I remember my friend Ali, a Shi’a 
I played soccer with. I had to pull strings and get him an I.D. card that said his name was 
Georges and that he was a Maronite so that he can come to my neighborhood safely.” It 
is memories like these, like the one recounted by Robert, passed down to the next 
generation, that serve to reinforce memories of place and confessional identity. Ali was 
there when I met with Robert the second time to confirm the data gathered from the 
initial interview. We had coffee on the balcony, and Ali and Robert shared stories of 
times crossing the checkpoints back and forth with the fake IDs. Ali used to be Robert’s 
neighbor before the civil war, but he now lives in al-Dahiya. Robert’s neighborhood is 
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predominantly Orthodox Christians with some Maronite families; Ali’s family migrated 
during the civil war to a Muslim neighborhood in Eastern Beirut. 
 
5.1 Contested Memories in Beirut 
One of the negative traits attributed to confessional memories of place and 
imagined geographies is that they are inherently disputed and contested. Different 
people have different versions, a result of the lack of civil war education in schools 
which is due to the inability of decision-makers and educators to agree on what really 
happened. For example: If a Maronite and a Palestinian discuss certain events from the 
civil war, their recollection will be different, perhaps even contradictory; that 
recollection influences who they are as a people because their version of history stems 
from the lived experiences of their ethno-religious groups. In turn, this results in two 
version of events, theirs and the ‘other.’ By extension, it creates their perception of the 
self, and the perception of ‘the other.’ It does not, however, mean that one version of 
events is truer than the other, it is just the fact that the perception of the event is 
different; and if the perception is different, the event itself therefore comes to be 
viewed in a different light.  
The events of April 13th, 1975 that sparked the 15-year war illustrate this 
difference: Maronites blame Sunni Palestinian militants, and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization, for the church massacre on that day because they saw a car plastered 
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with PLO posters and flags fire at Kataeb members.48 In contrast, Palestinians deny the 
allegation: consider the PLO shot at the churchgoers, why retaliate on an entire refugee 
camp? Palestinians therefore reject the accusation that they were the reason for 
sparking the civil war of 1975.49 The church attack in Ain el-Remmaneh resulted in the 
death of four Maronites belonging to the Kataeb party that day, and the Maronites 
responded with an attack on a nearby Palestinian refugee camp with as many as 30 
Palestinian casualties. Many similar violent events occurred during the civil war, and the 
memory of those places undoubtedly influences the identity of the community and the 
individual. 
Contested memories are not exclusive to a Christian narrative as opposed to a 
Muslim narrative. As I learned in my interviews, there were memories and counter 
memories within the Christian community as well. The most prominent one described to 
me by those who experienced it came towards the end of the civil war when Christian 
militias turned on each other. There is a period of 2 years, between the Ta’if Accord and 
the end of the war, where a series of clashes occurred between loyalists to the Lebanese 
Forces and by extension Dr. Samir Geagea, and those loyal to General Aoun. Geagea 
loyalists, who were members of the Lebanese Forces call this period Harb al-ilgha’ 
                                                          
48 For Maronites, when they talk about Palestinians, they usually lump militant Palestinians in refugee 
camps and refugees as one. Very rarely do Maronites distinguish between militant Palestinians and 
refugees; this mentality, however, is changing with the younger Maronites who do make the distinction. 
49 There is also a third version circulating amongst non-sectarian Maronites and Palestinians who say the 
Palestinians had nothing to do with the attack, but that it was rather an attack orchestrated by Syrian 
loyalists who plastered PLO logos and slogans on the vehicle used in the church attack in order to spark a 
conflict between Christians and Palestinians. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad cites the Christian – 
Palestinian conflict as a security concern and therefore justifies the Syrian occupation and military 
presence in Lebanon. 
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(Arabic: ءاغللإا برح; translation: War of Elimination) in that Aoun was waging a war to 
eliminate the opposition; at the time, in January 1990 Aoun had ordered the Lebanese 
media to refrain from using political titles when referring to those elected into office the 
under Ta’if Accord.50 Consequently, the participants I talked to who were loyal to 
General Aoun at the time, or make-up part of his party’s constituency today, refer to the 
same clashes as Tawhid al-Boundouqiyyeh (Arabic: ةّيقدنبلا ديحوت; translation: Unification 
of the Rifle). 
Today, the major rift within the Christian community is between the Christian 
supporters of General Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Christian 
supporters of Dr. Samir Geagea and the Lebanese Forces. As I mentioned earlier, this rift 
stretches back to the end of the civil war and the 2-year period between the signing of 
the Ta’if Accord and the last day of the Lebanese civil war. General Aoun, who had been 
exiled before 2005, is an ally of Hezbollah and Amal – both predominantly Shi’a political 
parties. Together, the Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, and Amal, makeup the 
March 8th Alliance: a pro-Syria, pro-Iran coalition. Their name comes from their 
demonstration on March 8th, 2005, prior to the Cedar Revolution that was meant to 
show solidarity with Syria and to thank them for their efforts in ending the Lebanese 
Civil War. It should be noted, however, that General Aoun and his supporters – in 2005 
the Free Patriotic Movement was not an official party yet – were part of the March 14th 
Alliance at the time because Syria was the main force behind his exile to France. General 
                                                          
50 This was in a bid to consolidate power. At the end of the civil war, the National Pact that had been 
verbal up to this point, had been penned into the Ta’if Accord amending the constitution, requiring that 
the Prime Minister be a Sunni Muslim. General Aoun, however, was not Sunni, nor Muslim. He was a 
Maronite, and with the absence of an elected president had declared himself Prime Minister. 
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Aoun had fled to the French Embassy towards the end of the civil war when Syrian 
troops sieged the presidential palace in Baabda, Mount Lebanon.  
The March 14th Alliance was formed in 2005 as a response to the assassination of 
Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri; an act that prompted the Cedar Revolution and the 
removal of Syrian forces from Lebanese soil. The March 14th coalition’s most significant 
achievement, in my opinion, is not the removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon but rather 
it was the first time in the history of Lebanon that Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze 
parties were all allied and working towards one common goal – although this would 
later fall apart. At the time of the demonstrations, Dr. Samir Geagea was imprisoned in 
the Lebanese Ministry of Defense – accused and convicted of bombing a church in 1994. 
Many of Geagea’s supporters claim that this was a fabricated attack to imprison Geagea 
and sideline the Lebanese Forces. From 1990 until his arrest and conviction in 1994, 
Geagea had resisted the Syrian government publicly, and resisted participating in what 
he termed a ‘puppet government’ while Syrian troops remained on Lebanese soil and 
influenced Lebanese politics. 
 Many civil war veterans I interviewed who were part of the Lebanese Forces 
during the war argue that it is impossible for Geagea to order the bombing of a church 
because the whole reason the Lebanese Forces fought during the civil war was to 
protect Christian identity in Lebanon and the Middle-East; it therefore wouldn’t make 
sense that Geagea would order the bombing of a church. My participants argue that the 
dissolving of the Lebanese Forces – now a political party – and the arrest of Geagea and 
his advisors and deputies are proof that Syria, through the Lebanese government, 
92 
wanted to silence any opposition. In 1996, Amnesty International (1996) issued a report 
confirming what many of Geagea’s supporters argue. The report claims that Geagea’s 
trial and his conviction were unjust and politically motivated. The report’s main reason 
is that Geagea was acquitted of the church bombing but was convicted of maintaining a 
private militia, arms, and bombs in the aim of overthrowing the Lebanese government – 
an accusation that the report found no basis for (Amnesty International, 1996).  
 The amnesty deal protecting the warlords of the civil war was therefore voided 
and Dr. Geagea was imprisoned until the massive demonstration of March 14th saw him 
released from jail and General Aoun return from France. Originally, the March 14th 
Alliance’s major parties51 included the Future Movement – a Sunni political party led by 
Rafiq al-Hariri before his assassination, but later picked up by his 2nd son and current 
Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri. Alongside the major Sunni political party were 
the Free Patriotic Movement (Aoun supporters, not yet an official party), Lebanese 
Forces, Kataeb, National Bloc, National Liberal Party, Independence Movement – all 
predominantly Christian parties. Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party was also allied 
with the March 14th Alliance.  
The main political parties today are the same as they were during 2005, except 
the allegiances have shifted. As I have mentioned, General Aoun and his supporters are 
allied with Hezbollah while Dr. Samir Geagea and his supporters are allied with the 
Future Movement. Christians who are anti-Hezbollah therefore perceive General Aoun 
                                                          
51 I designate the parties ‘major’ because although there are many more parties officially recognized in 
Lebanon, all the ‘major’ parties I mentioned have had one or more representative in parliament between 
1994’s elections and the most recent elections in 2018. 
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as a traitor owing to his alliance with Hezbollah. Part of my interview process was a 
panel of four civil war veterans; four people who support different political parties. 
Maronites who fought against General Aoun and his supporters during the civil war, and 
who are against him today, argue that he is allied with the enemy. Their logic stems 
from their argument that Syrians oppressed and kidnapped Christians and silenced 
oppositions, and today by virtue of allying with Syria’s allies, he is legitimizing their 
behavior and offering political cover for Hezbollah’s operations – something that 
Christians who are not supporters of General Aoun are completely against.  
The other side of this disagreement is the alliance of Samir Geagea and the 
Lebanese Forces with Saad al-Hariri. By extension, General Aoun’s supporters and the 
Free Patriotic Movement argue that Samir Geagea is enabling the Saudi vision for the 
region and Lebanon with his alliance with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the 4-
person panel, a Aounist supporter levied an accusation against the Lebanese Forces 
supporter saying: “What about all the trips your master takes to Saudi Arabia? Every 
time he disagrees with Saad al-Hariri he packs up his bags and flies to Saudi Arabia and 
then comes back calm and amicable.”  
One memorable quote from the panel that all participants seemed to agree on is 
the idea that Christians are more divided than their counter-parts. The echoed 
sentiment was that the Shi’as have two main political parties: Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s 
Hezbollah and Nabih Berri’s Amal. The Sunnis also have two main political parties: 
Hariri’s Future Movement and former Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s Majd Movement. 
The Druze, as well, have two main political parties: Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive 
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Socialist Party and Emir Talal Arslan’s Lebanese Democratic Party. The Christians, 
however, have many more and the result is that there is much more disagreement 
within the Christian community than there is within any other ethno-religious 
community in Lebanon. This thesis has mentioned Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement 
party and Geagea’s Lebanese Forces. Other major Christian political parties include: the 
Gemayel family’s Kataeb Party, the Chamoun family’s National Liberal Party, the Eddé 
family’s Lebanese National Bloc, the Moawad family’s Independence Movement, and 
the Sakr family’s Guardians of the Cedars. 
As you may have noticed, I designated the families associated with various 
political parties because the Christian political parties hand down leadership of the party 
within the family. Many of these political parties are based in one town or another, and 
the political leader is also head of the most influential family in their respective town or 
district. I argue that this is another failure of Lebanon’s consociational democracy: when 
political elite are charged with keeping the peace (read: keeping your own constituency 
in check), it inadvertently promotes the “hand-off’” of leadership to your own political 
party within the family and the cycle simply repeats itself. The elections, if there are any, 
are merely symbolic; as evidenced by the Kataeb’s more recent leadership elections: 
party leadership that did not support Sami Gemayel in the election was weeded out. As 
a result, the Christians have many more political parties than their respective 
counterparts and, generally speaking, the constituency of the political parties tends to 
be local Christians from said town or district. The only exceptions to this rule are the 
two major Christian political parties: Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, and Geagea’s 
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Lebanese Forces, who tend to have popular Christian support throughout Lebanon as a 
whole – as well as Shi’a support and Sunni support from their political allies.  
Memories and counter memories, therefore, are not exclusive to two different 
ethno-religious groups; rather, it is possible for them to exist within the same group. 
Furthermore, these clashes played out in Beirut as well; Beirut’s Christian 
neighborhoods, therefore, came to embody memories and counter-memories. To this 
day, many Christian families remain torn as a result of the final two years of the civil 
war. Robert, who had talked earlier about obtaining an I.D. card for his friend Ali, told 
me: “My own uncle did not come to my father’s funeral. He did not pay his respects to 
his own brother because one had pledged loyalty to Aoun, and the other to Geagea. 
That is the reality for many families. Brother not talking to brother. The war divided us 
all, no matter the religion.” Robert continues saying that his mother moved out of 
central Beirut towards the suburbs because the city’s physical structures reminded her 
too much of the war’s events. Robert’s mom, who sat with us the first time around, says 
that the same street will have different meanings to two different people if they are 
both looking at it from opposing sides. “Like Robert told you, brother was killing 
brother. If their children revisit the same street today, they will not have the same 
version of events. One’s father had died and the other had killed. They might not agree, 
but both stories are true.” 
Imagined geographies and memories of place, in Beirut, have many similarities 
to memories and counter-memories in South Africa and Israel / Palestine. In his study of 
spatial segregation during the apartheid years, Hall (2006) discusses how the physical, 
96 
material, and cultural landscape serves both to create closure through common 
interests and to challenge by way of counter-memories. These counter-memories 
challenge the oral histories. As Hall (2006) argues, counter-memories inadvertently 
create a discourse of identity and power-dynamics. Furthermore, in the case of 
‘segregated mixed cities’ in Israel and Palestine (Falah, 1996), the memories and 
counter-memories based on differences in ideological, social, political, and economic 
relations create an exclusive identity in the aftermath of ethnic violence.   
The cantonization of Beirut, therefore, creates memories within a community, 
and a counter-memory within opposing, ‘other’ communities. Concerning Hall’s 
argument, however, the element of power dynamics is rendered moot here due to the 
fact that every ethno-religious group has its own version of events, and by virtue their 
own memory. The counter-memories, therefore, are not the memories of the weak 
ethno-religious group; rather, counter-memories are the other side of the story; the 
version of events as ‘the other’ recounts it. These memories and counter-memories, 
consequently, become more exclusive as a result of the homogenous, closed-in 
communities in the segregated city.  
Jean-Paul, a young Maronite participant I met through a childhood friend, had 
this to say: “We grow up hearing one version of events and they (referring to Muslims) 
grow up hearing one version of events. The two versions of the civil war might, and 
probably do, conflict. The problem, however, is that we do not hear the other side until 
our version of events has been firmly established.” Jean-Paul, later on in the 
conversation, says that he never really delved into a deep political and religious 
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conversation with Muslim friends until he interacted with them more in college. Before 
attending l’Université Saint-Joseph de Beirut, Jean-Paul says that he never really 
interacted with Muslims. “Similarly,” he continues, “the other side does not hear our 
side until they’ve determined that their version is the correct one. This is a problem. It is 
a problem that there are competing histories, because every side favors their own 
version over the other side as the truth, which keeps us divided. It comes down to 
ethno-religious lines; we believe our version of events because it is what our people say 
happened. They believe their version of events because it is what their people say 
happened. We believe our version because of what their people did to us, and they 
believe their version because of what our people did to them.” 
With the spatialization of the capital city and the subsequent manifestation of 
contested memories, Maronites – and conversely other ethno-religious groups – 
privilege a certain part of history and ignore other parts (Hall, 2006), forming cultural 
and political identities through particular understandings of the city’s cultural 
geography. As Jean-Paul described, the younger generation comes to understand 
Beirut’s cultural geography through the lens of the previous generation – a generation 
whose memories and histories are no doubt influenced by the sectarian civil war. Many 
places and spaces in the city are viewed through the lens of events that occurred during 
the civil war; mostly events of sectarian violence. These are memories and histories that 
resent the ‘other’ and is the issue with people having a particular understanding of 
place.  
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Figure 5.2: Many residential buildings and neighborhoods will use religious statues and 
symbols to highlight the ethno-religious identity of the building / neighborhood. This 
picture was snapped in the entrance of a residential building in Achrafieh; the statue of 
the Virgin Marie (in white and blue) and Saint Rafqa (in the black garb of a nun) are a 
clear indicator that the building’s residents were Christian.  
 
While we were sitting, I overheard a lady speak in French with her waiter. The 
waiter, however, did not understand French; it was obvious by his Arabic dialect that he 
was a Syrian refugee. The lady knew that because although both the Lebanese and 
Syrians speak the Levantine dialect of Arabic, there are differences in pronunciation. So, 
while she was giving the waiter a hard time in French, he was telling her in Arabic that 
he cannot understand her. So, although she clearly understood him, she used the 
language barrier as an exclusive boundary.  
Boundaries are everywhere in Beirut, normally they designate who belongs and 
who doesn’t based on primarily one of two things: either ethno-religious affiliation, or 
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political affiliation. Beirutis, and Maronites, like to tell the world that co-existence is the 
Lebanese way; many will point to the downtown Beirut area with the Sunni Muhammad 
al-Amin’s mosque being adjacent to the Saint George Maronite Cathedral. This might 
have been true before the civil war; some of my participants confirm co-existence 
before the civil war. This is not to say, however, that there are no neutral spaces in the 
city.  
Martyr’s Square in front of Muhammad al-Amin mosque and the Saint George 
cathedral is definitely a neutral one having previously hosted demonstrations by both 
March 8th and March 14th political coalitions. More recently, the square saw both 
Christians and Muslims protest the “unity government” after events like the garbage 
crisis, the public-sector teachers not being paid, the protests to preserve the beaches 
and the mountains from commercial projects, among other things. Beyond Martyr’s 
square as a neutral space there aren’t many more places in the city.52 
Beyond this neutral space, there are some mixed areas in Beirut are typically 
public spaces and rarely residential areas – except for the high income neighborhoods. 
Nightlife spots are public-spaces only-so-much as you conform to what has already been 
established as normal. There are, however, historically Muslim streets that welcome the 
‘other’ – such as Hamra; conversely, there are historically Christian streets that welcome 
non-Christians such as Badaro and Gemmayzeh. In these mixed spaces, everyone is 
welcome and religious symbolism is minimal.   
                                                          
52 Jbeil, a town north of Beirut, is widely known and respected for being a neutral space. Residents of Jbeil 
will tell you that while Lebanon was torn apart during the civil war between Christians and Muslims, the 
inhabitants of Jbeil didn’t allow the divide to seep into their town.  
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There are many such examples in the city, recently, with Shi’as attending church 
in Mar Mikhael, and al-Dahiya decorating its streets for Christmas. On the other side, 
many Christian politicians have taken to congratulate and offer holiday wishes to 
Muslim politicians during their holidays. Government offices are also mixed spaces; the 
offices close for Christian holidays and Muslim holidays. Similarly, universities are also 
mixed spaces that close for Christian and Muslim holidays; more importantly, however, 
universities are usually the first space in which many Maronites encounter the ‘other.’  
While many universities hold hardcore student body elections that are heavily 
influenced by national political parties and sectarian slogans are shouted, they are 
nonetheless an officially neutral institution that welcomes everyone. Université Saint 
Joseph is the primary example. Three of my younger Maronite participants attended this 
university and it is there that they first encountered Druze and Sunni Muslims with 
whom they became friends. Although U.S.J. is officially Christian, it welcome students 
from all faiths – a long as you can afford the tuition.  
It is easier for institutions, however, to be neutral or mixed spaces because 
historically many of them do not hold sectarian or confessional identities. Streets like 
Hamra, Badaro, and Gemmayzeh, however, are more important in the sense that they 
offer real evidence of mixed spaces in an area historically affiliated with one ethno-
religious group or another. It is the youth that drives this intermingling, many of whom 
hang out with friends from different ethno-religious groups in the street cafés and 
restaurants along the sidewalks in Hamra, Badaro, and Gemmayzeh. Downtown Beirut, 
as well, having generally been contested territory during the civil war, is today home to 
101 
Marty’s Square – a square meant to commemorate everyone; its restaurants also 
welcome everyone with no religious symbolism other than the Muhammad al-Amin 
mosque and the Saint George cathedral towering overhead offering hope for solidarity 
to a post-conflict society. 
Preconceived ideas about a people or a place, typically are the result of, or result 
in, historical tensions; in the case of my research, confessional and ethno-religious 
tension is manifested in the segregation of the city.53 This segregation is not made any 
easier by the confessional political system employed in Lebanon that constantly 
reinforces ethno-religious identity. Memories of place are bound to imagined 
geographies through belonging. The sense of who belongs, and who does not belong, in 
certain places involve memories of place because it is in place that disputed narratives 
and contested memories collide. Renée, an interior-design student I interviewed used 
churches and bell tolling to illustrate belonging. “I know I belong in a place, and that it is 
safe for me when I see decorations for Christian holidays and know that I can hear the 
[church] bells toll during the holidays and on Sundays,” she said. “I have a friend who 
lives in a predominantly Sunni town, and although they have a church, you do not feel 
like you belong there because they do not put up decorations for our holidays, and they 
are scared to toll their church bells to call for mass. But if you look at Christian areas, 
                                                          
53 The animosity from the Christian lady towards her Syrian waiter is not rare. A majority of Christians in 
Lebanon hold animosity towards the Syrian people; they blame them for the actions perpetrated by their 
government. It is often repeated when Syria is mentioned that they kidnapped thousands of Christian 
youth during the civil war. I remember when I was young myself, my parents often told me to cover my 
cross in public when I was alone because it was not safe to signal that I was a Christian; at the time, 
Lebanon was occupied by Syria and there were Syrian checkpoints outside the city. 
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you know you belong because you can feel the holiday spirit and you are called to 
prayer by the tolling of the Church’s bells. 
 
Figure 5.3: In June of 2008, an armed confrontation occurred between Hezbollah 
loyalists and the Lebanese government and citizens. Hezbollah occupied Western Beirut 
for three days before tensions eased. The Lebanese government, at the time led by 
Sunnis, March 14th Christians, and Druze, had elected to shut down Hezbollah’s (Shi’a) 
communication network. The government had officially declared the communication 
network, outside of the Lebanese defense network, to be illegal. This picture in the 
denotes the old Christian – Muslim Green line, and the emerging Sunni – Shia line my 
participant Maroun had mentioned. (Shadid, 2007).  
 
103 
 
Figure 5.4: This picture taken in Ras Beirut shows a Stop Solidere sign hanging from the 
St. Georges hotel. The Solidere Project is usually attributed by Maronites as being the 
brainchild of Gulf-Arab and Sunni elites. It is perceived by many Maronites as 
encroachment by Sunni elite onto historically Maronite neighborhoods. 
 
5.2 Illustrating Beirut from a Maronite perspective 
This section of this chapter will examine how Maronite identity is experienced 
and played out in the representations, memories, and understandings of the cultural 
geography of the city, with a specific focus on what role, if any, the civil war of 1975-
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1990 played in processes of identity making. During my interview process, I discussed at 
length with my participants the ethno-religious nature of various Beiruti neighborhoods. 
Similar to Renée’s example, Beirut’s neighborhoods have different ethno-religious 
identities based on who lives there, and the symbols and boundaries demarcated by the 
occupants; for example, are there churches or mosques? Are there Christian symbols or 
not? What are the names of the local shops? What language are the signs? What 
political symbols / slogans are displaced on balconies and on the sides of buildings?   
Based on my interviews, and discussions I had during my trip I elected to draw 
two maps that would illustrate ethno-religious Beirut. The data gathered for these two 
maps stems from my interviews with 24 Maronite participants. Throughout the 
interview process, I spoke with both older Maronites, and younger Maronites about the 
different neighborhoods of Beirut and how they perceived the identity of these 
neighborhoods to be. For the maps, I compared and contrasted the information given to 
me about pre-1975 Beirut and contemporary Beirut after the civil war. It should be 
noted that both maps are a depiction of the city from a Maronite perspective, and in 
some cases the illustrated neighborhoods do not reflect the reality of the city; the 
illustrated maps are Beirut and its neighborhoods from a Maronite perspective. After I 
present my pre-civil war and contemporary maps, I use el-Chami’s (2013) illustration of 
the city to compare and contrast her objective data with the Maronite perspective.  One 
of the major topics of contention between the Maronite perspective and the reality of 
the city are going to be the neighborhoods of Zaqaq el-Blat, Bachoura, and Mar Elias.
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Figure 5.5: An illustration of pre-civil war of 1975 Beirut from a Maronite perspective. The pink neighborhood is 
known as the “American” neighborhood. 
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The pre-1975 civil war map depicts Beirut with the Green Line dividing it. The 
different neighborhoods are not the official neighborhoods / districts of Beirut. I 
designated the borders on the neighborhoods based on the information I received from 
my participants. For example, if an interviewee said that “an area is Maronite from here 
to here” then I drew my borders from where the person pointed, to where they said the 
certain population ended. Because I interviewed 24 participants, many of the borders 
did not align from one interview to the next; in these cases, I drew the border along the 
general consensus of my participants.  
What is immediately clear in looking at the pre-1975 map is that Sunni Muslims 
dominate Western Beirut and that Christians dominate Eastern Beirut. Sunni Muslims 
and Orthodox Christians in Western Beirut are the ‘old families’ of the city as both 
communities descend from merchant and business classes who migrated to the city 
during the Ottoman Empire when Beirut’s port was a major trading hub. Moreover, in 
Western Beirut we can see that Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Sunni 
Muslims lived with each other while the Maronites did not. In the map, it is evident that 
Maronites were near the port, and towards southern Beirut; they occupied their 
neighborhoods almost exclusively without the presence of any other ethno-religious 
group.  
Maronites were not the original Christian population of Beirut; in fact, many of 
the Maronites in Beirut would tell you that their family roots are from out-of-the-city 
towns. Many Maronites, after the events of the 19th century, fled to coastal cities like 
Beirut. Maronites live in the city because it offers better jobs, and schools, than the 
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towns their family is originally from. Eastern Beirut, in comparison, on the other side of 
the Green Line is almost exclusively Christian in nature. There are two major changes, 
however between this map and the post-civil war contemporary map. First, is the 
presence of what my interviewees termed the American neighborhood. Before the civil 
war, the United States had an embassy in Beirut, and all around it were American shops 
and restaurants, and Americans occupied the residential area all around it. In the 
contemporary map, the embassy and the American neighborhood are not present – 
after the Beirut embassy bombing, the American embassy closed, and the closest 
American embassy was in Damascus, Syria. Today, the American embassy is once again 
in Lebanon, however it is in Awkar, Mount Lebanon, in a Christian district that is very 
pro-West, anti-Hezbollah. The other notable difference between pre-civil war and 
contemporary Beirut is the complete absence of a sizeable Shi’a community before the 
civil war, and the Hezbollah stronghold in al-Dahiya in modern-day Beirut.  
Furthermore, while there are major ethno-religious groups living in different 
mixed neighborhoods, what we are about to see is that the neighborhoods after the civil 
war become much more homogenous in nature – no doubt a result of the cantons, 
sectarian violence, and ethno-religious based checkpoints. Mar Elias, notable in the pre-
1975 map because I marked it with horizontal Christian Orthodox and Roman Catholic 
markers is gone in the post-civil war contemporary map as you will see on the page 110. 
A residential neighborhood once predominantly Christian has become predominantly 
Muslim in nature as the civil war caused a migration of ethno-religious groups between 
Western and Eastern Beirut. When the militias established cantons during the civil war, 
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these pockets of influence where the various ethno-religious militias had control, many 
of the residents did not feel safe staying in their homes and this triggered a migration of 
communities from one side of the Green Line to the other. The result of this, as the 
illustration of contemporary Beirut from a Maronite perspective will show, is that 
neighborhoods became more homogenous and other than Sunni Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians in Western Beirut, very few neighborhoods – if any – remained where the 
residents were both Christian and Muslim. 
In this Maronite illustration of post-1990 Beirut, the only sizable Christian 
population that remains in East-Beirut according to my participants are the Christian 
Orthodox; in comparison to the pre-1975 illustration, Maronites and Catholics migrated 
over the Green Line into Eastern Beirut. Furthermore, the most significant change in the 
city today is the major Shi’a population that migrated to south Beirut from Southern 
Lebanon after the Israeli invasion during the civil war. When compared to the pre-1975 
map, much of southern Beirut that was once home to Maronites is now a Shi’a area; 
moreover, the area near the port that was previously mentioned to be exclusively 
Maronite is now a Sunni Muslim area. The area immediately bordering the Green Line 
seems to have Maronites alongside it; whether it is a Majority Maronite neighborhood, 
or a Christian Orthodox neighborhood with a sizeable Maronite presence. Furthermore, 
there is one neighborhood that needs to be mentioned and that is Zaqaq-el-Blat. Before 
the civil war, the neighborhood was illustrated by my interviewees as being home to a 
majority Christian Orthodox neighborhood, but also home to a sizeable Sunni Muslim 
community.
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Figure 5.6: An illustration of modern-day Beirut from a Maronite perspective. 
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Post-civil war, and in the contemporary illustration, my participants noted that 
Zaqaq-el-Blat and Bachoura neighborhoods are almost exclusively Christian Orthodox in 
identity. Yasmina al-Chami’s (2013) work however, denotes that Zaqaq al-blat and 
Bachoura are low-density high-income Druze, and high density high income Sunni 
Muslim respectively. It is possible that my participants denoted the area to be Christian 
because the Christian Orthodox Patriarchy is in the area; what can be extracted from 
this, however, is that the Maronite recollection of the city’s neighborhoods and their 
identities does not always reflect the empirical reality. 
When I asked Robert’s mom on what else besides sectarian violence could have 
resulted in the more homogenous neighborhoods, she talked to me about the urban 
displacement of Christians and Muslims during the civil war. She says: “al-bouyout al-
mousadara (Arabic: ةرداصملا تويبلا; translation: Confiscated, or Seized homes) played a 
major role, but they came as a result of the sectarian violence.” An occupied home, as 
Robert’s mom explained, is a home that was evacuated during the civil war because the 
family fled. Most often, these homes were left behind by one ethno-religious group, and 
then occupied by “the other.”  
 She explains: “Our neighbor here, in the second floor. They do not own the 
home, but before the civil war they lived in al-Gharbiyyeh (Western Beirut). During the 
civil war, the previous occupants of the home moved across the Green Line. What 
happened is that Christians who lived in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods crossed 
over the Green Line and took up residence in an abandoned home; a home probably 
abandoned by a Muslim family who left a Christian neighborhood to go and live among 
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other Muslims so they can feel safe.” What was essentially happening is that families of 
a certain ethno-religious affiliation were leaving their immediate ‘uneasy’ surrounding 
environment, and either leaving the country, or migrating to a neighborhood where 
their ethno-religious identity was dominant. Because neighborhoods and districts were 
protected by sectarian militias, families were fleeing to a neighborhood where they can 
safely cross the checkpoints. As such, throughout the civil war, families and households 
were being displaced, or leaving voluntarily, and moving into the now-vacated homes. In 
essence, these homes were now seized, or confiscated, by those who had now moved 
into a neighborhood that shared their ethno-religious identity. The house, now occupied 
by a family that is not the rightful owner, is now mousadar. Al-Bouyout al-Mousadara, 
therefore, as Robert’s mom notes, played a role in the contemporary segregation of 
Beirut’s neighborhoods. “It is rare,” she says, “for the previous owners to come back 
and claim their property.” 
Al-Bouyout al-Mousadara is evidence that Christians and Muslims lived in a 
pluralistic city before the civil war. My participants noted that many families left their 
homes and moved across the Green Line to a neighborhood where they felt safe. 
Therefore, it only stands to reason that Christians and Muslims lived with each other 
before the civil war. As Mona, an elder participant, noted to me: “You could go to the 
market on Wednesdays when they brought fresh fruits and vegetables and you couldn’t 
tell who was Muslim and who was Christian. There wasn’t this strong showing of one’s 
religion before the civil war that there is today. Many Muslim women did not veil like 
they do today; Muslim women played sports with Christian women. Men played sports 
 112 
with Muslim men. No one wore a Hijab, and no one used a person’s religion against 
them. But after the civil war, both sides got more aggressive with their religion. You 
started to see more Islamic influence in Muslim communities, and more Christian 
influence in our communities. The Maronite church always played a major role in 
Lebanese politics, but never as openly and publicly on the television as they do today.” 
She continues saying “Yes, you could go to the market or go walk on the beach 
and buy ice-cream or corn and butter from one of the carts and you didn’t think to 
yourself ‘what is he?’ or ‘what is she?’ Nowadays, you can’t go to the market anymore 
because there isn’t a market in downtown anymore where farmers come to sell their 
produce. Today, your neighborhood has a local grocery store and usually you will go to 
someone from the same ethno-religious group as you to shop for groceries. There are 
two Egyptian brothers up the street from here, yes? I think their vegetables are better 
than the grocery store here, but if I go and I buy my groceries from them then people in 
this building are going to talk about why I went and I gave money to Muslim Egyptians 
instead of an elderly Lebanese Christian man.” 
Mona explains that Christians before the war thought of themselves in terms of 
Phoenicianism and Christian faith, and the Muslims probably viewed themselves in 
terms of Arabism and Muslim faith. “The civil war however” she says, “hardened these 
lines and made it so that if you were Christian, Muslims were your enemy; and if you are 
Muslim, Christians are your enemy. It wasn’t always like that, Muslims and Christians 
were far more civil with one another than we are today.” Mona finishes by saying that 
the civil war divided the different Lebanese communities; ethno-religious identity 
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became much more invasive and influenced daily life much more than before. “I am not 
remembering it better than it was, and I am not changing the truth. I was alive before 
the civil war, and maybe it wasn’t in all of Beirut where neighborhoods were 50-50, but 
Christians and Muslims lived with each other. The civil war changed that, families moved 
from one side of the city to the other to feel safe. You can see the change because you 
have families living in homes and they don’t have the ownership deeds for them” – 
Mona was referencing Al-Bouyout al-Mousadara. 
A resident of Ayn-al-Remmaneh, a neighborhood right alongside the Green Line, 
an elderly participant Badiaa told me: “There are many tales of such homes becoming 
the place of residence for families who were displaced; most of these families 
abandoned their homes in unfriendly neighborhoods, usually due to their ethno-
religious identity not being shared by the majority of the other residents, and moved 
into other homes similarly abandoned by other families.” The result of this then became 
a homogenization of neighborhoods where one ethno-religious group or another 
became dominant as a result of ‘the other’ packing up and moving. This process then, 
al-bouyout al mousadara, undoubtedly made the cantonization of Beirut easier for the 
sectarian militias: neighborhoods adopted homogenous ethno-religious identities.  
During the process of drawing Beirut’s neighborhoods from a Maronite 
perspective, there was the possibility of nostalgia and imagined geographies in the back 
of my mind. I looked for other research that could have possibly mapped out the ethno-
religious make-up of Beirut’s neighborhoods so that I could compare it to the map I 
drew of Beirut from a Maronite perspective. I found Yasmina el-Chami’s (2013) 
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illustration of post-civil war (See Figure 5.7 below) Beirut and found it not too far-
removed from the description given to me by my Maronite participants.  
 
Figure 5.7: el-Chami’s (2013) post-civil war map illustrates the major ethno-religious 
groups in the various Beiruti neighborhoods and districts. Furthermore, el-Chami’s 
illustration demonstrates the neighborhoods density and economic status as well.  
 
The only major difference is the predominantly Druze neighborhood, Zaqaq el-
Blat, she has in the north-western part of Beirut. In her study, el-Chami (2013) notes 
that as much as 25% of the city’s population had been displaced due to the civil war. El-
Chami (2013) argues that it resulted in the change of communal distribution of not only 
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Beirut’s neighborhoods and districts, but the whole country as well. The congregation of 
people among people of similar ethno-religious backgrounds spread outwards from 
Beirut, happening in all parts of Lebanon (el-Chami, 2013). 
As Demonstrated by Figure 5.8, ethno-religious identities go beyond confessional 
rites and political affiliation. Ethno-religious labels are even attributed to various civic 
institutions. El-Chami (2013) in her research also has maps detailing Christian hospitals 
and Muslim hospitals in the city. What is important in relation to education systems 
being categorized into Christian and Islamic natures is the fact that one is preferred over 
the other. As demonstrated by my young participants in the next chapter, the French 
curriculum of Christian schools is preferred to that of Islamic schools. Whereas the 
Christian schools teach Arabic, French, and English, Arab “Islamic” schools typically stick 
to Arabic.  
Furthermore, Christian schools teach STEM fields in English or French which 
opens the door for academic and job opportunities abroad – mainly in the United States 
or Europe.54  In contrast, with Islamic schools using Arabic to teach STEM fields, the 
graduating student is less competitive in the academic and job markets. Tanya, Jean-
Paul’s girlfriend who sat with us during the interview, says: “the education systems also 
further keep us divided. It is hard to get a good salary job if you only speak Arabic – 
most will ask for English and French fluency on top of Arabic. With the two education 
systems, I can sort of understand some of their resentment.” Tanya and Jean-Paul then 
                                                          
54 Jean-Paul, one of my young participants, who studied at the University of Saint Joseph graduated their 
Pharm.D. program with a year at the University of Texas. His degree is accredited here in the United 
States and allows him to work without the need to have it evaluated.  
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go on to explain that the system privileges Christians and the wealthy who can afford 
Christian and Western-oriented curriculums while public schools and Islamic schools 
adopt the less-desired Arabic curriculum. 
 
Figure 5.8: In this map, el-Chami (2013) marks modern-day schools and universities in 
Beirut. It is interesting to see that the center of Beirut, and west of the Green Line, the 
education institutions are predominantly Islamic (with the exception of A.U.B. in the big 
red and white area in north-eastern Beirut). In contrast, all the schools in Eastern Beirut 
are Christian in nature. Most notable, however, is that there are no Islamic schools or 
universities in Eastern Beirut while there are a quite a few Christian schools in the 
western parts. It is quite possible that these schools are a remnant of the pre-civil war 
demographics of the city; a time when Orthodox Christians and Catholics lived among 
the majority-Sunni neighborhoods.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 In summary, as demonstrated by the maps and my participants, Beirut’s ethno-
religious segregation and heavy use of confessional identity serves to reinforce the 
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sectarian divide of the city, and the country as a whole. The cantons of the civil war have 
given Beirut’s contemporary neighborhoods the foundation with which ethno-religiously 
segregated neighborhoods exist. First, the dominant homogenous groups in 
contemporary Beirut function in a way that emphasizes ethno-religious identity, 
whether through symbols, language, – a process that sharply hastened during the civil 
war because of ethno-religious identity being a primary cause of migration and 
displacement.  Examples of this phenomenon were given by my participants and my 
experience when shops and restaurants were designated Christian or Muslim based on 
the religious identity of the owned. 
 Second, language is used as a means to construct arbitrary, mobile boundaries. 
As evidenced by the lady at the restaurant, and the names of places, and the close 
association of French with Phoenician nationalism and Lebanese particularism, language 
is used as a designator of ethno-religious identity. Pharmacies, for example, will usually 
have Christian or Arab names, a signifier of the owner’s ethno-religious identity and of 
who belongs and who does not belong. Furthermore, as Renée said, there are 
Maronites who use churches and bell tolling as a means to designate who belongs and 
who does not belong.  
Third, although the Maronite illustration of Beiruti place and space might have 
nostalgia and bias embedded in its recollection, it is not too far removed from el-
Chami’s objective depiction of Beirut’s ethno-religious make-up. What is significant, 
however, is that ethno-religious identity has permeated educational institutions – a civic 
entity that should remain secular as education is a human right. What we see, however, 
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as told by my younger participants, is that education is used to keep the divide amongst 
the younger generation; a divide further highlighted by the post-civil war depiction of 
Beirut that shows that neighborhoods are more segregated today. As we are about to 
see in the next chapter, the homogenous bubbles that make-up Beirut are detrimental 
to the future well-being of the city and the country. Because these neighborhoods are 
exclusive, and because they form contested boundaries, what is happening inside is that 
the population is fostering the exclusive traits of their identity that separate them from 
‘the other.’ There is no interaction with the ‘other.’ 
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CHAPTER 6 
REINFORCING MARONITE IDENTITY IN BEIRUT’S ACHRAFIEH 
NEIGHBORHOOD
“For us Maronites, Achrafieh is our constitution.” 
- Maroun, a Maronite civil war veteran. 
Interview with author, July 2016 
 
This chapter mobilizes literature that addresses identity theory, and theories of 
space, place, and belonging in cultural geography toward an examination of Maronite 
identity and processes of identity-making in Achrafieh. To recall a key argument from 
Chapter 2, identity is a continually evolving, and fluid process that requires an arena, or 
space, in which the process occurs. That space, in turn, contributes to and is also 
changed by that process. Achrafieh is the space and place in Beirut most important to 
processes of shaping Maronite identity.  
The general consensus that can be extracted from my conducted interviews is 
that while Beirut itself does not shape Maronite identity, the various neighborhoods and 
districts in Beirut laden with Christian memory and nostalgia inform Maronite identity. 
Every neighborhood or district described to me as playing a role in shaping, or informing 
Maronite identity, was cited in relation to the civil war; something happened there that 
still influences Maronite identity in the city today. Achrafieh – a district in Beirut – 
surfaced in my interviews as the district that most shapes and informs Maronite 
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identity.55 Maronites from all three participant categories mentioned Achrafieh. 
Interestingly, however, Achrafieh’s role is perceived differently by the different 
generations. 
Maronite identity appears to be undergoing a change when we compare the 
older generation who lived during the civil war and the younger generation that did not. 
The data gathered from my interviews demonstrates that the role of Achrafieh in 
informing Maronite identity is mainly political and religious for the older generations. In 
contrast, Achrafieh’s influence on the younger generation, that never experienced the 
civil war, it is more cultural than it is political. For example, older Maronites would use 
Achrafieh to talk about the civil war; perceived by many as the bedrock of Lebanese 
Forces ideology and support. For younger Maronites, Achrafieh is important to them 
because unlike al-Dahiya, you can meet foreign students who rent in local dorms, or 
foreigners who come down to Achrafieh’s pubs at night. The perception of Maronite 
youth is that you would not find this in Shi’a areas. 
Achrafieh is a district with an almost completely Christian identity. Historically, it 
was a district of wealthy Orthodox Christians before Maronites migrated from the 
mountains after the events of 1860. The signs are in French, hospitals and schools have 
French names, and Gemmayzeh street on the weekend is arguably the prime night-life 
spot in all of Lebanon. A progressive, ‘othered,’ Hezbollah-voting Shi’ite may come down 
to Achrafieh, however attachment to place, groups, and cultures plays a role in 
belonging (Cresswell, 1996; Antonsich, 2010). It may be believed that a transgression is 
                                                          
55 See Appendix A: Questions 21; 22 
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not occurring; on the other side, however, a hardcore Lebanese Forces-voting, 
conservative Maronite will perceive the Shi’a as transgressing simply by belonging to a 
different ethno-religious or political party. 
When I was in Lebanon, one of my best friends here in the United States 
travelled down to Lebanon at the same time to visit family in the south. My friend is a 
devout Shi’ite; in public, it is obvious he is because he wears an Imam Ali sword necklace 
and his wife dresses in conservative robes and a hijab. In Achrafieh, they stand out. We 
went out to a restaurant one night, and you could feel everyone looking over at our 
table. To the Christian crowd at the restaurant, my friend and his wife were 
transgressing simply by virtue of being Muslims in Achrafieh. The perception is that 
Muslims fought Christians in the civil war, and Shi’ites are political and ideological 
opponents of the Kataeb and Lebanese Forces political parties; their view of Lebanon’s 
identity is incompatible. The very fact that my friend bore his Imam Ali dagger and his 
wife was veiled could be perceived as offensive because they dared to do it openly in 
Achrafieh. 
For some Maronites, even other Christians could be considered as transgressing 
if they are pegged to be supporters of General Aoun and anti-Lebanese Forces; in this 
case, the exclusion is political in nature. The Christian transgressor does not belong 
because it is perceived that their political ideals clash with the political ideals that 
Achrafieh itself represents. Transgression and belonging go beyond conformity: what 
place, or group, or culture do you belong to? Compared to other neighborhoods, and 
districts, even Maronite neighborhoods like Ayn al-Remmaneh, or Haddath, you will find 
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in those places Maronites who disagree politically; Maronites on completely different 
ends of the spectrum ranging between those who support Hezbollah,56 and those who 
view it as a terrorist organization.57 
Maronite youth learn about the 1975 civil war from stories that depict Christians 
and ‘others.’58 Within Lebanon’s Christian communities there are many prominent 
Maronite leaders, tied to the civil war, who are revered; leaders like Pierre Gemayel, 
Camille Chamoun, Suleiman Franjieh, and later Michele Aoun. These leaders, at one 
point, believed in al-Qadiyyah (Arabic: ة
ّ
يدقلا; translation: the cause) – the fight for a 
sovereign non-Arab Lebanese state.59 The belief in al-Qadiyyah is one of the exclusive 
forms of political thought fostered in Achrafieh. When I asked my Maronite participants 
what place in Lebanon mostly informed Maronite identity, the unanimous answer was 
Achrafieh. Of the 28 people I asked during my field research, all 28 invoked Achrafieh as 
‘the place’ that most informs Maronite identity in Beirut. For the older generation, and 
civil war veterans, it is because the district represents the Christian militias’ struggle for 
the cause. For the younger generation, it is Achrafieh’s cosmopolitan aura and its night 
scene: the pubs and the nightclubs; it is Achrafieh’s progressive, liberal attitude that 
does not exist in the more orthodox Muslim parts of Beirut.  
                                                          
56 Maronites who support Hezbollah are usually part the March 8th coalition; this is the modern-day pro-
Syrian, pro-Iran political alliance. 
57 Maronites who are against Hezbollah are usually Maronites who are independent or part of the March 
14th coalition. 
58 As stated in Chapter 2, the events of the 1975 are not taught in school. Therefore, the Lebanese youth 
comes to adopt the event through their parents’ and the older generations’ learned memories. These 
learned memories are inherently tinted with bias and pre-conceptions made of the ‘other’ based on civil 
war events. 
59 Al-Qadiyyah was primarily fought for by the Christian militia groups that later formed the Lebanese 
Forces. 
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Maroun, a civil war veteran, described Achrafieh so: “You’re from America. You 
have a constitution. For us Maronites, Achrafieh is our constitution. You asked me what 
place in Beirut represents me as a Maronite, and it is without a doubt Achrafieh. Anyone 
who tells you different is lying. Achrafieh represents the ideas and values we fought 
for.” For many Maronites, the hope for al-Qadiyyah started with the young charismatic 
Maronite leader Bashir Gemayel and ended with him. After his death, some Maronites 
argue that the civil war continued as a struggle for power between the Maronite 
warlords and not as a struggle towards the cause. Members of the Lebanese Forces 
during the civil war I interviewed argue that the Lebanese resistance – as the Christian 
resistance was colloquially known – began with Bashir and the Kataeb party in Achrafieh 
and ended with him on the day of his assassination in the bombing of Achrafieh’s 
Kataeb headquarters two weeks after he was elected president. To this day, Maronites 
and Christians lament the assassination of Bashir Gemayel and talk of what could have 
been. 
Based on the data gathered from my older participants who were members of 
the Lebanese Forces during the civil war, the assassination of Bashir, then the president-
elect, cemented Achrafieh’s place in Maronite memory as the place that most informs 
their identity in Beirut. Bashir embodied al-Qadiyyah and a sovereign non-Arab 
Lebanon. Therefore, in the minds of the older Maronite community, his assassination 
was perceived as an attack on their identity and their vision for Lebanon. This memory, 
and the meanings it carries, serves as a means for Maronites to create the ‘other.’ It 
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becomes a tool through which to measure those whose values are not compatible with 
their Christian values and political vision.  
As some of my participants put it, the ‘other’ dresses differently. Tim Box, a 
younger participant, says: “They (Shi’a) wear these jeans with bedazzles on the back-
pockets with formal dress shoes. We would never wear something like that. I don’t have 
to talk to them to know they aren’t Christian.”60 The ‘other’ smells differently. Marwan, 
an older participant says: “they use these Arab hand-crafted colognes. If you cannot tell 
from the way they dress, sometimes you can tell from their cologne because it smells 
different.” All of my participants also agreed that the ’other’ talks differently. My 
participants agreed that they can usually tell a Shi’a from their Arabic dialect; in 
contrast, Sunnis are harder to make-out in conversation – especially if they are educated 
– because their pronunciation is similar to Christians. Druze, unless from rural areas, are 
the hardest to peg for my participants because their pronunciation is almost identical to 
Christians and they tend to be educated so they are also fluent in French. The older 
participants also highlighted the fact that the ‘other’ eats differently, referring to Halal 
meat. 
Achrafieh is the “Maronites’ and Christians’ socio-economic powerhouse district 
in Beirut. “Our political power stems from the president’s palace in Baabda, but our 
social and economic power rests in Achrafieh. It is our schools and businessmen that 
                                                          
60 Tim Box was talking about identifying male Shi’a out on the streets. For many younger participants, 
females were easier to identify mostly due to the hijab or the burka. My participants generally agreed that 
the hijab was equally worn by Sunnis and Shi’a – if it is tight, it meant the family was devout or orthodox 
in their faith; if it was loose it meant that the family was more moderate, and progressive. The Burka was 
almost always identified with Shi’a exclusively; most citing that they only see it in al-Gharbiyyeh when 
going to the post office or the airport. 
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keep Beirut a powerhouse today,” as André, a Maronite Lebanese Forces civil-war 
veteran told me. Achrafieh, for him like many others, is the place in Beirut most 
Maronites take pride in. As recounted by my research participants: It is the birthplace of 
the 2005 cedar revolution that ousted the Syrian armies from Lebanese territory. It is 
the place where Hassan Nasrallah’s authority, and the ideology of Hezbollah, does not 
dare extend.61 Achrafieh is “Christian land that promotes and reinforces strong 
Maronite leadership,” André said.62 
As stated earlier, the district of Achrafieh was overwhelmingly cited by all three 
groups of my research participants: the authoritative, the older, and the younger 
groups, as the place in Beirut that played a role in informing Maronite identity. 
Achrafieh, after all, is renowned for being a Christian district. Geographically, it is in 
Eastern Beirut – it is therefore assumed, based on the Green Line that materialized 
during the civil war, that it has a Christian population and identity. As such, this chapter 
will extract personal and cultural memories recounted by Maronites in my interviews 
and analyze and contextualize them in order to better understand the role Achrafieh 
plays in informing and reinforcing Maronite identity. Achrafieh, therefore, will be 
examined as a homogenous space that reinforces Maronite identity through communal 
sharing of learned cultural memories.  
 
                                                          
61 When asked why Achrafieh was their nominated place in Beirut that most informs, or represents, 
Maronite identity, a common response was that it was a refuge from Hezbollah’s influence and ideology. 
Many comparisons were made conversely by the younger Maronite generation about Achrafieh’s 
progressive nature as opposed to Hezbollah’s al-Dahiya neighborhood and their ‘regressive’ nature. 
62 Many of the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb’s political speeches, gatherings, and festivals are held in 
Achrafieh’s Sassine Square. Achrafieh is the bedrock of support for them. 
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6.1 Identity 
To better understand the Maronite community of Achrafieh, it is important to 
reiterate that Maronites trace their origins to the early fourth Century and Mar (Saint) 
Maroun.63 Every single participant affirmed that Maronites are not Arab and cite Syriac, 
the almost-forgotten language of the Maronites, as proof; Syriac is a dialect of Aramaic, 
a Semitic language. To further uphold the argument that Maronites are not Arab, many 
of the older participants informed me that Syriac is being taught in rural Maronite 
churches again and that there is hope for it to be taught in schools soon; those 
participants even seemed to take pride in the fact.64 As it stands, however, Syriac is 
mostly used today in Maronite church liturgy and Maronite bibles. Amongst themselves, 
Maronites will typically speak a mix of English, French, and Arabic.65 
Although there is disagreement over their origin, the identity of Maronites has 
been an ever-evolving process, shaped and molded by navigating complex social, 
political, and economic variables encountered over the centuries, resulting in a complex 
contemporary identity. The 1975 civil war further complicates matters for the younger 
generation owing to the learned memories of the civil war – these memories, informing 
their identity, convey the bias inherent to the lived experience of the previous 
                                                          
63 This assertion was reinforced by many of my participants; some of whom even went beyond the fourth 
century and stressed that Maronites are descended from the Aramaic Tribes and Ancient Assyria.  
64 As demonstrated later in this chapter, language seems to play a major role in Maronite identity; 
whereas Christians prefer to identity with the French and English languages, they perceive Arabic to be 
the language of Muslims and others (for example, the Druze). Many of the younger Maronites increasingly 
use English words in their communication; replacing words that previously would have been in Arabic or 
French.  
65 The common joke is that a typical Maronite greeting is: “Hi, Kifak, ça va?” with Hi being an English 
greeting, Kifak being Levantine Arabic for ‘how are you,’ and ca va being French for ‘everything’s is okay?’ 
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generation. Many scholars are in agreement in the fact that these two political 
ideologies are incompatible, and increasingly embody an ethno-religious tone and 
identity (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 1995; Sirriyeh, 1998; Firro, 2004; Kaufman, 2004; Weiss, 
2004; Salameh, 2015). On the one hand, the Christians’ Lebanese particularism is an 
attempt at creating a unique Lebanese identity that is separate from the majority Sunni 
Arab majority. On the other hand, the Muslims’ Pan-Arabism has its loyalties lying 
outside the borders of Lebanon, aimed towards the broader identity of the Middle 
Eastern region, and Arab countries as a whole. Maronite youth, therefore, comes to 
view anyone who supports pan-Arab views as the ‘other,’ and by virtue of this fact, they 
are viewed as someone who is against their own political views.  
Today, Lebanese society remains divided in spite of the across-the-aisle political 
coalitions formed by the political elite.  The differences among the different ‘mansions’ 
have come to be reflected geographically. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
effective cantonization of Lebanon, and the massive population movement between 
Christian and Muslim areas have hardened the lines of division and served to further 
highlight the differences amongst the ethno-religious groups as a form of political 
identity (Salibi, 1988; Kaufman, 2004; Fregonese, 2009). This image appears to be 
changing though, as many of the participants in my younger generation groups noted: 
they have more interaction with non-Christians than their parents, and as a result have 
more non-Christian friends with whom they communicate and hang out. Older and 
younger participants also noted that Sunnis, more-so than Shi’ites, are increasingly 
moving into their neighborhoods.  
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One participant, even, who wished to be identified as Sari says that he is a 
constituent of the Progressive Socialist Party – headed by Walid Jumblatt, a Druze.66 30 
years prior this would have been almost unheard of because Christians were on one side 
of the political isle, and the Druze with the Palestinians and Sunnis on the other. Even 
today, this is an extremely rare occurrence: in Lebanese politics, political parties tend to 
be associated with one or more ethno-religious groups based on the majority base of 
said political party. The Progressive Social Party, for example, tends to be associated 
with the Druze ethno-religious group that makes up the majority of its constituency.  
As many interviewed participants recounted, Achrafieh is where the Lebanese 
resistance started. Achrafieh, therefore, is symbolic in that it is regarded as the 
vanguard for the Christians’ vision of Lebanese particularism. The interviewed 
participants broadly assert that the Muslims’ loyalties lay elsewhere – outside the 
borders of Lebanon. To illustrate: many of those interviewed contend that the loyalty of 
Shi’a Muslims is not to Lebanon but to Iran and their Grand Ayatollah, or to Hezbollah 
whose standalone militia and economy in al-Dahiya as viewed as a “state within a 
state.” Marwan said to me: “How can you build a sovereign nation, deserving of the 21st 
century, when your own civil servants are afraid to bring law and order to al-Dahiya?” 
The difference, he says is that “Maronites are loyal to our borders, it is true that we look 
outward for support but our priority is the Lebanese state. The Shi’as’ priority is their 
Ayatollah in Iran, and what he says, his puppets Hezbollah do.” Similarly, the same 
participants view Sunnis as loyal to Saudi Arabia and acting on their orders; the 
                                                          
66 The majority of the party’s base is also Druze; their base is in Alley – a Druze district in Mount Lebanon. 
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perception is that Sunni politicians receive their direction from Riyadh. The Druze, 
however, which mainly the older group talked about in length, appear for them to be 
loyal to Lebanon; some noted that this was true only so far-in as the loyalty to Lebanon 
benefitted them. There was agreement among all participant categories, however, that 
the loyalty of the Druze community, in comparison to Sunnis and Shi’as, lay within the 
borders of Lebanon. 
The incompatibility of the Maronites’ Lebanese particularism and the Sunnis’ 
pan-Arabism came to a head in 1977 when Christian militias began to target the Syrian 
Army who had intervened on behalf of the Palestinians in Lebanon (Salibi, 1988; Phares, 
1995 Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004; Kaufman, 2014). In the recollection of the 
Maronites, this was the turning point of the civil war where sectarian undertones began 
to manifest themselves. Up to that point, the conflict had largely been confined to the 
Christian militias and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. During the time I spent 
between Achrafieh, and Ain-el-Remmaneh – the first an overwhelmingly Christian 
district and the second a majority Maronite neighborhood steeped in civil war nostalgia 
and Lebanese Particularism ideology –  I got the feeling from talking to people on the 
street, and families of interviewed participants that the P.L.O. was the perpetrator of 
the civil war. The majority of my participants and people I talked to blamed the civil war 
on the Palestinians; the idea was that Palestinians wanted to throw the Christians to the 
sea and take over Lebanon since Palestine was taken from them. Once that viewpoint 
was echoed, the usual follow-up was that the civil war of 1975 became a pro-West 
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versus pro-Arab because Muslims rallied around the Palestinians against the Christians 
who received aid from the West and Israel.  
To this day, in the eyes of the Maronite community, Palestinians are still seen as 
solely responsible for instigating the 15-year conflict that turned into a sectarian civil 
war. However, while the older interviewed participants argue that the Christian militias 
were set up to protect and safeguard the Christian neighborhoods and communities, 
many of the younger interviewed participants disputed the fact. Instead, the younger 
participants admitted that political aspirations, and lust for power played a role – 
especially when Maronite leaders turned on each other towards the end of the civil war. 
Originally a small-scale conflict, mostly about the future of Lebanon, the 
intervention of the Syrian Army on behalf of the Palestinians, and the involvement of 
Iraqi and Libyan mercenaries, painted a sectarian background to the war. Maronites in 
the interviews argue that the Syrians intervened on behalf of the Palestinians in order to 
prop up their neighboring Muslims; a fact that did not sit well with the Catholic 
Maronites. Achrafieh, therefore, is seen as the birthplace of armed resistance that 
fought to preserve Maronite and Lebanese identity; it is “the pride of the Christian 
resistance in Lebanon” and the reason Christians remain in the Middle-East according to 
André, a Maronite civil war veteran participant. 
Achrafieh, because of its ties to Bashir Gemayel and the Lebanese Forces, is 
therefore depicted as a district that fought for the Christians’ Lebanese particularism. 
This idea of Lebanese particularism resurfaced time and again whenever I interviewed a 
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veteran of the civil war’s Christian militias,67 or a participant from a known Lebanese-
Forces neighborhood. As Elias, one former member of the Lebanese Forces told me, 
1977 marked the start of a “pre-emptive war to protect Christian identity against the 
Muslim, Pan-Arab movement. We felt that they wanted to throw us in the sea and take 
over. We defended ourselves.” For many Maronites the civil war extended beyond 
politics. To Elias, Achrafieh was the “beacon of hope because no enemy was able to 
break us there until one of our own assassinated Sheikh Bashir.”68 
The Maronite memory of the civil war, therefore, is a struggle to protect their 
existence and identity against a pan-Arab ideology they believed threatened their way 
of life. “We fought for our way of life, a Christian way of life and that of Christian 
values,” Elias said. “We never tried to force them to come to our restaurants and drink 
alcohol, or spend the night smoking and listening to loud Western music. But we saw 
their (Muslims) pan-Arab ideology as a dangerous regressive step towards forcing us to 
conform to their way of life.”69 Elias, from the mountainous village of Batroun – a 
predominantly Maronite village – moved to Achrafieh shortly after the civil-war fighting 
began. By his own admittance, he had become an atheist and resented the Christians 
and favored the secular socialist parties but the death of his father steered him back 
                                                          
67 It was not as strong a focal point when the participant was part of the Lebanese Army as opposed to the 
coalition of Christian Militias – known as the Lebanese Forces. 
68 Bashir Gemayel was sometimes referred to as Sheikh Bashir – owing to his Family’s heritage and 
political prowess in Lebanon’s Bekfaya town. Many political leaders are referred to as Sheikh, a remnant 
of the Ottoman occupation that charged political elites in keeping their ethno-religious groups in check. 
69 Many Maronites cite the harassment of Restaurants open during the daytime in the holy month of 
Ramadan; they argue that if this happens when the powers are balanced, what would happen if the scales 
were tipped in favor of the Muslims over the Christians? 
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towards his faith and the cause. He joined the Kataeb political party’s militia before it 
merged into what later became the Lebanese Forces. “The cause,” he says “reignited 
the fire of faith in me. I joined the Lebanese Forces when I saw with my own eyes 
Christians being captured at checkpoints for the only reason that their I.D. cards showed 
they were Christians. We were fighting for our faith, and our way of life and in these 
parts of the world the two are one and the same.”  
 
Figure 6.1: The Lebanese Forces cross is usually seen spray-painted around Beirut’s 
conservative Christian neighborhoods. Usually those closely associated with the 
Lebanese Forces. In Arabic under the cross, it reads: “So that our church bells may keep 
tolling.” Originally the symbol of the Lebanese Forces, it has since been replaced at the 
request of the Maronite Patriarch. At the time of its conception, however, the cross had 
three main meanings: First, the cross was a representation of the militias’ Christian 
faith; it is red to honor the martyrs who died for the cause. The second meaning of the 
cross was an illustration of Jesus Christ carrying the cross – an illustration of Eastern 
Christians’ suffering for their faith throughout history. The third, and final, meaning of 
the cross is the cut at its base – it signifies that Christians will remain planted / rooted in 
this region. 
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Jean-Paul, and a group of his friends, mirrored a viewpoint similar to Elias when 
they collectively argued that they do not have an issue with Muslims coming over to 
Achrafieh as long as they assimilate. “How can you tell that someone is Muslim if they 
dress like you, and they are dancing, and drinking, and smoking? You cannot, and it does 
not matter what their religion is when they share the same values and lifestyle as you,” 
Jean-Paul Said. “The problem is when they come over, 10-15 of them on motorbikes and 
they play loud Hassan Nasrallah speeches and Hezbollah glory songs and start harassing 
you because of your lifestyle and different political views.” The problem, therefore, for 
Maronite youth as opposed to the older generation, is concerning the idea of who 
belongs and who doesn’t belong. Unlike the older participants, they do not care about 
the ‘other’ coming over to Achrafieh, even if they were not Christian, as long as they 
assimilate and act as they do. The problem, for Maronite youth, is with the ‘other’ 
coming over and attempting to force a way of life, and political ideology, upon them; 
this, then, reflects what Elias was talking about earlier when he mentioned his fear of 
Muslim ideology that would force him (and by virtue the Christians) to conform to a 
more conservative, Arab way of life. 
 Memories like Elias’ and countless others who were members of Christian 
militias and who believed in their cause, are powerful forces cultivated by lived 
experiences, and emotions (Johnson, 2003; 2012; Hall, 2006); these memories were 
passed down from one Maronite generation to the next. The strong identification of 
Maronite identity with Achrafieh further exacerbates these memories because Maronite 
youth is constantly reminded that Achrafieh is where the Christian resistance and its 
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ideology began, and this creates a type of pride, and pressure, to live up to such a 
legacy; there is a pressure to safeguard Christian identity and pride in the fact that, 
according to the older Maronite participants, Lebanon remains one of the only countries 
in the Arab world where Christians are not persecuted. In contrast to Elias’ recollection 
of Achrafieh’s role in safeguarding Christian values and way of life, Maronite youth 
appeared to echo a similar viewpoint of Achrafieh.  
As one participant noted: “At least in Lebanon, Christians can build, repair, and 
maintain churches unlike the Copts of Egypt. At least here we have a voice, not like the 
Assyrians and Chaldeans of Iraq.” These are the stories Maronite youth grow up hearing. 
The problem with these stories, however, is that they depict the Christians on one side, 
and an aspiring oppressor in the other. This matter is further exacerbated by the simple 
fact that Lebanon is a post-conflict society, so although there exists a ‘self’ and an 
‘other,’ there also lingers a sense of distrust and resentment between them; sentiments 
further exacerbated by the homogeneous neighborhoods where there are no competing 
counter-memories.  
For the younger generation, however, these memories further complicated their 
navigation of daily-life because unlike their parents, they have daily public encounters 
with people from other ethno-religious groups: whether it’s at school, university, or out 
in public. As a majority of my younger participants noted, it is difficult or awkward for 
them when their parents first learn of the ‘other’ nature of the friend coming over; the 
immediate parents’ reaction is to ask where they are from because by knowing the 
town, or neighborhood they are able to guess the person’s ethno-religious identity and 
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the severity of the political and religious beliefs. This, in itself, serves to highlight the 
importance of ethno-religious identity because it is usually the first thing parents want 
to know, according to my young participants. These civil war memories and bias 
adopted from lived experiences, or learned experiences, work as a sensory cue that 
provokes certain feelings or emotions. In day-to-day public encounters with ‘the other,’ 
the memories instill a deviation from normative thought processes (Drozdewsky et al. 
2016).  
I asked Jean-Paul if he would mind if a Muslim came to his residential building 
and he answered: “it depends. We have a Muslim neighbor now on the 5th floor but you 
can’t really tell. Their children go to our schools, they speak French, and they dress like 
us. I don’t mind Muslims moving to our neighborhoods if they act as we do.” Other 
younger participants also echoed similar sentiments, the general consensus of Maronite 
youth was that they don’t mind Muslims moving to their neighborhoods as long as they 
conform and assimilate.  Jean Paul’s girlfriend was sitting with us and she agreed. “Like 
Jean-Paul said, I don’t mind if they live like we do. I have to tell you, however, that I 
think we would have a bigger problem if a Shi’a family moved to our neighborhood 
compared to a Sunni family. Shi’a families tend to be a lot bigger, they usually have 
more children and the neighborhood here is quiet and clean. If you’ve ever been to 
Dahiya to get to the airport, or to get to the post office, you would know that Shi’a 
neighborhoods are not quiet, and they’re not clean. I think Shi’a moving to our 
neighborhoods would disrupt our way of life. Not religion, and not politics, but just the 
way of life would change if they move to our neighborhood.” 
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An important note here is that Jean-Paul, being a resident of Achrafieh, lives in 
one of the wealthiest districts in all of Beirut. When I was in Lebanon, the square meter 
in Achrafieh was selling for $3,200. I note this because the Muslim family that Jean-Paul 
mentioned is wealthy, otherwise they wouldn’t be able to afford being their neighbors 
on the 5th floor. The relevance of this is important because the distinction between 
wealthy and educated Muslims as opposed to uneducated Muslims is an important one. 
When my Maronite participants mentioned educated Muslims, they meant Muslims 
who attended private French or American schools and not the public Lebanese schools. 
Being educated meant being articulate in French and English beyond the spoken Arabic. 
Being educated, and being wealthy, therefore come hand-in-hand for Muslims because 
those who are wealthy can afford the education my participants talk about; those who 
aren’t moderately financially set, are unable to afford the schools that would classify 
them as educated.  
Both Jean-Paul, and Tanya have friends who are not Christian. Jean-Paul’s best 
friend is Druze and he met him at the Lebanese American University in medical school. 
Their favorite hangout spots with their friends are in Gemmayzeh or in Downtown 
Beirut: both places where it is really hard to tell the ethno-religious group a person 
belonged to – unless a religious symbol was displayed, for example: a rosary around the 
neck, or a hijab. In Gemmayzeh, Jean-Paul, Tanya, and their friends usually hang out at 
Coup D’état – a really hipster spot that doesn’t play Arabic music and has European 
beer. The food at Coup D’état is also foreign, the menu contains items like Mac and 
Cheese, Tacos, and Nachos. The place isn’t exclusive to anyone in particular; not on the 
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surface. Gemmayzeh, itself a street in Achrafieh, by virtue embodies much of the 
imagined geographies that outsiders would attribute to Achrafieh. Although it doesn’t 
exert boundaries and symbolisms that actively exclude anyone, its nightlife 
inadvertently does. 
Coup D’état, although it has no religious symbolism or political connotations, 
excludes those who aren’t able to read the Latin alphabet. Coup D’état’s menu is in 
English. A person educated in what Maronites call “Muslim schools” – Arabic curriculum 
schools – does not learn English or French; the Latin alphabet is therefore foreign to 
them and they are unable to read it. Coup D’état does not refuse service to anyone, it 
however excludes those who are unable to afford a French or English private school. 
This is a major problem for many of the “inclusive” places where you find it hard to 
identify the ethno-religious group a person belongs to.  
Public places where mixed ethno-religious groups hang out tend to welcome 
those who are “educated” and exclude those who are “not.” Generally speaking, the 
wealthier a participant was, the less likely they were to be more exclusive in their 
beliefs. The wealthier, and more educated a person was, the more they were willing to 
accept the ‘other.’ Perhaps it is because they are progressive in their thinking, with most 
of them having been educated in the United States, France, or England. Or perhaps it is 
because they do not follow the politicians and religious orthodoxy as closely as the 
middle-class and lower-class do. It is the less- ‘educated,’ and the less-financially stable 
who tend to be more bullish in their political views and more orthodox in their faith.  
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Financially stable, and wealthy youth, therefore tend to be more open to the 
idea of ‘mixing’ with other ethno-religious groups and tend to have more friends from 
other-ethno-religious groups than their less-educated, less-financially stable 
counterparts. A main reason for this is because those ‘other’ friends have the same 
lifestyle they do; they do not feel out-of-place when they visit them, and nothing is 
disturbed. The conception about who belongs and who doesn’t belong, for Maronite 
youth, is about who can assimilate and conform. Maronite youth, in comparison to their 
parents and the older generation, do not weight religious identity as heavily as the 
previous generation; what matters to them is compliance with their way of life and 
integrating rather than disturbing what is already there. In Lebanon, socio-economic 
class is a strong actor in determining this as the important of religion and politics 
diminish as the socio-economic status increases. 
A young interviewee, Tim Box told me: “Religious, political, and cultural identity 
in Lebanon [are] one; very hard to draw a line between them. Identifying as one, 
automatically tacks on an assumption of the other two unto you. Many who lived the 
civil war will ask you where you are from so that they can assume your ethno-religious 
identity.” The idea that religious, political, and cultural identity intertwined in Lebanon 
was unanimous amongst the participants. In Achrafieh, it is no different: if you were to 
tell someone that you were from Achrafieh, they will assume that you are either a 
Maronite, a Catholic, or a Greek Orthodox; that your political affiliation is for either the 
Kataeb or Lebanese Forces; and that you adhere to “Christian values.”  
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The process of discovering and defining who, or what someone is, is heavily 
influenced by political ideology as “societies, or groups within [these societies], strive for 
some coherent identity” (Johnson 2012, p. 240). In many cases political memory is 
(re)created through stories passed on from generation to generation about a certain 
place, or certain people. Tim Box identified this as a problem, noting that the civil war is 
not taught in schools. “We never learned about the war in school,” he said. “I grew up in 
Achrafieh and you know what that is like. Everyone is always talking about them 
(Muslims) around 8 O’clock news and what could have been if Bashir did not die. I did 
not even ever really talk to Muslims until I went to A.U.B. (American University of 
Beirut). I had Muslim and Druze friends in school but groups of friends tended to consist 
of mostly people who shared your background. Most of my friends now are either 
Muslim or Druze. I just feel like both sides misunderstand each other because of the civil 
war stories that both sides grow up hearing from their parents and communities. 
Growing up in Achrafieh especially, it would probably be different growing up in a 
neighborhood that is not so richly steeped with Christian history and that is not 
predominantly made-up of one group.” 
Thus, although an individual may not have personal lived experience with an 
‘other’ or a place, they subconsciously hold and reinforce certain prejudices based on 
these political memories (Said, 1979; Maalouf, 1984; Slyomovics, 1994; Chakrabarty 
1996; Slyomovics, 1998; Gregory; 2004; Kaufman, 2004; Mills, 2008; 2010; Neyzi, 2008; 
Larkin, 2010; Johnson, 2012); or in Tim Box’s case, interact with the ‘other’ and create 
their own political memory. According to Johnson (2012) this is known as a ‘trained 
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memory’ (p. 237). A trained memory, he says, is an “instructed memory; [a] forced 
memorization enlisted in the service of the remembrance of those events belonging to a 
common history which are held to be remarkable, even founding, with respect to the 
common identity” (Johnson, 2012, [p. 237). 
For Maronites, the civil war is a particular trained memory through which one 
may explore Maronite identity. As Tim Box mentioned, the 1975 civil war is not taught in 
schools; neither in Achrafieh’s Christian-dominated, private French-curriculum schools, 
nor in its shunned, (considered) sub-par, public school Arab-Curriculum. Thus, everyone 
in Lebanon, and in this specific case the Maronite youth of Achrafieh, adopts an 
instructed, trained memory from their parents. Maronite youth, therefore, is taught this 
civil-war memory and its meaning from parents who, in all likelihood, still hold a certain 
prejudice from their experience of the violent sectarian civil war.70 The fact that this 
Maronite youth is relatively isolated by growing up in Achrafieh further intensifies the 
effects due to the history of Achrafieh, its memory, and what it stands for. Moreover, 
although Achrafieh is homogenous in the sense that its population is almost exclusively 
Christian in nature, it is heterogeneous in the sense that not all Christians are of the 
same denomination, or political affiliation. The Christian Orthodox of Achrafieh, for 
example, are viewed as the original inhabitants and the ‘old money’ who welcomed the 
Maronites who sought refuge after the events of the 19th and 20th century. As such, 
Achrafieh seems to be homogeneous on the surface, but is very-much heterogeneous 
on the inside with different Christian sects and denominations. Although Maronite 
                                                          
70 Evidenced by their asking where someone is from when they are invited over. 
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youth frequently interacts with the ‘other’ in places like Gemmayzeh street in Achrafieh, 
there is a strong pushback by the older generation. 
Although there seems to be an immerging change in ideology about the ‘other’ 
between the older participants, and the younger participants, the older generation does 
not believe that Achrafieh will change anytime soon. Maroun, the civil war veteran who 
claimed that Achrafieh is the constitution of Maronites says: “We are prohibited from 
selling our houses to Muslims. The Maronite church has requested that Christian 
families stop selling our homes to Muslims so that they do not invade our 
neighborhoods. There are some families who will sell to Muslims, but they will do it 
quietly because they do not want to admit that they are accepting Muslim money. I do 
not blame them, some of them may be in tough spots. I understand that these buyers 
are coming with a lot of money from Iran and from Saudi Arabia. Christian families may 
not admit to doing it, but how else do you explain Muslims moving into our 
neighborhoods and houses where Christian families used to live?”  
Maroun goes on to explain that this cannot happen in Achrafieh however. “But 
they will never come here,” he says. “If they are strong supporters of Hezbollah, or their 
ideology does not align with Achrafieh’s they will never move here. Achrafieh is more 
than just a residential neighborhood. Achrafieh is rich with Christian history and 
Christian ideology; them moving here would be like me moving to al-Dahiya or to 
Tripoli. I would never move there because all the mosques, the history, it is not mine 
and Achrafieh is not theirs.” Elias, who became an atheist but rediscovered his faith and 
joined the Christian militias during the civil war says: “They don’t dare step foot in 
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Achrafieh. They can move to any neighborhood they want, but not Achrafieh. They 
know they aren’t welcome here so why would they move here with their families?”  
I took a taxi cab ride once from where I was living with my grandmother to meet 
Jean-Paul, Tanya, Timbox, and their Druze friends at Coup D’état. We drove past a 
balcony that had a General Aoun poster hanging from the rails; and I remember the taxi 
driver saying that he wished the resident didn’t live there. If the resident was a 
supporter of General Aoun, then the resident did not belong in Achrafieh. The mere act 
of him displaying a General Aoun poster, an ally of Hezbollah and by extension Syria and 
Iran, is an insult to the martyrs of the Lebanese Forces and those who died resisting 
Muslim militias and the Syrian Army during the civil war. If the driver’s sentiment was 
that way towards a Christian, then it is not at all strange for residents of Achrafieh who 
are strong supporters of Christian identity, and Phoenicianism, to be opposed to Shi’a 
moving to their neighborhoods.  
In Achrafieh, however, there is no ‘other’ competing argument, debate, or 
contest regarding the matter. The older generation would see a sizeable Muslim 
migration as a disruption to the neighborhood. If there are Muslim residents, Sunni or 
Shi’a, they are a relatively small number, or they have assimilated and are hard to point 
out. The narrative of Achrafieh, therefore, remains unchallenged: it is whatever the 
older Christian generation says it is. In the pursuit of a common ‘Maronite’ identity, 
many of the events and incidents related to Achrafieh will be recollected, within the 
Maronite community, in a way that creates and reinforces one common history, the 
Maronite history. This Maronite history then works to create a Maronite identity which 
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contests, and disputes the “other” history and identity – that which is recounted and 
embodied by the other.  
The problem with this, however, is that Maronites are divided between 
themselves.71 During the civil war, and prior to the consolidation of the different 
Christian militias into one force known as the Lebanese Forces, there were the Cedar 
Guardians, Ahrar, Tanzim, and the Kataeb.72 In order to consolidate these different 
factions, the future Lebanese Forces conducted many heinous acts to bring them 
around, including an infamous massacre of Ahrar members who refused to join them.73 
In the interest of preserving the common ‘Maronite’ memory of the Lebanese Forces 
and their integrity, this event was usually omitted by many Maronites I interviewed.  
Achrafieh Maronites who were typically members of Kataeb’s armed wing 
before joining with the umbrella group known as the Lebanese Forces seem to omit this 
fact. Although I knew about the event going into this research, Marwan, a veteran of the 
civil war but the only Ahrar member I spoke to, was the only one to tell me about the 
Safra massacre. He recalls Ahrar militiamen being killed in order to coerce Camille 
Chamoun (Political leader of Hezb al-Ahrar) and his son Dory Chamoun (Leader of 
Noumour al-Ahrar, the armed wing of Hezb al-Ahrar) into merging with the Kataeb 
                                                          
71 Just as there can never be one Maronite identity, there is no “one” political vision amongst the parties 
today either. 
72 In general, the only difference and reason for the different Christian militias is that everyone was 
established locally in different parts of Lebanon before they were later coalesced into the Lebanese 
Forces. Ahrar and Tanzim were the two born out of Beirut; Ahrar in Achrafieh and Tanzim in Dekwaneh. 
73 Known as The Safra Massacre, the tragedy is regarded as a major reason among my participants, both 
the older generation and the new generation as the chief reason for the rift between the different 
Christian parties – Many lost loved ones on the hands of other Christians during this consolidation, and 
they hold resentment for the other side to this day. For example, many of the Aouni constituents I 
interviewed cited the Lebanese Forces killing one of their own for their political choice. 
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under the banner of the Lebanese Forces – an act that would consolidate two of the 
most prominent Christian militias in Beirut.74  
 Conflict, and hence the competing memories and counter-memories, tend to be 
embedded in a disputed place or territory that was central to an ethno-national conflict 
(Nagel, 2002; Neyzi, 2008; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010; Bakshi, 2012) Furthermore, 
segregation as a result of past conflicts intensifies many aspects of memory, to include 
forgetting and nostalgia (Neyzi, 2008; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010; Bakshi, 2012). The 
borders that bound the space within which these memories manifest become a 
borderline that not only reflects a division between differing political opinions, but also 
the divided paradoxical national identities (Kaufman, 2004).  
The Safra Massacre, therefore, is an example of competing memories and 
counter-memories. This event can also be viewed in terms of Bakshi’s (2012) 
‘forgetting.’ The event itself is not discussed in a nostalgic manner; it is omitted 
completely by Lebanese Forces veterans and is therefore a form of forgetting rather 
than nostalgia. Achrafieh, therefore, a district of Beirut where the Lebanese Forces are 
revered, is a place where the Safra Massacre is omitted completely because it reflects a 
negative light upon the legend and reverence with which the older generation talks 
about its Christian militias – mainly the Lebanese Forces. 
I went into my research expecting nostalgia to surface when Achrafieh’s 
Maronites discuss what life was like before the civil war.75 I also expected forgetting to 
                                                          
74 The rarity of Ahrar members, as I encountered it, stems from the divide the occurred during the civil 
war. Those who pledged loyalty of the Lebanese Forces refer to themselves as such, while those who 
remained loyal to the Chamoun family refer to themselves as Ahrar members. 
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materialize as well, but I expected it to be in the form of the ‘other’ and not within the 
Maronite and Christian community. The Lebanese Forces militiamen omitting the Safra 
massacre, thus, caught me by surprise; it became apparent that there not only is a 
division between different ethno-religious groups in the form of memories and counter-
memories: there were opposing memories, and counter-memories within the 
homogenous Maronite ethno-religious group as well. When pressed about the Safra 
massacre, one Lebanese Forces veteran, Joe, claimed that the “Ahrar militiamen were 
not really Christians because they were dealing drugs out of the ports; they were ‘thugs’ 
and deserved it.” As a result, this leads to the conclusion that there was a designed 
Christian identity and you were not a Christian if you deviated from it. This divergence in 
identity then, no longer exists exclusively between Christians and the other, but rather it 
exists amongst Christians as well. In essence, although the ethno-religious groups of 
Lebanon tend to view the ‘other’ ethno-religious groups as one homogenous group, the 
truth of the matter is that every ethno-religious group has diverging identities within it; 
a Maronite from Beirut’s Dekwaneh neighborhood is not the same as a Maronite from 
Achrafieh’s neighborhood. The reality, however, does not echo this truth. In reality, 
there are stereotypical assumptions and presumptions tacked on to the different ethno-
religious groups without careful consideration that not everyone who falls within every 
group is the same.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
75 See Appendix A: Questions 7;10 
 146 
6.2 Imagined Geographies and Belonging 
Many participants interviewed expressed the view that Achrafieh, in contrast 
with al-Dahiya, is civilized due to the Orthodox Christians and Maronites’ sophistication, 
their ability to articulate the French and English languages, as well as their socio-
economic status among other things (Said, 1979; Harvey, 2000; Matejskova and Leitner, 
2011). There is the common-held belief that Achrafieh is better than the neighboring 
Beirut districts – except for maybe Solidere;76 the French hospitals, schools, and roads 
(Fawaz, 1984) make up a physical landscape that Maronites are so proud of. It is a 
Western-influenced landscape and therefore it is taken for granted by the Maronites 
who consider it to be better than the public hospitals and schools of al-Dahiya.77 As 
such, it is imperative to understand that the colonial history plays a role in the imagined 
geography and belonging of Achrafieh.  
Many of the monuments and names in Achrafieh are either French or Christian 
in nature; the physical landscape therefore works to reinforce Maronite belonging and 
the exclusion of the ‘other.’  Of the participants with whom I spoke, all of those from 
Achrafieh relied heavily on the French language to articulate their thoughts. French, in 
Lebanon, is seen as the language of the elite and is perceived as a status symbol when 
spoken in public. In Achrafieh, however, hearing French while out in public is common.  
Most notable of the colonial heritage in Achrafieh is the French Embassy in the 
Badaro neighborhood; one of the few embassies not in the downtown district. 
                                                          
76 A strongly cosmopolitan, intricately planned residential and business district in the northern parts of 
Beirut funded by Sunni Arab-Gulf money. 
77 A common recurring theme amongst the participants was that anything Western was better than 
anything local. 
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Achrafieh’s residents take pride in that; they see themselves as the conduit between the 
French government and the Christian community in Lebanon. The prestigious Grand 
Lycée Franco-Libanais, a French-curriculum school: another example of the French 
colonialist heritage ever-present in Achrafieh. It is operated by La Mission Laïque 
Française. Headquartered in Paris, the mission of this organization is to spread 
secularism and the French language.  Furthermore, a diploma from the Grand Lycée is 
recognized and accepted in France as much as any diploma granted by a French 
educational institution. Like many other private schools in Achrafieh, it is based on 
France’s education system – a system privileged by both public, and private institutions, 
over the Arabic-curriculum employed by the majority of public schools.  
Another example of the French colonialist heritage is l’Université Saint-Joseph. 
Built in 1875, it is a French-curriculum university located on Rue Monnot (Monnot 
Street). The street is named after the Jesuit priest who founded the university: Father 
Ambroise Monnot. A street intersecting Rue Monnot is Rue Huvelin – named after 
French law historian Paul Huvelin who founded Université Saint-Joseph’s law school. For 
many, Rue Huvelin is the stepping stone from which the 2005 cedar revolution took off. 
Many of the Maronites who vividly recall recent events – participants who are well older 
than my generation – argue that the student movement out of Rue Huvelin, in 
Achrafieh, against the Syrian occupation during the 90’s is what led to the massive 2-
million demonstrators on March 14th, 2005. “Young people, mostly educated university 
students would protest there. Many of them encountered unjustified shootings, tear 
gas, and firetrucks with water hoses during the Syrian occupation,” one participant, 
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Tanya, said of Rue Huvelin. “Some were kidnapped and never seen again,” she finished. 
Other examples of French colonialist heritage in Achrafieh include: Avenue de 
l’Independence, the avenue taken by French troops on their way out of Lebanon after 
the country declared independence in 1943 and Collège de la Sagesse – an international 
French university.  
French is not the only foreign presence per se in Achrafieh. American schools 
have been all the rage in Lebanon lately. Some of the newer private schools in Achrafieh 
follow a more American curriculum where the concepts of ‘elective’ classes, and lockers 
are new; but none are Arabic-based, a system typically adopted by Lebanon’s poorly-
funded public schools. Achrafieh does not have a private school where Arabic is the 
primarily language of education – English, and French languages take precedence.78 In 
pre-school (referred to locally as Petit Jardin and Grand Jardin), students enrolled 
typically learn the Latin alphabet even before the Arabic alphabet – an evident legacy of 
French colonialism and its after-effects amongst the Christian communities in Lebanon 
(Fawaz, 1984; Salibi, 1988; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). Maronites learn their math 
and sciences either in English or French; depending on the school’s curriculum and the 
university they plan on attending. For example, the American University of Beirut uses 
English in its classrooms while Université Saint-Joseph uses French. 
As many of my interviewees said, the difference in language further separates 
them from the Arab identity (Fawaz, 1984; Salibi, 1988; Sirriyeh, 1998; Kaufman, 2004). 
                                                          
78 My use of primary language in this context is that French or English are the languages in which students 
learn STEM fields in school. Although Arabic is learned as well, it tends to be confined to literature, 
grammar, poetry and dictation. French and English are also taught in terms of literature, grammar, poetry, 
and dictation; but depending on the school, one of the two is used to also teach maths and sciences.  
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Marwan, the Ahrar militiaman, told me: “Why should my kids learn Arabic? We are not 
Arab, and we are not Muslim. I want my children to learn the language of their 
ancestors. The language our ancestors were forced to forgo in public in fear of paying 
the jizya (Arabic: ةيزجلا; meaning: a tax that was historically levied by certain Islamic 
states on non-Muslims). Why should we speak their language and forego ours?” 
Another reason for it, mentioned often by the interviewed youth, is as simple as landing 
a job. According to them, it is almost impossible today to get a job in the government’s 
public or in the private sector without being fluent in three languages: English, French, 
and Arabic; especially in Achrafieh they say, where the average person is more educated 
than other parts of the city and knowing all three languages is the standard and nothing 
special. 
As demonstrated then, many of the physical urban landscapes and landmarks in 
Achrafieh serve as an homage to French colonialism – a crucial aspect of Maronite 
identity in Achrafieh. Many of the participants with whom I conducted interviews 
articulated gratitude towards France’s colonialism and the schools, hospitals, and 
railroads which they built.79 The connection to France is rather evident when even the 
word ‘street’ is in French. In the examples cited above, many of the streets use rue to 
reference a street – the French word for street. In Arabic, the word for street is cherih 
(Arabic: عراش); it is therefore interesting that many streets in Achrafieh are named Rue 
Huvelin, Rue Monnot, Rue Gouraud instead of Cherih Huvelin, Cherih Monnot, or Cherih 
Gouraud like they would in other parts of the city. As such, it is evident that there is a 
                                                          
79 80 years ago, during the French Mandate, these institutions gave a significant advantage to the 
Christians. Beirut, at the time, was still emerging as a cosmopolitan and global capital. 
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strong rejection in Achrafieh for the Arabic language. Compare this to a Maronite-
dominated Ain-el-Remmaneh neighborhood where people use the word cherih to 
denote a street as opposed to rue.  
Therefore, in Achrafieh, not only is the French word for ‘street’ used, but the 
names of the streets themselves serve to rebuke against Arab heritage and Arab 
identity. Among the Maronite community, and all of my participants, there is an 
agreement in that religious, political, and cultural identity in Lebanon is one – they 
intertwine and interconnect to the point that a religious identity is synonymous with a 
certain political and cultural identity (Hall, 2006; Makdisi and Silverstein, 2006; Mills, 
2010). This sentiment echoed by them is true in the sense that “what happens in our 
house, stays in our house,” meaning that there can be disagreement between the one 
ethno-religious group but there must be agreement when addressing the ‘other.’ 
As stated earlier by Tim Box, it is very difficult to draw a line between religion, 
political, and cultural identity in Lebanon; and the assumption that falling within one 
category automatically determines your status in the other categories is valid. As such, 
the use of French names for the streets, of French priests and lawyers and generals 
inadvertently rebukes the Muslim association that comes with the Arab heritage by 
virtue of their embodiment of Christian, European, colonial, and anti-Muslim 
representations; Huvelin, Monnot, Gouraud, all French Christian figures whose names 
are used to simultaneously honor the work their namesakes did for the Maronite and 
Christian communities and rebuke the Muslim Arab heritage; the ‘other.’ 
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Although many of the Maronites were quick to praise French colonialism, it 
should be noted that the French did privilege their ‘civilized’ Christian kin of the Middle-
East (Said, 1979; Fawaz, 1984; Harvey, 2000; Kaufman, 2004). The preference by the 
French shown towards Christians fueled Muslim resentment. As mentioned earlier, 
physical landscapes can be just as nostalgic as memory. Imagined geographies can be 
countries, regions or cities, and they can include both urban, built-up neighborhoods 
and ‘empty’ rural spaces. As such, one can argue that Achrafieh’s physical landscape is 
one of perpetual contested and nostalgic memory. On one side, the Maronites view it as 
the vanguard of Christian identity while the other side, mainly Muslims, view it as a 
remnant of an ugly past where their country-kin were privileged over them simply due 
to religious beliefs. Today, French relations have improved with the Sunni population. 
Sunni political leader Saad al-Hariri has a home in France and regularly hosts official aid 
summits for France to invest in Lebanon. Furthermore, there are yearly aid packages 
sanctioned by the French government in support of all Lebanese citizens and not just 
the Christians.  
 Symbols, memories, and histories all serve to create perceived and conceived 
spaces (Larkin, 2010). In Achrafieh, the convergence of the perceived and conceived 
spaces produces a boundary designating who belongs and who does not belong. These 
boundaries, in turn, are reinforced by human agents – most of whom are Maronites, or 
Christians – through daily interactions. When asked about what it means to be a 
Maronite,80 Marwan who had previously talked about Syriac being the language of 
                                                          
80 See Appendix A: Question 1 
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Maronites and not Arabic, told me that greetings matter. The basic act of saying hello, 
he says, defines you. Being a Maronite “means that I say Marhaba, and not Al Salamu 
Alaykom.” He explains to me that Marhaba (Arabic: ابحرم) is a Syriac greeting that 
means peace be with you; Al Salamu Alaykom (Arabic: مكيلع ملاسلا), in contrast, is a 
similar Arabic greeting that means peace be upon you. “This simple word,” Marwan 
says, “saying Marhaba, connects me to the centuries-old history of our people; I am not 
Arab, nor Muslim. You will not find a Maronite who says Al Salamu Alaykom. If I walk 
into a café and someone says Al Salamu Alaykom, I guarantee you that they are not 
Christian. A Christian will greet you with Marhaba because that is the greeting of our 
ancestors.” Achrafieh, therefore, becomes a place where language is a tool that denotes 
who belongs and who does not belong. One form of speech, the Arabic greeting, 
becomes an identifier then for Achrafieh residents of who belongs and who does not 
belong.  
A simple word, therefore, becomes an identifier of ‘the other’ in Marwan’s eyes, 
and perhaps countless others. One simple word, a simple greeting, comes to define your 
identity. As Marwan later explains, Marhaba is an Aramaic word in the Syriac dialect. It 
is used as a greeting and it means ‘peace be upon you’ in Aramaic. Conversely, Al 
Salamu Alaykom is also a greeting that means ‘peace be upon you;’ the only difference 
is that one is in Syriac and is identified with the Maronite ethno-religious group, and the 
other is in Arabic and assumed to be that of Muslim ethno-religious groups. 
In essence, Marwan explains what it is to be a Maronite in relation to the ‘other.’ 
Maronites, as Marwan said, greet you with the greeting of their Syriac-speaking 
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ancestors as opposed to how Muslims would greet you with Al Salamu Alaykom. Elie, an 
older participant I spoke with also explained to me who Maronites in relation to the 
‘other’ when he explains: “We send our children to the best schools. Maronite parents 
will sit without eating if it meant we could send our children to the best schools. They 
(Muslims) won’t do that. Do you see those kids walking between cars trying to sell you 
gum, flowers, and 10$ trinkets? That’s what they do when they can’t afford to send 
their kids to school. Instead of the parents sacrificing for their children, they will 
sacrifice their children’s future and send them to the street to make money.”  
 Elie goes on to explain that Sunni Muslims are closer to Maronites and Christians 
than the Shi’as, and that’s because of Christian influence on Sunni Muslims in Beirut – 
he explains the close connection between the Orthodox Christians of northern Beirut 
and the Sunni Muslims. Elie therefore tells me that Sunnis will send their children to the 
same private schools that Christians send their kids to if they can afford it. Elie clarifies 
further saying that the kids who sell trinkets in the streets between traffic would be 
more likely to be Shi’a than Sunni, since Sunnis are closer to the Christian and Maronite 
way of life.  
 Explaining Maronite identity in relation to the ‘other’ is not exclusive to the older 
generation, however. As I mentioned earlier, Tim Box who is a younger Maronite 
explains that Shi’as dress different than Maronites when he says that they wear jeans 
with bedazzles on the pockets. For Maronite youth, therefore, the ‘other’ dresses 
differently. For all of my participants, the ‘other’ also talks differently. All of my 
participants agreed that you can tell someone is not a Christian, usually, just my talking 
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to them. The Christian pronunciation of words is ‘lighter’ on the tongue because 
Christians – and Muslims who study at Christian schools – are articulate in French and it 
therefore renders their spoken Arabic smoother, and softer, than the ‘other.’ The ability 
to afford private schools therefore, is important to who Maronites are, and who belongs 
and who does not. A Muslim educated at a private school along with Christians is more 
likely to be welcomed by Maronites than those who are less fortunate and therefore 
unable to afford schools where the curriculum is in French or English.  
As Achrafieh demonstrates, it is therefore possible for a nostalgic memory to 
simultaneously be a disputed and contested memory (Nagel, 2000; 2002; Hall, 2006; 
Neyzi, 2008; Mills, 2008; 2010; Fregonese, 2009; Larkin, 2010) Maronites may have a 
nostalgic recollection of Achrafieh being the crown jewel of Beirut, but the ‘other’ 
ethno-religious groups view the same district differently – a difference stemming from 
the disputed and contested memories. As such, Achrafieh’s urban and physical 
landscapes are affected by imagined geographies. In a post-conflict city, societies can 
seek to imbed nostalgia into the physical landscape of the city (Johnson, 2003; 
Fregonese 2009; Larkin, 2010; Mills, 2010; Johnson, 2012). This may take many forms: in 
the context of Achrafieh, a statue may be erected post-conflict like Bashir Gemayel’s 
memorial statue in Achrafieh’s Sahat Sassine (Arabic:    يساس ةحاس; translation: Sassine 
Square) as a symbol that serves to reinforce collective memories (Johnson, 2003; 2012).  
Many residential buildings in Achrafieh, and other Christian neighborhoods and 
districts, have a shrine for Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary either outside the building or 
right after the entrance inside. This serves to create a collective Christian identity for the 
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whole building, and the neighborhoods of the Achrafieh district as well. These shrines 
are typically made up of a statue of the Virgin Mary, and the cross of Jesus Christ and 
every day the residents make sure to light a candle and say a prayer. These shrines are 
symbols that signal at once both a Christian residential building and not a mixed ethno-
religious residential building; at the same time creating a boundary excluding those who 
do not conform and fall within the declared identity.  
 
Figure 6.2: A photo of Sassine Square in Achrafieh. A memorial to Bashir Gemayel can 
be seen in the background. The square is well-known in Eastern Beirut for being a major 
commercial hub with A.B.C. Achrafieh being the most prominent. In the past, Sassine 
square garnered a reputation for being the locale of anti-Syrian protests mostly by 
college-aged youth as seen in the movie Rue Huvelin. 
 
Looking beyond these shrines many streets will have Christian symbols such as 
civil war memorials for those who died: Christian symbols, for Christian martyrs of a 
Christian cause. The shrines at the entrance of buildings in Achrafieh, and the memorials 
for Christian martyrs work to include one group (The Maronites and Christians), while 
simultaneously excluding the ‘other.’ The memories provoked by similar symbols are 
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further intensified due to the ‘post-conflict’ status of a fragmented Beirut; as such, the 
events of the civil war further reinforce and exacerbate the contested memories and 
disputed histories (Johnson, 2003; Slyomovics, 1994; Neyzi, 2008; Fregonese 2009; 
Larkin, 2010; Mills, 2010; Johnson, 2012). Achrafieh, as a rather enclosed and exclusive 
district, fails to allow for post-conflict discourse – Maronite memories and histories are 
not contested with the ‘other’ because the district is almost homogenous with its 
Christian population. Until you step out of Achrafieh, there is one common memory, 
one common history, and one common identity. Beyond ethnic and religious 
homogeneity, Achrafieh is also homogenous politically as in the past, and present, it has 
always been dominated by the Gemayel’s Kataeb and Lebanese Forces party. As such, 
there are no contested memories and counter-memories being heard by those who 
grow up there.  Achrafieh, therefore, fails in allowing for post-conflict discourse because 
Maronite youth grow up learning and adopting a memory that remains uncontested 
until early adulthood when they encounter the ‘other’ in Universities and outside public 
spaces. 
Much like Marwan identifies certain words with certain ethno-religious groups, 
many of Beirut’s neighborhoods are also associated with certain ethno-religious groups. 
For example: a Maronite from Achrafieh will typically not cross into al-Dahiya, not only 
because the neighborhood’s entrances are decorated with Hezbollah and Amal flags, or 
because they are plastered with posters of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini and Hezbollah’s 
Sayyed Nasrallah, but also because a Maronite who grew up in Achrafieh, or any other 
part of Eastern Beirut, grows up hearing from their parent that they do not belong there 
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and that it is a different, and dangerous area. Tim Box, and Thaleesi,81 two young 
participants with whom I conducted a joint interview both note that they just “feel 
different and out of place; it is a gloomy place” when they have to go through al-Dahiya 
to get to the airport, or the post office. Both of them even noted that they would not 
like it if a Shi’a moved-in nearby. “Our way of life is different; Sunnis are moving into our 
neighborhoods, but they do not have the same negative presence in the neighborhood 
that a Shi’a would,” Thaleesi said. “Sunnis are more moderate if we are talking about 
day-to-day life. They are opening up to the West just as we have. The Shi’as are more 
conservative in that sense, they are anti-West and their presence in our neighborhoods 
disrupts our daily life.” 
 The Maronite community, both the older generation and the younger 
generation, distinguishes Muslims between Sunni and Shi’a. Understanding the 
difference from a Maronite perspective is also a complicated one because there are 
Maronites who are pro-Hezbollah and anti-Sunni, and there are Maronites who are pro-
Sunni anti-Hezbollah. The Maronites who are pro-Hezbollah and anti-Sunni are the 
Maronites who support General Aoun and the Free Patriotic Movement. These 
Maronites, although they are opposed to Shi’as moving to their neighborhoods, are 
supporters of Hezbollah because General Aoun, their za’im,82 is a political ally of 
                                                          
81 A Game of Thrones fan, obviously! 
82 Lebanese politics are tribal in the sense that ethno-religious communities will follow one za’im (leader) 
or another; any criticism of the za’im is taken personal by the constituent and the accusation is usually 
deflected back onto the other person’s za’im. One of the more common examples of this is Maronites 
telling Free Patriotic Movement constituents that their political leaders are stealing government money; 
how does one politician go from having a car loan declined one year, and then he has a private jet and 
three multi million dollar homes the next year on a $5,000 monthly salary (the salary of a parliament 
 158 
Hezbollah. This group of Maronites, therefore, although they would be opposed to 
welcoming Shi’a to their neighborhoods, they nonetheless support Hezbollah and repeat 
the same reasons that General Aoun espouses in his political speeches. Maronites who 
support Hezbollah will say that they support Hezbollah because he is the only protector 
of Lebanon capable of repelling Israel – for that reason, the resistance is necessary, and 
any Lebanese government should give them legitimacy and political cover on the 
international stage. Furthermore, this group of Maronites would argue that Hezbollah is 
made-up of two entities: the military wing, and the political wing, and they both operate 
independent of one another. This group of Maronites may support Hezbollah politically, 
but they still perceive them as less educated than the Lebanese Sunnis.  
 On the opposite end of Maronites’ perception of the Shi’a are those who support 
March 14th political parties, and therefore allied with the Sunni Future Movement. 
Maronites in this category are also opposed to Shi’a moving to their neighborhoods, 
perceive them as less educated than the Sunnis, and also are opposed to Hezbollah 
politically as well. Unlike the Free Patriotic Movement Maronites, this group does not 
distinguish between Hezbollah’s political wing and its armed wing. To this group of 
Maronites, Hezbollah is one singular entity and one branch does not operate without 
the other; the political wing and the armed wing are not separate. Marwan says: “You 
cannot distinguish between them. The leadership of each might be different with 
militants on one side and politicians on the other, but the politicians of Hezbollah give 
cover to the militants and so you cannot separate the two sides. What modern-day 
                                                                                                                                                                             
representative)? The constituent will usually deflect this by saying: “What about your za’im? You want to 
tell me he doesn’t steal either?” 
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country are you going to build when you have a militia on your land, stronger than your 
military, openly conducting military parades in the streets of Beirut?” The common 
Maronite assumption of the anti-Hezbollah group is that Hezbollah wants to establish 
Wilayat al-Faqih in Lebanon, and they will usually point you to the Hezbollah political 
party constitution that has it listed at the top of its charter.  Finally, this group of 
Maronites does not make a distinction between Hezbollah’s political aims and the 
political aims of Shi’as. Most Maronites in this group lump all Shi’as as one: they are all 
pro-Iranian, pro-Wilayat al-Faqih, living outside Lebanese law.  
 The Maronite community, therefore, is split between the pro-Hezbollah camp 
that says March 14th Christian leaders are Western and Saudi puppets, while the anti-
Hezbollah camp accuses the march 8th Christian leaders of being Iranian and Syrian 
puppets. What both sides agree on, however is that neither would like for the Shi’a to 
move to their neighborhoods. Both sides would rather a Sunni move to their 
neighborhood. It is important to note, however, that when Maronites talk about Sunnis 
being welcomed to their neighborhoods, they are usually talking about the educated 
Sunnis who have attended western schools, or who have attended private schools along 
with Christians. It is the educated Sunnis that Maronites would welcome, and not Sunnis 
educated in Lebanon’s Arabic-curriculum schools who are seen as less educated, and 
perceived to be more disruptive and more orthodox in their religious practice.  
Maronite perception of Hezbollah therefore plays an important role. This 
perception of Hezbollah, in turn, influences the imagined geography and pre-conceived 
notions that many Maronites attributes to al-Dahiya. Their militant nature, and the 
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perception by many of Hezbollah as an extended arm of Iranian influence is why many 
Maronites do not feel welcome in their neighborhoods, and they would not be likely to 
welcome them to theirs. The same, however, is probably true for a Shi’ite who looks 
across the street and sees a Lebanese Forces cross spray-painted on a crossing in 
Achrafieh, or a poster of Bashir Gemayel hanging from a residential building. These 
images displayed in public create tangible boundaries, a very real division between the 
‘self’ and the ‘other’ (Lefebvre, 1991; Slyomovics, 1994; Larkin, 2010; Johnson, 2012). 
Conversely, however, a Maronite not from Achrafieh, perhaps a Maronite who votes for 
the Free Patriotic Movement – a Maronite party allied with Hezbollah – may in contrast 
be perfectly okay with going to Dahiya, and their parents (if they were of the younger 
generation) may not find it outside the norm for them to have a Shi’ite friend.83 One 
important fact to note, however, all of the younger participants attended private 
universities, like the American University of Beirut and l’Université Saint Joseph. I was 
made aware that a majority of Shi’as – except for the elites – cannot afford to attend 
private universities and so most attend the public Lebanese University.84 The Maronite 
youth’s interaction, therefore, occurs more frequently with Sunni youth than it does 
with Shi’a youth – unless said Maronite youth attends a public university. 
                                                          
83 This may be highly unlikely due to the ethno-religious segregation of Lebanon as a whole, and not only 
Beirut – based on my interviews with college-aged youth, their first real communication with the ‘other’ 
occurred at universities. A common theme that surfaced in my discussion with younger generation 
Maronites is that they have Sunni and Druze friends, but not so many Shi’a friends. 
84 That is if they have the grades: the Lebanese University typically only grants admission to the top 
students of any given graduating class. Whereas my participants view the ‘foreign’ universities as more 
prestigious whose admission relies mostly on connections and wealth, acceptance into the Lebanese 
University is perceived as a meritorious achievement because the school only accepts the top students of 
any graduating class.  
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 Transgression, therefore, is an act of breaking rules, or exceeding boundaries 
(Cresswell, 1996). In the context of imagined geographies, transgression can be as 
simple as a Shi’a, or Sunni, crossing over into Achrafieh. Memories of place establish 
norms and rules, and in turn, the norms and rules come to reinforce the memories – it is 
a perpetual circle (Hall, 1997); Maronite identity in Achrafieh, as influenced by the civil 
war of 1975, starts to establish what is acceptable and what is not, what is prohibited 
and what is not. A Maronite church in al-Dahiya ringing its bells is a transgression, 
similarly a Mosque’s Adhan in al-Sharkiyyeh is also a transgression; it is a break of the 
norm and what is acceptable. Many participants, mostly the ones who identified as 
religious Maronites as well as ethnic Maronites, cited the safe tolling of Church bells in 
Achrafieh and public celebration of Christian holidays as a major part of the district’s 
Maronite identity. Much like belonging and boundaries unequivocally create inclusion 
and exclusion, transgression illustrates the taboo and the norm. Space, therefore, is the 
arena in which transgression is played out.  
 Transgression is different than resistance in that the effect and reaction of a 
particular act are more defined (Cresswell, 1996). It is not so much the lead-up to 
breaking the norm and the reasoning behind it, but rather the after-effects of the taboo 
and results of it. Furthermore, transgression is typically defined by the power-dynamics 
at play. It is usually the powerful, the more dominant, who creates the established 
memories and norms that color a space (Cresswell, 1996). In the case of Achrafieh, it is 
the Maronites and the Christians who are most powerful. Therefore, it is they who 
determine the spatial order: Is it acceptable close shop on Friday and not Sunday, or is it 
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normal to prohibit the sale of alcohol and gambling like in Dahiya. Essentially, 
Transgression is the conduct that connects imagined geographies and belonging, to the 
city of Beirut as a place. All the disputed narratives and contested memories, confined 
to a place create a sense of belonging. If you fall within the norm, you belong; if at any 
point you break the norm, you suddenly are transgressing and do not belong. Owning to 
the rich history, and the ethno-centric memories of Achrafieh, simply by virtue of your 
religious identity you may be a transgressor.  In many cases, belonging is associated with 
identity (Hall, 1997; Harvey, 2000; Kaufman, 2004; Neyzi, 2008; Antonsich, 2010; Larkin, 
2010; Mills, 2010; Matejskova and Leitner, 2011; Rabil, 2011; Bakshi, 2012). Like 
Marwan and Elias said, identity plays a major role in who belongs and does not belong 
in Achrafieh; the decision is made along the lines of ethno-religious identity.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 Beirut, unto itself, does not play a major role in influencing and forming 
Maronite identity. Rather, according to many who were interviewed, it is Beirut’s 
Achrafieh district and other Christian neighborhoods that influences Maronite 
identity. The civil war period between 1975-90 is seen as a struggle for the Maronite 
identity in Beirut and Lebanon – a struggle that started in Achrafieh in 1977 with the 
creation of the Lebanese Forces. The interviewed participants identified Achrafieh as 
the Christian stronghold without which Lebanese particularism would have 
succumbed to the Pan-Arab movement of the 1970s. Although the civil war did not 
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end until February of 1990, many Maronites consider September 1982 as the end of 
hope with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. 
 Bashir Gemayel, Achrafieh, and the Maronite community believed that 
Lebanese particularism served as a vanguard against Pan-Arab movements which they 
feared would bring Islamist ideologies to the country’s government and their way of life. 
It is very difficult to draw a line between religion, political, and cultural identity in 
Lebanon; and there is an assumption that falling within one category automatically 
determines your status in the other categories. These assumptions are further 
reinforced by the inclusive and exclusive nature of Achrafieh; assumptions further 
compounded by nostalgic (or contested) memories and histories.’ 
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CHAPTER 7 
FINAL THOUGHTS
As evidenced by my research, sectarian polarization is the norm. We see this in 
Beirut’s urban landscape where different neighborhoods and districts have ethno-
religious identities attributed to them. The sectarian urban landscape reflects and 
reinforces the problematic sectarian political structure institutionalized by Lebanon’s 
Ta’if Accord and confessional democracy. Although neighborhoods tend have a 
predominant ethno-religious presence, there are some neighborhoods in flux; as my 
participants have indicated these are mostly encounters of Sunni Muslims and Christians 
of all denominations. Furthermore, Maronites in Beirut are more likely to know or have 
Sunni Muslims friends or Druze acquaintances than they are having Shi’a friends.  
What is at stake here is the future of Lebanon. Beirut’s segregated 
neighborhoods are a symptom of the larger problem in Lebanon; the different ethno-
religious communities still do not trust each other and most refuse to live next to one 
another almost 26 years after the civil war. Although we see some neighborhoods 
getting more diversified with Sunni and Christian residents, the socio-economic status of 
these neighborhoods is one that can be described as middle-class and above; 
furthermore, these residents who are willing to live next to someone who doesn’t share 
their ethno-religious identity, they tend to be more moderate in their way of thinking. 
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The Sunnis and Christians and Druze who live next to one another are not the 
conservatives who are preserving and reinforcing the segregated neighborhoods in 
Beirut. Maronite stories matter in this case because they are an essential component of 
the Lebanese government and of the Lebanese society. Their particular brand of 
nostalgia gives us one lens through which to study Beirut’s urban landscape and the 
failure of consociational democracy in Lebanon.  
There are current divisions between Christians and Muslims – mainly Shi’a 
Muslims who are viewed as loyal to Iran and Sunni Muslims who are loyal to Syria. There 
are also divisions among Christians themselves, the division is also political in nature. 
One side of the Christian divide are the followers of General Michel Aoun, a Maronite 
Christian and founder of the Free Patriotic movement; he is also an ally of Hezbollah. 
The other side of the Christian divide are the followers of Samir Geagea, also a Maronite 
Christian and current chairman of the Lebanese Forces; the party most opposed to 
Hezbollah.  
In order to promote a more post-conflict society, I propose that the Lebanese 
political system slowly move away from the consociational democracy; as I have 
explained in my research, and as evidenced by the segregated neighborhoods of Beirut, 
the political system keeps society divided along ethno-religious lines. In turn, the divided 
society propagates the ethno-religious identity as the primary lens through which they 
navigate everyday encounters. As evidenced by my younger participants, the further we 
move away from the Lebanese civil war, the more the circle of friends and 
acquaintances becomes diverse and inclusive. As more Maronites encounter the ‘other,’ 
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we should start thinking of a political system that can replace the institutionalized divide 
prevalent in the government. The presidency should not be restricted to Maronites only; 
rather, the highest office in the country should be obtained based on merit and not 
ethno-religious identity. The same needs to be applied to the positions of speaker of 
parliament and prime minister; these positions should not be reserved for Shi’ites and 
Sunnis, but should also be obtained based on merit rather than ethno-religious identity.  
I also propose that Christians and Muslims alike learn about each other’s 
histories and faiths in order to bypass the preconceptions both communities have of 
each other. I attended College Melkart before my parents and I immigrated here, and I 
believe their approach to this issue should be adopted countrywide. Once per week, we 
would have a Catholic priest come to class and talk to us about Christian history in the 
Middle East, and about the Christian faith; during that time, Muslim students would be 
in the class. At the same time, a Muslim imam would come to class, and he would teach 
us all about Muslim history in the Middle East, and about the Muslim faith. We never 
really approached the civil war, but we did learn about one another’s history in a 
civilized and educational matter while we were young. There needs to be a way for 
schools in Lebanon to address this societal disconnect in order to move forward. 
Finally, my hope is that the Lebanese citizens stop following “zou’ama” for the 
sole reason that they are “zou’ama.” The same political leaders and their families have 
been in charge of Lebanon for over 300 years – since the Ottoman period. These 
political leaders, as my participants pointed out, have traded in religion in return for 
political gain and that has not nothing but divide the country and the society even 
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further. In the 2018 elections, for the first time in history, Lebanon had a political party 
come forward and present an inclusive secular political agenda aimed at everyone – no 
matter the religious affiliation; unfortunately, they were only able to win one 
parliamentary seat. 
Lebanon is beginning to see this change, however. Whereas the previous 
generation had a divide along ethno-religious lines, the data from my interviews shows 
that the new frontier emerging in the young generation is not ethno-religious in nature. 
The new divide surfacing in Lebanese politics is between the youth who support the 
traditional confessional parties and the progressive secular parties. The election of 
journalist Paula Yaacoubian on behalf of Hezeb Sab’a – the secular party – is evidence 
that the political landscape is changing, and Maronite youth are hopeful that Lebanon 
can move away from the current “mafia” ruling the country. Tim Box, who voted for 
Paula says: “We need to move forward. Right now, you have a mafia ruling the country. 
They disagree on the surface, but they work together when their rule is in danger. Look 
at the Beirut mayoral elections; when Beirut Madinati’s (pre-cursor to Hezeb Sab’a) list 
seemed like it was close to winning, you saw March 14th and March 8th political parties 
work together and come out with one list; they are afraid to lose power.”  
Tim Box was not the only younger participant to note that the politicians are a 
mafia. Many of my young participates mentioned that the politicians work together and 
give each other business, and nothing happens without their approval and without them 
making money from it. Jean-Paul, a participant who received his doctorate in pharmacy 
from the University of Texas here in the United States says: “I have a degree from the 
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Pharmacy school in Texas, and it is the only program in the world where I can go and 
practice pharmacy without having to go through a country’s credential process. I come 
back home, and I want to open my own pharmacy, and the municipality wants one 
million dollars in exchange for the signature on registration and license paperwork.”  
Beirut Madinati was the result of pent-up anger people held towards the 
politicians after almost a year of garbage crisis where the politicians could not agree on 
a solution. Thaleesi says: “Do you know why they couldn’t agree? Because they couldn’t 
agree on how much money they were all going to make. They are talking about projects 
costing close to a billion dollar for a solution, all of these solutions by the way, somehow 
cost more than it costs to sanitize and pick-up garbage in Saudi Arabia. Think about that; 
Lebanon, a much smaller country, much smaller population than Saudi Arabia but 
somehow garbage collection and sanitation costs more here. Do you want to know how 
we know they steal? Look at the energy ministry. They all hand it off to one another, 
and since I can remember we have never had electricity 24/7; Or water 24/7.” Jean-Paul 
intervenes here and says: “Yes, you get these politicians who come into this ministry, 
and propose all these projects, in the end they all fail and the minister walks away with 
millions in his pocket. The ministry of energy is their gold mine. Look at Fatima-Ghul: 
They brought these ships from Turkey, they were supposed to give us electricity 24/7 
while we fix the electrical power grid. The ships don’t work, and our reliance on 
generators has grown. Angela Merkel and Siemens proposed a project that would 
provide electricity to the whole country, for something like 750 million, and they would 
maintain it for 15 years; of course, our politicians declined. They make more money 
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from backroom deals bringing Turkish electricity ships than they would making a deal 
with a German company. They do the same with water, why do you think some people 
have dirty water, or no water at all? Because they own the water distribution trucks, so 
they cut your water supply forcing you to buy water from their companies.” 
Maronite youth is therefore waking up and breaking away from their parents’ 
political thought. As I mentioned, the previous rift along ethno-religious lines is fading 
and the new rift is between those who still advocate for the old political parties, and 
those who want to move forward and look to target different challenges. Whereas the 
older generation was concerned with ethno-religious identity, the new generation is 
more concerned about what the older generation would term ‘western ideas.’ These 
‘western ideas’ include the debate over capitalism and socialism, the ideas also include 
social welfare and environmentalism. Joe, an older participant says: “You have these 
young ones talking about what the west talks about when we don’t ever have electricity 
and water. How can you debate the Lebanese economic system, when government 
employees aren’t even guaranteed to receive their checks on time? Look at public 
sector teachers, they are demonstrating because they haven’t received a paycheck in 3 
months. And these young ones want to debate environmental protection laws and 
welfare programs? Let us fix our problems first before we adopt the west’s problems.”  
Nagel and Staeheli (2016) explore this growing shift in public policy debate. The 
interviewees in their article (Nagel and Staeheli, 2016) echo some of the same thoughts 
my participants voiced concerning the changing rift and shifting discourse among the 
youth: the youth is open to communicating understanding the ‘other,’ the youth is 
 170 
concerned about the environment, and the ruling political class is only concerned about 
money. As my older generation mentions, and as Nagel and Staeheli (2016) point out, 
many of these ideas are coming from the ‘west,’ through NGOs or through the youth 
being more connected with the west through the internet. 
Lebanon definitely needs to tackle environmentalist policies and regulations; 
Lebanon desperately needs welfare programs, and a higher standard of living – 
especially with electricity and water. Before Lebanon can tackle this, however, they 
need to tackle the problem in parliament and they need to break the corruption of the 
ruling political elite. The older generation and the younger generation are both right; 
you cannot tackle environmental regulations when the majority of people only gets 6 
hours of electricity, and less than 2 hours of water a day. You cannot tackle welfare 
programs when the ruling elite constantly increase taxes because the government 
coffers are empty, while they pad their pockets.  
Moving forward, the younger generation has the right idea, they need to come 
out and vote for political parties like Hezeb Sab’a, and they need to get involved in the 
mayoral elections of cities like they did with Beirut Madinati. The youth however, is 
facing an obstacle in their parents who would say that voting for a secular party is 
wasting the vote because ‘the other side’ is united. The further we move away from the 
civil war, however, the more we see a change in political ideology. My hope is that in 
the future, more Lebanese are able to consider these “new” ideas, than rely on the 
older divisive political parties that have done nothing to mend the rift of the Lebanese 
society. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Please note that where the question specifies Muslims, the intent was to address both 
Sunnis and Shi’as. Otherwise, the question is specifying which ethno-religious group is 
intended. The average time of my interviews was 97 minutes. 
 
Q 1 - What does it mean to be a Maronite?  
* Derive common traits. E.g. religious, cultural, political. 
Q 2 - In your opinion, how do the Sunnis view Maronites? 
*How do you view the Sunnis? 
Q 3 - In your opinion, how do the Shi’as view Maronites? 
*How do you view the Shi’as? 
Q 4 - In your opinion, how do the Druze view Maronites? 
*How do you view the Druze? 
Q 5 - In your opinion, how do the Orthodox Christians view the Catholic Maronites? 
*How do you view the Orthodox Christians? 
Q 6 - In your opinion, how do the Armenians view the Catholic Maronites? 
*How do you view the Armenians? 
Q 7 - What was Beirut like before the civil war of 1975? 
* Cultural geography, urban geography, urban landscape, physical and built 
landscape. 
 179 
Q 8 - What was Beirut like during the civil war of 1975? 
* Cultural geography, urban geography, urban landscape, physical and built 
landscape. 
Q 9 - What was Beirut like after the civil war of 1975?  
* Cultural geography, urban geography, urban landscape, physical and built 
landscape. 
Q 10 - Before the civil war, would you say different neighborhoods identified with a 
specific religion or ethnicity? 
* To what degree? 
* Give an example. 
Q 11 - During the civil war, would you say different neighborhoods identified with a 
specific religion or ethnicity? 
* To what degree? 
 * Give an example. 
Q 12 - After the civil war, would you say different neighborhoods identified with a 
specific religion or ethnicity? 
 * To what degree? 
 * Give an example. 
Q 13 - Why do you think neighborhoods / districts of Beirut were as they were before? 
* Most important factors 
*Social / Spatial reasons 
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Q 14 - Why do you think neighborhoods / districts of Beirut are as they are now? 
* Most important factors? E.g. key events? 
* Social / Spatial reasons 
 *Is there segregation? Was there always segregation? 
Q 15 - Do you believe there is a difference in encountering a Sunni on a Beirut street 
compared to encountering a Maronite? 
*Would this encounter be different depending on the neighborhood? 
* Can you give me an example? 
Q 16 - Do you believe there is a difference in encountering a Shi’a on a Beirut street 
compared to encountering a Maronite? 
*Would this encounter be different depending on the neighborhood?  
*Can you give me an example? 
Q 17 - Can you tell which social group a person belongs to by looking at them?  
*Can you tell a Sunni apart from a Maronite? 
*Can you tell a Shi’a apart from a Maronite? 
Q 18 - Can you tell which social group a person belongs to by talking to them? 
*Can you tell a Sunni apart from a Maronite? 
 *Can you tell a Shi’a apart from a Maronite? 
Q 19 - Describe the Maronite community, in your own words.  
*How do Sunnis view the Maronite community? 
*How do Shi’as view the Maronite community? 
*How do Druze view the Maronite community? 
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*How do Orthodox Christians view the Maronite community? 
*How do Armenians view the Maronite community? 
P.S: Although a similar question was asked before, the previous question was about the 
individual whereas this question is about the collective community as a whole. It is also 
intentionally towards the end of the interview, so as to avoid the canned response given 
earlier for the 'individual' Maronite. 
Q 20 - Describe, in your own words, the Maronite Church.  
* How do the Sunnis view the Maronite Church? 
* How do the Shi’as view the Maronite Church? 
* How do the Orthodox Christians view the Maronite Church? 
 * How do the Armenians view the Maronite Church? 
P.S: With the Maronite church playing an advisory role to the Maronite parties, the idea 
behind this is to find out if there are implications on the segregation of the city? This 
question is also intentionally in this part of the interview, to avoid the canned response 
about the different communities and how they view Maronites.  
Q 21 - Is there a specific place in Beirut that, in your opinion, is essential to the Maronite 
community? 
* Does it shape / inform Maronite identity? 
Q 22 - Would you say Beirut plays a role in shaping / informing Maronite identity? 
*If so, what / how? 
Q 23 - Would you say Maronites play a role in shaping Beirut? If so, what / how? 
*Rights to the city. How does the community shape the city?  
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* How does the community exert its identity on the city? 
Q 24 - Can you tell me of a time when you felt most strongly about being a Maronite? 
 *Elicit memory and identity 
Q 25 - When did you first understand that you were a Maronite and others were not? 
 *Also, elicits memory and identity. 
Q 26 - What is your strongest memory of the war? Where did it happen? 
P.S: Only the Authoritative / Older group would be able to answer this. 
